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(13711)

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

A F G H A N I S T A N

PART X

JANUARY TO JUNE 1929

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting Afghanistan.

PART X.

[N 42/42/97]

No. 1.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 2.)

(No. 261.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, December 31, 1928.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 179.

I have received an enquiry from the Afghan Government asking when the arms will be ready, and whether they can be delivered on frontier at Chaman.

In addition, they have renewed request for supply of lorries referred to in my telegram No. 208.

[N 53/42/97]

No. 1A.

Government of India to India Office.—(Received January 2.)

(No. 18 S.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

January 2, 1929.

KATODON No. 248. Army in India do not possess 1-ton nor 2-ton lorries. One-ton Chevrolet and 1½-ton Ford lorries with pneumatic tyres could, however, be purchased at Bombay and Karachi in the open market. Cost of twenty-five of each would be 1 lakh and 75,000 rupees, approximately, f.o.r. Chaman. We are prepared in the special circumstances to supply vehicles free of cost as a form of assistance to King, provided Minister considers, after weighing the risks of putting ourselves in the wrong with the tribes at this juncture, this still politic.

Army lorries, 1½-ton solid-tyred, are available, but supply is not recommended, chiefly because of the disadvantages involved in too patently identifying ourselves with the Afghan Government in any measures of repression of tribes.

We believe that delivery at Chaman could be made within ten days of the taking of the decision.

[N 74/42/97]

No. 2.

Government of India to India Office.—(Received January 3.)

(No. 30 S.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

January 3, 1929.

KATODON No. 261. It would be difficult to conceive a more inconvenient season in which to be asked by Amanullah to make good our promise of presenting him with arms. On the one hand, compliance could hardly fail to associate us definitely in the tribal mind with his repressive measures; on the other hand, refusal to do so would deepen the suspicions of our bad faith over the rebellion which the Russians have been instilling into him. Apart from all other considerations, safety of the Legation is so dependent on the goodwill of the rebels, and not merely of the Afghan Government, that we cannot afford to let our help to the King take a form which is definitely provocative to the tribesmen. Actually, too, we do not believe that possession of more arms would help him. A well-advertised report saying that

we were presenting them might do so. But its immediate effect at the danger point, viz., round our Legation, might be to provoke the rebels to attack the Legation.

The practical conclusion thus seems that we should help Amanullah by the presentation of the lorries he has asked us to sell him, and we should be dilatory, as far as we decently can, over the delivery of arms which we promised him.

But difficulties and dangers inherent in implementing the promise of arms at the present juncture are forcing us to examine advisability of our seeking to liquidate the promise by a corresponding gift of cash. We should be glad of the Minister's views on this point in particular while we are clarifying our own. Line of approach with Amir might be desirability of avoiding inevitable delay over collection of arms promised, and fresh discussion of this nature might incidentally enable us to mark time without at the same time giving an impression of unhelpfulness.

[N 35/1/97]

No. 3.

*Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir W. Tyrrell (Paris).**

(No. 4.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, January 4, 1929.

GOVERNMENT of India telegram No. 3107 S of 31st December.

You should inform Government to which you are accredited of substance thereof, and ask them to instruct urgently their representatives in Kabul and consular officers in India to discourage and, so far as possible, forbid, by withholding passports, entry or re-entry of women and children into Afghanistan until such time as their return can be made without slightest risk to their safety.

His Majesty's Government make no claim, of course, to decide who shall or who shall not enter Afghanistan, but since rescue work has in present instance fallen on them and would presumably do so in any recrudescence of trouble, they think it only right that position should be explained to the Government to which you are accredited, who will appreciate need to reduce rescue work to a minimum, as climatic or other conditions may in future instance render it impossible to afford such wholesale measures of rescue as Government of India have been happy to afford on present occasion.

(Repeated to Kabul, Delhi.)

[N 76/1/97]

No. 3A.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.---(Received January 4.)

(No. 7. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, January 3, 1929.

ADDRESSED to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and repeated to India and North-West Frontier.

With reference to my telegram No. 5 of the 2nd January.

Umar Khan has family connexions with the Mohmands, and he may attempt to get through to them.

I received to-day, from a source in touch with Soviet Legation, secret warning that they are advising King to commit some outrage against British Legation with a view to extricating himself from his humiliating position. According to Soviet idea, Afghanistan would then be entered by British forces with a view to inflicting punishment, and King would be able to call the whole nation together to resist invasion by those contemplating the downfall of the country, and so divert attention from domestic difficulties.

According to my informant, the Soviet Legation have told King that he can count on active assistance of their Government, and, at the worst, an asylum in Soviet territory.

This report may be quite unfounded. But if Umar Khan enters Afghan territory and proclaims himself Ameer, there can be little doubt that this will be regarded by Afghan Government as evidence of British intrigue, in which case His Majesty's Legation may be placed in grave peril.

* Also to His Majesty's representatives at Berlin (No. 1), Rome (No. 3), Tehran (No. 4), Washington (No. 11) and Constantinople (No. 11), *mutatis mutandis*.

[N 90/42/97]

No. 4.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.---(Received January 5.)

(No. 12.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, January 4, 1929.

TELEGRAM from Government of India dated the 2nd January, No. 8 K.

In view of present delicate situation, I propose to inform the Afghan Foreign Office that lorries of army pattern are not available in India, but that fifty Ford and Chevrolet lorries can be purchased by Afghan consuls at Karachi and Bombay in open market; also that facilities for transport to Chaman by rail will be granted if asked for. Whatever financial assistance it may be politic for us to give to Afghanistan at present, I do not think it wise to give Afghan Government the opportunity of advertising to the tribes that we are presenting Amanullah with means of prolonging the civil war.

[N 90/42/97]

No. 5.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir F. Humphrys (Kabul).

(No. 5.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, January 5, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 12 of 4th instant: Lorries for Afghans.

His Majesty's Government approve your proposed language.

Following suggestion is tentative only and for your consideration. If Government of India agree, you might think it worth while to attempt to manoeuvre Afghan Government out of insisting on gift of arms by offering a corresponding cash credit (£75,000) for purchase of lorries and other articles, preferably not arms nor guns in India.

[N 6118/5456/97/1928]

No. 6.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir F. Humphrys (Kabul).

(No. 6.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, January 5, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 235 of the 26th ultimo.

You have full discretion to withdraw to India or to move mission elsewhere if circumstances, in your opinion, rendered either course desirable.

[N 136/1/97]

No. 7.

Government of India to India Office.

(No. 85 S.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

January 6, 1929.

FOLLOWING received from North-West Frontier, Peshawar, No. 3 C., dated the 6th January, 1929:—

“Reference Katodon telegram No. 7 of the 3rd January. My opinion has not been asked, and matter is not strictly within my sphere, but I venture to put forward following views, as I have been in close touch with situation throughout:—

“Position outlined in second paragraph of telegram quoted, quite apart from question of escape of Muhammad Umar, has long been recognised here as a grave danger. There were indications that Russians were trying to embroil us with Afghanistan even before rebellion started. During recent fighting our Legation was subjected to severe rifle and gun fire from Afghan troops. After discussing details with ladies of Legation and considering Minister's reports, I am quite unable to believe that this damage was all due to bad shooting or accidental. There is, I understand, no doubt that Russian Air Force, in particular, took active part in operations against rebels. To me the conclusion is irresistible that they were trying to do such damage as would force the British Government to intervene. Owing to good fortune and excellent arrangements made by Minister, they were unsuccessful, but any further fighting in the neighbourhood of Kabul will give them another opportunity.

“We should inevitably demand reparation if any members of Legation were killed, and under present conditions Amanullah would be unable to give it, and it appears to me that war would then be inevitable.

[20088]

B 2

"Our Legation in Kabul is thus a hostage to fortune, and, as I see it, the only way to escape danger is to withdraw Legation until settled government is restored.

"Russian infiltration would increase, and we should leave the Russians a clear field for the time, and, if Amanullah survives, our position in Afghanistan would be seriously prejudiced. If Amanullah goes under, as I think probable, it does not seem we should necessarily lose anything *vis-à-vis* his successor. To my mind, in either case, the risk is preferable to that of being forced into a war against Afghanistan."

[N 143/1/97]

No. 8.

Government of India to India Office.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 86 S.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

January 7, 1929.

REFERENCE my immediately preceding telegram. Wednesday's aeroplane carries personal letter to Humphrys, of which following is the gist: We recognise everything that could be said against proposal that Legation should withdraw in a position in which no other Legation nor British Indian colony nor Christian colony contemplated evacuation, *e.g.*, prejudicing of our relations with Afghan Government, removal of what constitutes greatest restraint on tribal excesses, creation of panic among Legations, and possible imperilling of whole situation. At the same time these are difficulties incidental to withdrawal in any circumstances in greater or less degree, and foreign Governments would doubtless follow suit if ever we decided on evacuation. At the other extreme, failure to withdraw until it was too late would be not merely personal tragedy, but incident in history of the Empire which in its developments might easily prove catastrophic. Hence Viceroy presses you for your views on various possible lines in order to help us to look them in the face.

P.S.—Above was drafted before receipt of Bolton's telegram No. 3 C. Our intelligence points rather to Russian desire to embitter Afghans against us while avoiding our being definitely embroiled than as suspected by him that Russians wish to embroil us with Afghanistan. As regards outrageous firing on the Legation, there seems scarcely sufficient reason for suspecting Russian hand in this directly. On our scanty information, firing seems to have been due partly to suspicions that rebels were actually using our buildings, partly to nerves, partly to gross lack of discipline, and partly, perhaps, to a feeling percolating from Palace circles that possibly British were not entirely innocent of all connexion with the disturbance. Your appreciation is awaited.

[N 135/42/97]

No. 9.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 8.)

(No. 21.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, January 7, 1929.

REFERENCE your telegram No. 5. Yesterday, in conversation with Ghulam Sadiq on the subject of lorries, I used language proposed in my telegram No. 12.

I hinted to Sadiq that my Government would be prepared to give some assistance towards reconstruction when the present confusion had subsided, provided attitude of Afghan Government was friendly. I gave him solemn warning about sanctity of the Legations and rode him off the subject of arms.

[N 237/237/97]

No. 10.

Sir F. Humphrys to Lord Cushendun.—(Received January 14, 1929.)

(No. 109.)

My Lord,

Kabul, November 12, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to transmit the diary of the secretary to this Legation for the week ending the 10th November, 1928.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Secretary of State for India and the Government of India.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure in No. 10.

Diary of the Secretary, British Legation, Kabul, for the Week ending November 10, 1928.

1. Military.

Reference paragraph 1 (c) of diary for the week ending the 14th July, 1928.

The Italians have got no forwarder with their work. The most they have done is to give occasional artillery instruction of a very elementary character to Afghan officers. They are bandied between the Under-Secretary of the War Office and the chief of the General Staff, and the final answer to all their complaints is that everything must await the arrival of the Turkish military mission, when presumably the Italians will receive a yet shorter shrift. According to Colonel Alberto Civalieri, the guns arriving in Kabul from Europe as gifts or purchases are stored with the dust of their journey still thick upon them and left to rust, like himself, forgotten.

2. Aviation.

(a.) The following flights have been observed during the past week:—

November 3.—A D.H. 9 A flew over Kabul for an hour.

The Potez flew over Kabul for 50 minutes.

November 5.—The large passenger Junker made two flights during the evening totalling 1 hour and 30 minutes.

November 10.—An air mail Junker left Kabul at 7.15 a.m., flying north.

(b.) On Monday afternoon, the 5th November, the King went for an hour's flight in the three-engined Junker in the direction of Jabal Siraj. The Queen was nearly persuaded to accompany him, but at the moment of climbing up into the machine her courage failed her. So many Europeans and Afghans assembled on the aerodrome for passenger flights the same afternoon that many were disappointed.

(c.) Four Afghan officers in the air force were handed their discharge on the ground that they had Russian wives. It now appears that they have successfully argued that they are in the civil and not the military air service. They have been reinstated, but will be confined to flying the mail Junkers.

3. British Subjects.

(a.) Lieutenant-Colonel and the Honourable Mrs. F. M. Bailey arrived in Kabul on the 7th November, where they are staying at the British Legation.

(b.) A deputation of Sikhs, comprised of motor-drivers and cleaners, called on the Legation on the 1st November with the request that His Majesty's Minister might intercede with the Afghan Government on their behalf to exempt them from wearing hats, as their religion required them to be turbaned. It now transpires that, after an abortive deputation to the King, the Sikh community in Kabul have agreed to wear hats. The Bureau Peshawar has been asked to warn Sikhs coming up to Kabul that within the city precincts they will probably be called upon by the police to wear hats.

4. Foreigners: Americans.

(a.) Reference paragraph 5 (a) (iii) of diary for the week ending the 27th October, 1928.

Miss Mott Smith, sustained by food parcels from the British Legation, has decided to prolong her stay in Kabul. Among other things, she has been known to give an exhibition of the dances of her birth-place, Honolulu.

(b.) Mr. and Mrs. Allen Isaacson arrived in Kabul from Peshawar on the 3rd November in their own car. They are on their way to America from China, but intend to return to Peshawar, pursuing their way westwards via Duzdap into Persia. They have solved the chief problem for tourists in Afghanistan by cooking, eating and sleeping in their own car.

5. Afghans.

(a.) A number of new appointments have been made, in some cases confirming and in others reshuffling appointments already provisionally announced. The following are the most important:—

(1.) Ghulam Sadiq Khan (W.W. 398) to be Foreign Minister.

(2.) Abdul Aziz Khan (W.W. 18), late Minister of the Interior, to be War Minister.

(3.) Abdul Ahad Khan (W.W. 6), A.D.C. to the King, to be Acting Minister of the Interior.

- (4.) Ali Muhammed Khan (W.W. 227), late Minister in Rome, to be Minister of Commerce.
 - (5.) Muhammed Sarwar Khan (W.W. 746), late Governor of the Eastern Province, to be Under-Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior.
 - (6.) Abdul Aziz Khan (W.W. 17), late Under-Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior, to be Governor of Mazar.
 - (7.) Azimullah Khan (W.W. 280), who was going to Cairo, now to be temporary Governor of Kataghan and Badakshan.
 - (8.) Abdul Shakur Khan (W.W. 158), late Hakim-i-Kalan of Badakshan, to be Governor of the Eastern Province.
 - (9.) Muhammed Sami Khan (W.W. 730), late Commandant of the Kabul Police, to be officiating Vali of Kabul.
 - (10.) Muhammed Akbar Khan, late Hakim of Laghman, to be Commandant of the Kabul Police.
 - (11.) Mir Ata Muhammed Khan (W.W. 266), late Chief Justice of the High Court, to be Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Justice.
 - (12.) Muhammed Akbar Khan, Judge of the High Court, to be Chief Justice.
 - (13.) Mir Muhammed Hussein Khan (W.W. 446), late Minister in Tehran, to be Chief Justice of the High Court for trial of officials.
 - (14.) Abdul Majeed Khan, Kabul delegate in the Council, to be Chief Judge of the Chief Court for trial of officials.
 - (15.) Gul Ahmad Khan, late Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Justice, to be Chief of the Intelligence Department.
 - (16.) Syed Sharif Khan, late Chief of the Courts in War Office, to be Investigation Officer in the War Office.
 - (17.) Sher Ahmad Khan (W.W. 773), President of the National Council, to be Chief of the General Investigation Department.
- Prince Hayatullah Khan, Mir Muhammed Hasham Khan, and Faiz Muhammed have retained their respective portfolios of Justice, Finance and Education. Abdul Hadi, late Minister of Commerce, has resigned and intends to stand as one of the representatives of Kabul in the new Council.

(b.) The Foreign Office has been reorganised into five main Departments as follows :—

- (1.) *Political Department* —Divided into three sections :—
Publication, Intelligence and Translation Branch.
Western Branch.
Eastern Branch.
- (2.) *General Department*.—Divided into two sections :—
Visa and Consulate Branch.
Accounts Branch.
- (3.) *Reception Department*.
- (4.) *Record Department*.
- (5.) *Information Department*.

Two sections are to come directly under the Foreign Minister :—

- (i.) Cypher Branch.
- (ii.) Special Correspondence Branch.

6. Jalalabad.

Reference paragraph 4 of last week's diary. Reports show that the Governor has not yet succeeded in satisfying the demands of the Mohmands against the Khugyanis. It is said that the offending Khugyani Malik, who is accused of abducting the Mohmand woman, has paid 15,000 rupees (Kabuli) to the Governor.

7. Kandahar.

The German railway survey party arrived in Kandahar on the 24th October and left for Herat on the 27th. One member of the party has apparently been left behind to complete the survey between Ghazni and Kandahar.

8. Afghan Press.

(a.) The forty-seventh number of the "Aman-i-Afghan," dated the 31st October, published a long diatribe against the Simon Commission under the heading "Political

Situation in India." The arguments follow the familiar lines of the extremist press in India, but special stress is laid on the complaint that India with all its natural resources remains poor because its wealth is wasted on increasing the army and making frontier fortifications against the so-called Red danger.

(b.) The same issue gives a reply to the Khilafatists of Bombay, who had apparently published an open letter to the late Foreign Minister to the effect that the present discarding of purdah by the women of Afghanistan would lead to ruin.

(c.) The "Anees" of the 13th October contains some very outspoken criticisms of the Shirkat Motor Company, which for the present has the monopoly of the motor traffic between Kabul and Torkham. The same paper publishes a somewhat anti-Turkish article under the heading "Afghans cannot be deceived," explaining the origin of the false rumour that the King wanted to give his sister, Kubra Begum, in marriage to Mustafa Kemal. The reasoning is so tortuous as to give the impression that *qui s'excuse s'accuse*.

9. Miscellaneous.

King Amanulla's recent ukases proclaiming the new model for Afghanistan have contained, among other things, an exhortation to his people to take an active part in sport and physical exercises. Towards the development of this important side of a modern nation's well-being the British Legation is playing a prominent part in Kabul. For several years past some members of the Legation have demonstrated their prowess at clay pigeon shooting in friendly rivalry with the aristocracy before the assembled crowds at the annual independence celebrations. Now in other forms of sport demanding more of the team spirit international contests have quickened the interest and stimulated a healthy desire for emulation among a wider circle. The Afghan Sports Club, a *chose pour rive* six months ago, is now besieged with applications for membership. In the matches between this club and the British Legation the Afghans are acquiring the sporting spirit, without which games become a curse instead of a blessing. But the gain is by no means all on one side. On the playing fields of Kabul, members of the Legation have the opportunity of coming into contact with young Afghanistan, and thus, while learning themselves to sympathise more fully, may perhaps by example lay some long-cherished bogey of suspicion. The King himself has asked for the measurements of a squash court, and the time is not far distant when every kind of sport will be found going in full swing in Kabul. This must have a civilising effect on a people whose physical activities in the past have been employed in sterner pursuits. The King paid a delicate compliment in a public speech by saying that the British were the finest race physically he had met on his travels. But if the Empire's reputation in these contests is to be left in the hands of the British Legation, it will soon be necessary, with the increasing standard of the Afghan, to hang a notice outside its walls: "Internationals only need apply."

L. W. H. D. BEST, Secretary,
British Legation, Kabul.

[N 238/237/97]

No. 11.

Sir F. Humphrys to Lord Cushendun.—(Received January 14, 1929.)

(No. 111.)

My Lord,

Kabul, November 19, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to transmit the diary of the secretary to this Legation for the week ending the 17th November, 1928.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Secretary of State for India and the Government of India.

I have, &c.
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure in No. 11.

Diary of the Secretary British Legation, Kabul, for the Week ending
November 17, 1928.

1. Military.

(a.) Reference paragraph 3 (vi) of diary for the week ending the 6th October, 1928.

(i.) On the night of the 13th-14th November, a detachment of Afghan troops got into contact with the gang of Bachai Saqao and surrounded them in

a house to the north-east of Serai Khoja. After a fierce fight, in which one soldier was killed and five wounded, the gang succeeded in escaping by setting fire to the house and leaving it by a hole in the back wall.

(ii.) On the 16th November nine corpses were brought into Kabul as a result of a raid by Bachai Saqao in the neighbourhood of Charikar. It is not yet known whether they were soldiers or civilians.

(iii.) On the evening of the 16th November, a body of infantry, about 1,000 strong, with pack guns left Kabul on the Charikar road.

(b.) Considerable disturbances have been taking place between Batikot and Dakka. It is reported that Afghan Shinwaris have raided a convoy and have burnt the Government offices at Acheen. The Kabul-Peshawar road has been closed between Dakka and Jalalabad, and the telegraph and telephone line has been interrupted since the 10th November. Authentic details are still lacking. Reinforcements left Kabul for Jalalabad on the night of the 16th November, but numbers and composition are not yet known.

(c.) The arrest of the Mullah of Tagao (W.W. 465) has been ordered, but has not been effected to date.

2. Aviation.

(a.) The following flights have been observed during the past week :—

November 10.—Five D.H. 9A's. flew over Kabul for forty-five minutes, three in formation and two carrying out what appeared to be fighting tactics.

November 11.—The large passenger Junker left Kabul at 7.45 A.M. flying east. Its return to Kabul was not observed.

November 12.—The large passenger Junker made three flights over Kabul totalling 50 minutes.

A small Junker flew over Kabul for thirty-five minutes.

(b.) Reference paragraph 1 (c) of the diary for the week ending the 8th September. Dr. Hanns Heinz Hagemann, the Junkers' representative, arrived in Kabul a few days ago. He has already interviewed the King, who is very keen on establishing an air mail line between Kabul and Tehran. Dr. Hagemann, however, does not consider that it will be a paying proposition without extending the line to India, and he has been putting out feelers as to this possibility.

(c.) The Afghan aeroplanes are now changing their identification marks. In the place of "Allah-o-Akbar" in Persian script under the bottom main planes, a bull's-eye after the R.A.F. fashion is being painted in the Afghan national colours—centre green, inner circle red, outer circle black. Four of the D.H. 9A's. have also been painted a light green.

(d.) A certain amount of building activity has been observed on the aerodrome, where at least four new sheds are in process of construction. It has not yet been ascertained whether these are hangars or workshops. In the meantime, the three-engined Junker still remains out in the cold.

3. British Subjects.

(a.) Lady Bray, Miss Bray, Colonel and the Honourable Mrs. Bailey left Kabul for Peshawar on the 12th November.

(b.) Reference paragraph 3 (b) of last week's diary. Although the local Sikhs are made to wear hats, Sikhs who are British subjects are not interfered with at the moment as long as they produce their passports or passes.

4. Foreigners.

(a.) *Americans*.—Miss Mott Smith left Kabul for Peshawar on the 13th November.

(b.) *French*.—The French Minister held a morning reception of his colony on Armistice Day, to which the members of the British Legation were also invited. The *Entente cordiale* was enthusiastically pledged.

(c.) *Turks*.—M. and Mme. Djevad Bey left Kabul for Peshawar on the 12th November *en route* for Turkey. He has been legal adviser to the Afghan Government in international affairs for the last year, and has been very helpful to the British Legation. According to him, the Afghans feel fully capable now to deal with international problems, but he himself cannot share that confidence.

5. Afghans.

(a.) Maulvi Fazli Rabbi (W.W. 342) has been arrested by order of the King in connexion with the Hazrat Sahib affair.

(b.) According to the Kabul municipal engineer, work on the new capital has been stopped owing to lack of funds. On the other hand, the King has been reported to have said that he will be installed in his new palace by hook or crook on New Year's Day (21st March, 1929).

(c.) Said Mustapha Khan has been appointed third secretary, Afghan Embassy, Angora.

(d.) Abdul Kadir Khan has been appointed first secretary, Afghan Legation, London.

6. Afghan Press.

(a.) The issue of the "Aman-i-Afghan," dated the 10th November, reproduces certain notes made by the new Kabul municipal president outlining various improvements to be made. The introduction of taxis, the fixing of the price of hats, the segregation of shops according to particular trades, and the registration of private servants are among the items of his programme.

(b.) The "Anees," dated the 29th September, but not issued till the 6th November, excuses its irregularity on the ground that the compositors' work is made difficult by the use of Persian type. Owing to the many different forms of one letter, it would require at least eighty compositors to bring out a daily paper of eight pages. After alluding to the advantages of Latin letters, the article concludes by saying that no daily paper can be produced unless the alphabet is improved, and appealing to the Ministry of Education to introduce the Latin alphabet into the primary schools.

(c.) The "Anees," dated the 30th October, attacks the "Daily Herald" for publishing a report from its Kabul correspondent that there is a strong movement on foot to offer allegiance to King Amanulla as Caliph. Heading his article "How the Water is made Muddy," the editor reads into this item of news an attempt to stir up differences on religious grounds. He denies that there is any foundation for the report.

L. W. H. D. BEST, Secretary,
British Legation, Kabul.

[N 557/237/97]

No. 12.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 28, 1929.)

(No. 113.)

Sir,

Kabul, December 3, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to transmit the diary of the secretary to this Legation for the fortnight ending the 1st December, 1928.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Secretary of State for India and the Government of India.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure in No. 12.

Diary of the Secretary, British Legation, Kabul, for the Week ending December 1, 1928.

1. Military.

Reference paragraph 1 (a) of diary for the week ending the 17th November, 1928.

Troops came into contact with Bachai Saqao's gang near Charikar, during which two or three of the gang are said to have been killed, and four men and one woman captured and brought into Kabul. On the other hand, it is said that Bachai Saqao has collected some 400 men and has joined hands with the Tagao Mullah. A bazaar story is going the rounds of Kabul that the robber chieftain got on to the telephone at Charikar and rang up the King, saying that the next time he met him he would kill him.

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It has been further reported that two motor lorries carrying soldiers to Jabal Siraj, acting as escort to Ahmed Ali Khan, who had gone there to enlist recruits for the army, were ambushed by some of Bachai Saqao's men. Ten soldiers surrendered and the others took flight; the lorries were burnt.

2. Aviation.

(a.) Unprecedented aerial activity has been in evidence due to the operations from the air in connexion with the Shinwari rising. It has been difficult to check and observe all the flights from the Kabul aerodrome; those flights observed are recorded below. Jalalabad aerodrome was evacuated in the afternoon of the 26th November, just in time as the hangars were burnt by the insurgents that night. There is a report, however, that two aeroplanes were destroyed with the hangars. The Russians now declare the aerodrome unsafe for landing. In the course of the bombing operations a number of Afghan soldiers were killed and wounded in error; it is reported that two Russian airmen have been dismissed in consequence. It has been noted that the rudders also of the D.H.9A's have been painted with the Afghan national colours, and their numbers in white on the fuselage. The three-engined Junker has been repainted in black and white with the letters Y.A.T.M.R. in black under the planes.

(b.) The following are the flights which have been observed during the past fortnight:—

November 18, 1928—

A D.H.9A left Kabul at 12:30 P.M. flying east. This machine returned to Kabul at 2:45 P.M.

November 19, 1928—

Six D.H.9A's left Kabul at 10:20 A.M. flying east. Four of these machines returned to Kabul at 1:20 P.M.

The large passenger Junker made three flights over Kabul during the afternoon totalling 1 hour and 5 minutes.

November 21, 1928—

Two D.H.9A's left Kabul at 7:20 A.M. flying east.

Three D.H.9A's approached from the east and landed at Kabul 4:15 P.M.

November 22, 1928—

— D.H.9A's were heard leaving Kabul at 7 A.M. but were not observed.

Four D.H.9A's left Kabul at 10 A.M. flying east.

Four D.H.9A's landed at Kabul at 10 A.M.

Three D.H.9A's left Kabul at 11 A.M. flying east.

Four D.H.9A's approached from the east and landed Kabul 12:30 P.M.

Two D.H.9A's approached from the east and landed at Kabul 2:10 P.M.

November 23, 1928—

A D.H.9A left Kabul at 9 A.M. flying east. This machine returned to Kabul at 11:30 A.M.

A D.H.9A arrived in Kabul from the east at 4:15 P.M.

November 24, 1928—

— D.H.9A's were heard leaving Kabul at 7:40 A.M. but were not observed.

Three D.H.9A's arrived in Kabul from the east at 2 P.M.

A Junker arrived from the east and landed at Kabul 4:40 P.M.

November 25, 1928—

An air mail Junker left Kabul at 10:45 A.M. flying north.

November 26, 1928—

A D.H.9A left Kabul at 8:30 A.M. flying east. This machine returned to Kabul at 11:30 A.M.

The large passenger Junker flew over Kabul for 15 minutes.

Six D.H.9A's arrived in Kabul at 4 P.M.

November 29, 1928—

A D.H.9A left Kabul at 2:10 P.M. flying east. This machine returned to Kabul at 4:30 P.M.

November 30, 1928—

A D.H.9A left Kabul at 8:15 A.M. flying south. This machine returned to Kabul at 9:30 A.M.

December 1, 1928—

A D.H.9A left Kabul at 7:40 A.M. flying north-east. This machine returned to Kabul at 8:20 A.M.

3. British Subjects.

Tasadduq Hussein, the King's chauffeur, met his death under suspicious circumstances on the 26th November. Although there are many rumours the affair is still a mystery.

4. Foreigners.

(a.) Considerable perturbation is arising in the minds of the foreigners in the employ of the Afghan Government in Kabul at the course of events in the Eastern Province. Many fear that, should the insurrection spread to Kabul itself, they may be identified with the King's reforms and suffer accordingly.

(b.) *Americans.*—(i.) Reference paragraph 4 (b) of diary for the week ending 10th November, 1928. The Isaacsons have been unable to leave Kabul, as they have only sufficient petrol to reach Peshawar and are unable to purchase more in Kabul to travel by the Kandahar-Chaman route. Owing to the cold they have been forced to leave their car for a house as living quarters.

(ii.) Mr. D. Fullerton, an American from Calcutta, who came up to Kabul at the beginning of the month for a short visit, is also stranded.

(c.) *Danes.*—Miss Maria Rasmussen, of the Dutch Mission Mardan, came to Kabul on a second visit at the beginning of the month and has been unable to return. The bazaar rumours at this time are naturally very alarming to a "lone lady" living in the Wali Hotel.

(d.) *Turks.*—(i.) Idris Sabih Bey, second secretary to the Turkish Embassy, left Kabul for Turkey via Chaman on the 24th November on transfer.

(ii.) Haider Ismet Bey, surgeon to Turkish Embassy, left Kabul for Turkey via Chaman on the 24th November.

5. Shinwari Rising.

Reference paragraph 1 (b) of diary for the week ending 17th November, 1928. The disturbances mentioned have turned into a general rising of the Afghan Shinwaris. This outbreak still remains uncrushed and is demanding all the resources of Government to cope with it. The salient features from the military point of view, so far as they have been ascertained from reports, are given chronologically as follows:—

November 15.—Afghan Shinwaris, led by Maliks Muhammed Afzal, late colonel in Afghan army, and Muhammed Alam, rose against the Government on account of their dissatisfaction with the King's reforms and corrupt administration. Achin surrounded and seized by insurgents, Government offices burnt, Treasury looted and eighty rifles captured from khassadars. Hakim of Achin, Sher Ahmed Khan, taken prisoner. Small garrison at Darband and pickets at Peshbolak and Basawal disarmed. Caravan looted and road closed between Dakka and Batikot.

November 16.—Night attack on Dakka repulsed with casualties on both sides, garrison losing one gunner killed. Wives and children of Afghan officials at Dakka evacuated to Peshawar earlier in the day. Kahi (see Military Report on Afghanistan, p. 564) invested by rebels. Reinforcements left Kabul for Jalalabad.

November 17.—Three lorries looted and burnt near Batikot. Dakka attacked again during the night.

November 18.—Colonel Syed Hassan, of Jalalabad garrison, went out to parley with insurgents, but was turned back unsuccessful after being deprived of his revolver. Three motors containing troops, rifles and ammunition reached Dakka from Jalalabad. Dakka again attacked during the night. Investment of Kahi Fort made closer, water supply being cut off. One aeroplane (D.H.9A) flew from Kabul to Jalalabad and then over Shinwari country, and returned without landing, after dropping pamphlets on rebels to the effect that they should stop fighting or their blood would be on their own heads.

November 19.—Six aeroplanes (D.H.9A), manned by Russians and Afghans, left Kabul and dropped bombs on Shinwari concentrations. Two landed at Jalalabad and the remainder returned to Kabul. Shinwaris made efforts to induce Mohmands to join them, but Mohmands held back by Chaknawar Mullah pending his representations to the King. Mohmands picketing road in sections between Hazarnao and Batikot, and villagers in neighbourhood armed with rifles brought in motor cars from Jalalabad.

November 20.—Kahi Fort taken by Shinwaris, who suffered over forty killed in the assault. Garrison disarmed but allowed to go free, except the commanding officer. Over 400 Martini-Henry rifles captured. One aeroplane flew over Shinwari area from Jalalabad and returned to Jalalabad.

November 21.—One aeroplane from Jalalabad flew over Shinwari country at midday, and in the evening five aeroplanes, three from Kabul and two from Jalalabad, dropped bombs on Shinwaris. Three aeroplanes returned to Kabul. General Mahmud Sami left for Jalalabad, together with a contingent of infantry and several batteries of pack and field guns. Two companies of regulars reached Dakka from Jalalabad. Hakim of Achin released by rebels on a ransom of 500 rupees (Kabuli). Fall of Kahi led to wild rumours in Kabul that Jalalabad had been plundered.

November 22.—Nine aeroplanes flew from Kabul over Shinwari country throwing bombs on Shinwari villages. Five landed at Jalalabad and four returned to Kabul. Two more subsequently returned to Kabul from Jalalabad.

November 23.—Mobilisation orders issued by War Office calling up reservists of the Northern Command for temporary service. *Moral* of regular troops in Jalalabad reported to be bad. Ahmed Ali Khan, the new President of Kabul Municipality, appointed president of an executive committee to raise recruits for the army in the Northern Province. Sher Ahmed Khan, President of the Council, appointed to look after the general administration of the Eastern Province, and left Kabul for Jalalabad. British Legation lorry in an attempt to get through from Peshawar to Kabul was turned back by insurgents near Hazarnao. An Afghan lorry was captured at the same time.

November 24.—Eight aeroplanes flew over the Shinwari area from Kabul and returned. Approach of body of tribesmen led to alarm in Jalalabad that city was going to be attacked, but they turned out to be friendly Khugyanis coming to offer their services against the Shinwaris. Governor of Jalalabad busy enlisting friendly tribesmen. Attack on Hazarnao Village repelled with casualties on both sides, including three Afridi volunteers among the villagers. Ghulam Sadiq, Afghan Foreign Minister, sent by King to Jalalabad to deal with situation.

November 25.—Situation unchanged.

November 26.—Martial law proclaimed in Jalalabad. British consul requested by local authorities to move into the city for greater security, but remained at his post till further orders from Kabul. Sher Ahmed Khan sent leading men of friendly tribes at Jalalabad to parly with Shinwaris. Six aeroplanes returned from Jalalabad to Kabul in the evening. Hangars on Jalalabad aerodrome burnt by the rebels during the night. Two aeroplanes are said to have been destroyed in the hangars.

November 27.—The Foreign Minister reported to have gone to Batikot to interview a Shinwari jirga and not to have returned. Aerial visibility bad owing to low clouds and rain.

November 28.—Concentration of insurgents in the neighbourhood of Jalalabad. Aerial visibility still bad. Feverish preparations in Kabul to strengthen the front. Cartridge manufacture section of the Government arsenal working day and night. Lorries commandeered to take troops and supplies to Jalalabad. School boys appealed to by Minister for War to help their King and country in this crisis; 200 volunteered their services.

November 29.—Situation at Jalalabad worse for Government. Mohmands, though outwardly neutral, ready to join in looting, and Khugyanis are wavering. Rifles and ammunition handed out to so-called loyal tribes are being sold by recipients to any buyer. Skirmishes between hostile and friendly tribesmen, but regular troops kept aloof within city walls of Jalalabad. All Europeans evacuated from Jalalabad. 1,000 Hazara recruits arrived in Kabul.

November 30.—Jalalabad now closely invested by rebels. King's palace and other buildings on the outskirts of Jalalabad set on fire and some twenty lorries burnt in a serai. Mangal levies arrived in Jalalabad, but loyalty doubtful. Mohmands more openly against Government. Hostile gangs now operating on Kabul side of Jalalabad, cutting telegraph line and holding up traffic. British consulate, Jalalabad, reported untouched. The Yawar Mahmud Jan has been sent to Nimla to assist in negotiations with rebels. King has ordered bombing from the air to be stopped.

6. Communications.

(a.) The telephone and telegraph line between Dakka and Jalalabad was cut some days before the Shinwari rising. The rebels subsequently destroyed a number of telegraph poles and lengths of line. Intermittent communication has been established by field telegraph, but general traffic by this route has not yet been resumed. The line between Kabul, Kandahar and Quetta has been operating fairly well with occasional interruptions. The bulk of the telegraphic communications has been dealt with by the Kabul wireless station working with Peshawar in a commendable fashion.

(b.) The road between Jalalabad and Dakka was closed at the commencement of the rising. It was opened again a few days later, apparently owing to picketing of the threatened sections by Mohmand tribes under the orders of the Chaknawar Mullah. The Afghan mail lorry got through to Peshawar and back during this interval. The road was then closed again, probably owing to the withdrawal of the Mohmands from picketing, and has remained closed for all traffic except occasional Afridi owned and driven lorries which are allowed through unmolested. The route to India via Kandahar and Chaman has been used extensively, but it is now reported that a gang of robbers is openly operating on the Kandahar-Chaman section and holding up the traffic.

7. Afghan Press.

Following on the Shinwari outbreak, the Government have been managing the two chief organs of the press in Kabul—the “Aman-i-Afghan” and the “Anees”—in the most up-to-date fashion. Both papers have been issuing special editions giving the latest news from the front, and the writing-up of the good reports and the explaining away of the bad recall the best efforts of the various combatants newspapers during the Great War. The way in which the Government realise the importance of propaganda can be judged from the fact that the walls of even small villages in the neighbourhood of Kabul are plastered with broadsheets from these two inspired journals.

L. W. H. D. BEST, *Secretary,*
British Legation, Kabul.

[N 241/1/97]

No. 13.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 14, 1929.)

(No. 116.)

HIS Majesty's Minister, Kabul, presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of correspondence with the Acting Afghan Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting the Afghan proposal for the evacuation of the British Legation, Kabul.

Kabul, December 25, 1928.

Enclosure 1 in No. 13.

Aqai Mirza Muhammad Khan to Sir F. Humphrys.

Kabul, 1st Jidi 1307 (December 22, 1928).

IN reply to your Excellency's letter, I have the greatest honour to state that we were very sorry to see that the centre of the rebels was in the neighbourhood of the Legation, and that the Government forces, which were obliged to dislodge them, were forced to fire on them in the course of battle, and that the shock of the gun and rifle fire must have caused great trouble to the honourable members of the Legation. We express regrets for the occurrence of this and for the trouble caused.

The Foreign Office has understood the arrival of the aeroplanes of the British Government and their flight in the atmosphere of Afghanistan, and does not attach any importance to it on account of the friendly relations (which exist) between the two Governments. (It is evident) that the defection of the wireless and the non-receipt of news in India have been responsible for these actions, and that these steps cannot cause any ill-feelings. It was due to these feelings that, when one aeroplane was damaged and landed at the Sherpur landing-ground, the headquarters of the Afghan air force treated the men in a most friendly manner and received them like a dear

guest. They have been sent to the Legation to-day. Until the telegraph (service) is restored there will be no objection if in future also other aeroplanes came to Kabul for the news of the Legation, and the headquarters of the air force agrees to their flight. We entirely agree with (the proposal) of the sending of the ladies of the Legation and the coming to Kabul of the big aeroplane. On the basis of the discussion with Ghulam Yahya Khan, mudcer in charge of the General Political Section of the Foreign Office, held with your Excellency to-day, intimation regarding the despatch of telegrams, the delivery of answers received, and the arrangements which the War Office would like to make regarding the despatch of the honourable ladies will be communicated to your Excellency.

In the end, supporting the discussion held with your Excellency to-day by the said mudcer, it is requested that [sic] the proposal by him it will be very much better if your Excellency and the other members of the Legation moved into the Café Wali until the disturbance is over, because the rebels continue to attack and your presence in the Legation is a great obstacle for the Government forces. So much so that great difficulties have been caused on this score. However, if you do not agree to leave the Legation, in that case, on account of the insistence of the War Office, we will be obliged if you will permit a military force to stay inside the Legation so that the said force may protect the Legation and prevent the rebels from taking hostile steps against the Legation. It is trusted that your Excellency will agree to these proposals, which are in accord with the universal practice in vogue and which are very useful for the protection of the Legation, and that you will either change your place of residence or permit that a military force should stay round the Legation compound inside its walls.

MIRZA MUHAMMAD KHAN,
Officiating Foreign Minister.

Enclosure 2 in No. 13.

Sir F. Humphrys to Aqai Mirza Muhammad Khan.

My dear Minister,

Kabul, December 24, 1928.

YOUR Excellency's letter of the 22nd December was received by me on the 23rd, and I have the honour to make the following observations:—

1. The very extensive and unnecessary damage to the Legation buildings which has been caused almost entirely by the shell and rifle fire of the Afghan Government forces has been reported to His Britannic Majesty's Government and will later form the subject of a separate letter.
2. The proposal that the members of the British Legation should move to the Hotel Wali has already been rejected by me in conversation with Mr. Ghulam Yahya. It is not the practice of His Britannic Majesty's Ministers to quit their Legation without orders from their own Government.
3. The alternative suggestion that a military force should be allowed to reside inside the Legation was also rejected by me. On the one hand, it has been my chief concern from the beginning of the fighting to exclude all combatant forces from British territory, and, on the other, the protection of the Legation can be most effectively secured from the buildings outside its grounds.

I have been obliged to protest on several occasions during the last few days against the unauthorised trespass of Government forces within the Legation grounds. It is clear that their presence might easily lead to fighting taking place on British soil.

4. It gives me pleasure, on the other hand, to acknowledge with grateful thanks the courtesy of the Afghan Government in allowing British aeroplanes to land at Sherpur, and the assistance which has been given by the Afghan air force to facilitate the evacuation of the ladies and children of the British Legation and other foreigners by British aeroplanes to India, and their kind treatment of Flying Officer Trusk.

I wish also to express my thanks to General Muhammad Hasham for his kind assistance in the evacuation of the British Legation ladies.

I avail, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[N 221/1/97]

No. 14.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 35.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, January 13, 1929.

GOVERNMENT of India's telegram, dated the 7th January, No. 86 S. I consider shelling of Legation was result of (1) gross inefficiency. I myself watched through field-glass the artillery firing in an incredibly haphazard manner. (2) Callous indifference, common characteristic of the Afghan in siting guns so that Legation was in direct line of fire with the target.

I do not think hits on Legation were deliberate, and most of them could not have been observed from soldiers in gun emplacement owing to intervention of trees. On the other hand, many rifle shots fired into Legation were deliberate. These chiefly came from a building held by undisciplined Mangals. It was observed that these men shot down many Royal cavalry who were on their own side.

I have no reason to suspect that any of the shooting into Legation was done under orders from Afghan officers.

No. 15.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 39.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, January 14, 1929.

GOVERNMENT of India's telegram dated the 7th January, No. 86 S, and your telegram of the 5th instant, No. 6. Personal judgment and my instinct prompt me to remain in Kabul so long as King Amanullah is able to maintain his authority there or so long as there is a reasonable prospect that Amanullah will be succeeded by a member of his family who could command approval and confidence of Afghan people and would therefore be worthy of recognition by His Majesty's Government. In other words for so long as a diplomatic mission can perform its proper function. On general grounds a strong reason for remaining is that in the view of vast majority of Afghans who live south of Hindu Kush, British Legation is the only Legation that counts. People of Kabul have some sense of security and stability so long as Union Jack is seen to be flying over Legation. In my opinion withdrawal of this Legation would precipitate Amanullah's fall and lead to chaos, panic and, possibly, massacre. It follows that previous withdrawal of British Legation would involve my colleagues and their colonies in considerable danger.

I should remain until hope of stable Government in Afghanistan can no longer reasonably be entertained if question of withdrawal is left to my unfettered discretion. If and when moment for withdrawal had arrived I should first superintend evacuation by air of all British subjects and foreigners for whom arrangements could be made and who applied to go. Then, after sending away British Legation staff, I would remain myself to hand over property of His Majesty's Legation and buildings to custody of Afghan Government. I do not regard it as feasible, apart from consideration of courtesy, for British Legation to go first, since we could not face risk of sending up aeroplanes to evacuate British subjects and foreigners unless His Majesty's Legation was here to send signals and make arrangements.

In order to be ready for the emergency, should it arise, I suggest His Majesty's Government should at once address French, German, Italian, Turkish and Persian Governments and ask them to instruct their representatives at Kabul in following sense:—

"Should situation in Afghanistan (which appears to be incalculable) necessitate His Britannic Majesty's Government to withdraw their Legation from Kabul to India, opportunity would first be given to foreign Legations to evacuate to India their staffs and nationals by British aeroplanes if weather conditions permitted; evacuation of non-diplomatic foreigners would be subject to claims of British nationals. British Legation would be withdrawn when arrangements for evacuation were completed. You should, without delay, submit your final lists to British Minister. If arrangements can be made, and if so desired, His Britannic Majesty's Government express themselves ready to evacuate by air at once those who wish to leave."

2. It may appear that above formula is quixotic, but I wish to emphasise two factors in this difficult situation: (1) Except Persian, all foreign missions have several nationals with unexpired contracts with Afghan Government. For this reason, and also because they have been unable to notify their Governments of the gravity of the crisis, head of each mission is very reluctant to be the first to go. They all look to British Legation for a lead. (2) Solitary evacuation of His Majesty's Legation and British subjects would lead Afghan Government to suspect that this was prelude to declaration of war or that we had decided to back rival candidates for throne. Under these circumstances operation would carry more risk than if it was part of a general scheme for evacuation.

It therefore seems that if foreign Governments were informed that after decision had been taken to evacuate British Legation there would be no opportunity of evacuating their nationals and that they must do so at once or not at all, result might be that British Legation, when time came, would be only one to go, as my colleagues would refuse to leave their nationals. We would then be in bad odour with everybody.

3. I will telegraph as soon as possible exact numbers of staff and nationals of foreign Legations. European foreigners, including Legation staffs, number about 100; there are, in addition, about a dozen Persians and 35 Turks, excluding Kiazim Pasha's Mission. Many of these may not wish to leave. Number of British Indians in Kabul who would wish to leave is likely to be large. Total of Legation staffs fourteen *plus* several Indian servants. This is excluding British or Russian.

If Soviet Missions remain after withdrawal of others it is my conviction that they would be soon forced to leave.

I have weighed, to the best of my ability, arguments in favour of immediate withdrawal, viz., necessity to avoid, before it is too late, outrage on His Majesty's Legation, which might involve Empire in war, and futility of attempting to prop a throne which may be tottering to its fall.

It is possible that within next few days right moment for withdrawal to commence may occur. I am confidently of opinion that time for withdrawal of British Legation has not yet arrived. I am speaking with full realisation of heavy responsibility which lies upon me.

[N 268/1/97]

No. 16.

Shuja-ed-Dowleh Khan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 15.)

Sir,

Afghan Legation, London, January 14, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to state that I have just received the following telegram from my Government:—

"His Majesty King Amanullah Khan, in order to put an end to internal revolutions, which were the result of misunderstanding, has, of his own free will and expression, abdicated and renounced his claim to the Throne of Afghanistan. His Majesty has nominated his elder brother Sirdar Inayatullah Khan to take the conduct of the affairs of State into his hands. The representatives of the nation, the Government officials and Ministers, the ulema and the sirdars have all acclaimed Sirdar Inayatullah Khan as the King of Afghanistan.

"The foreign relations of Afghanistan with the Powers will remain the same."

I have, &c.

SHUJA-ED-DOWLEH,
Afghan Minister.

[N 310/1/97]

No. 17.

Government of India to India Office.

(No. 189 S.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

January 16, 1929.

KATODON No. 39. We agree, subject to modification in detail, in two matters:—

- (1) Our clerical and other staff, which would be of no use, but rather a hindrance, should be evacuated as early as possible. We, however, reluctantly recognise Minister's argument that effective portion of our Legation must remain till the last to control arrangements for evacuation.
- (2) Humphrys should not remain, but accompany his staff. British property is so well known that there is no need to hand it over, and even its complete loss would be trivial, compared to any avoidable harm to His Majesty's representative. We have much less margin to work on than if evacuation was for British colony only, as problem is one of evacuation of entire foreign colony, with British Legation as last to leave.

It is still uncertain what total numbers will be, but according to figures on which we are at present working, it looks as though operation would not be completed in one day, but spread over three, or probably four, days. Decision to evacuate must, therefore, be taken earlier and made on less immediate grounds. Opportunity might be lost if deferred to a point that might be safe with a one-day operation. Minister will doubtless take every opportunity to get men off as formidable size of population renders its depletion by prior evacuation by road most desirable.

Emergency evacuation will only be at all feasible if residue can be brought down to workable figure like eighty. We have already ordered that no more foreigners are to be allowed to cross the frontier.

Above was drafted before downfall of Inayatullah appeared imminent. We think it better to issue it as it stands, as situation is still so fluid.

Humphrys will doubtless, as opportunity offers, explore possibilities of prior or simultaneous evacuation by road.

[N 310/1/97]

No. 18.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir F. Humphrys (Kabul).

(No. 12.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, January 18, 1929.

YOUR telegrams of 12th instant, No. 39, of 16th instant, No. 53, and Government of India's telegram, dated 16th January, K 61.

His Majesty's Government continue to leave to your unfettered discretion the question of the withdrawal of the Legation.

See my immediately succeeding telegram No. 13 for text of instructions which I have suggested Foreign Governments (other than Soviet) that they should send to their representatives at Kabul. Draft proposed by you has been altered to include modifications proposed by Government of India.

As owing to breakdown of Kabul wireless it may prove impossible for these instructions to be transmitted you are authorised, when you are able to re-establish contact, to inform your colleagues that communication to them of these further instructions has been suggested by His Majesty's Government to their Governments.

It will be seen from above that arrangements proposed by you have been approved subject to modifications proposed by Government of India. In particular we agree that you yourself should not delay your departure until after that of your staff.

[N 310/1/97]

No. 19.

*Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir W. Tyrrell (Paris).**

(No. 28.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, January 18, 1929.

IF situation in Afghanistan, which appears to be inauspicious, necessitates withdrawal of His Majesty's Legation from Kabul to India, His Majesty's Minister has been instructed that, as far as possible, opportunity should be given first to foreign Legations to evacuate their staffs and nationals to India by British aeroplanes, should weather conditions and local situation permit. Evacuation of non-diplomatic foreigners should be subject to claims of British nationals. It is contemplated that in preparation of foregoing possibility subordinate members of British Legation will, as far as possible, be despatched to India by road if opportunity offers and foreign representatives in Kabul should arrange for those of their nationals who can do so to leave beforehand by road in order that as much room as possible may be free in limited accommodation in British aeroplanes for those whose duties necessitate their remaining to the last. British Minister and superior staff would remain to superintend arrangements for evacuation by air and would withdraw when this is completed. Foreign representatives should submit their final lists to British Minister without delay. If desired, and if arrangements can be made, His Britannic Majesty's Government are ready to evacuate by air at once those who wish to go. Please ask Government to which you are accredited to send instructions in the above sense to their representatives in Kabul immediately telegraphic communication with that capital is restored.

(Repeated to Kabul, No. 13.)

[N 403/1/97]

No. 20.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 64.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, January 19, 1929.

JANUARY 19, midday. Your telegrams Nos. 12 and 13 have been received to-day.

I am very grateful for unfettered discretion which His Majesty's Government has granted me.

As regards details, my telegram No. 39 was loosely worded. I did not wish to imply that I should remain here as a solitary figure, but that I should accompany the last batch of my staff. I should do my best to hand over the Legation to a responsible official in order to prevent any looting at the finish, but I should risk no lives to secure this. I shall lose no opportunity of prior evacuation by road of subordinate members of staff. Present difficulty is that none of roads into India can be regarded as safe.

Evacuation by air is only possible under arrangements with *de facto* ruler. My considered views, as promised in my telegram No. 53 of the 16th instant, will be submitted after I have been able to establish touch with Government of the day. It is said Mirza Muhammad will be appointed Foreign Minister. He was permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs under late Government.

[N 377/42/97]

No. 21.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir F. Humphrys (Kabul).

(No. 14.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, January 19, 1929.

A PERSONAL message has been communicated by the Afghan Minister from ex-King Amanullah asking His Majesty's Government to supply him with arms and ammunition to enable him to regain his throne. Message was taken to Quetta by a messenger and telegraphed from there.

Minister explained that Afghan people would never submit to Bacha Saqao, and that Amanullah or a member of his family would inevitably return to power

* Also to His Majesty's representatives at Rome, Berlin, Constantinople, Tehran (No. 13).

after a few months. If His Majesty's Government assisted in matter in return they would secure the lasting gratitude and friendship of the Afghan people. If His Majesty's Government desired, transaction would be kept entirely secret. A guarantee for repayment binding Amanullah or any member of his family succeeding him would be given.

In reply to an enquiry the Afghan Minister said that he was convinced that no similar request had been made in Moscow. He admitted that Amanullah's abdication was a sham which had failed to secure its object in placating the rebels, and would be cancelled now, or whenever Amanullah's family regain power.

It is proposed to reply to the effect that in view of King Amanullah's abdication His Majesty's Government are unable to supply him with arms or ammunition, but, before replying, I shall be glad to have any observations from you either as to form of reply or substance.

[N 399/42/97]

No. 22.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 71. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, January 20, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 14 of 19th instant. The following are my observations: I always suspected that Amanullah's abdication in favour of Inayatullah was a "Box and Cox" arrangement, more especially as it was known that Inayatullah did not wish to be King, and had only agreed to accept crown under great pressure. I have often been told by Amanullah that in time of trouble he would first appeal for help from Great Britain, and if that failed he might be compelled to appeal to Russia.

Although Habibullah is now actual ruler of Kabul, it seems to me improbable that he will be able to consolidate his authority throughout Afghanistan. If other provinces declare against Habibullah they would either select candidate (Nadir Khan seems to me the most likely) or candidates of their own, in which case Amanullah would flee the country: provided Amanullah could obtain assistance from England or Russia, majority would support him or a member of his family.

In either case, a disastrous war would result. In present circumstances it appears evident that we cannot give Amanullah help of any kind, and I would suggest, if feasible, that His Majesty's Government should communicate a warning to Russia of "hands off" as regards supplying troops or war materials to Amanullah.

2. I suggest that reply to Afghan Minister should take following form:—

"Abdication of King Amanullah has been communicated officially to His Majesty's Government, and nominated successor to the Afghan throne has surrendered the capital and is at present (travelling through India) on his way to join his brother, ex-King Amanullah, in Kandahar. His Majesty's Government are therefore unable to recognise authority of the Afghan Minister. London, to hold official communication with British Foreign Office until present obscure situation has been regularised."

I feel that a direct negotiation should, if possible, be avoided, as it would give Amanullah the opportunity for which perhaps he is looking to make overtures to Russia.

[N 420/42/97]

No. 23.

Government of India to India Office.

(No. 285 S.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

January 21, 1929.

KATODON No. 71. We agree with reply to Afghan Minister as suggested by Humphrys.

His suggestion that His Majesty's Government should communicate a warning to Russia of "hands off" so far as the supply of war material or troops is concerned demands very serious consideration. We ourselves feel that a warning of some such nature is desirable. But present and future conditions are so obscure that it would

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D 2

be highly dangerous so to couch it as to connote inevitable counteraction on our part if warning went unheeded. In view of the entirely different set of circumstances that have now arisen, provisional policy as adopted contingently last year will clearly need careful adjustment. Sort of warning we ourselves contemplate would be a declaration of non-intervention and neutrality on our own part as regards civil war in Afghanistan (which in any case seems desirable as a sedative to the public), and a clearly worded assumption that this would be the attitude of all other Powers. London press could no doubt be influenced to underline the assumption. It seems hardly possible to prevent the supply of war materials by gift or purchase from the Soviet. Most we can hope to do is to remove temptation from Russia to intervene by supplying troops.

[N 446/1/97]

No. 24.

Government of India to India Office.

(No. 299 S.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

January 22, 1929.

FOLLOWING telegram received from North-West Frontier, repeated Kabul, dated the 21st January :—

"A remarkable outburst of feeling has occurred in favour of Afghan Royal Family and against Habibullah. From Lahore northwards the Moslem press strongly condemn Habibullah, and yesterday a large meeting organised by Khilafatists in Peshawar passed resolutions against Habibullah and in favour of Amanullah (see my telegram of the 19th January, No. 67 N, regarding similar meeting of transfrontier men in Peshawar). As result of their meeting, Afridis and Mohmands have sent messengers to Orakzais, Wazirs and Mohmands [? Mahsuds] inviting them to attend a jirga at Dacca on the 25th January to plan a campaign for restoration of the Afghan Royal Family. Much as I wish to keep our tribes from interfering in Afghan affairs, I feel it is impossible to take any steps to check this movement. By doing so we would be accused of assisting rebels, and it would put us in the wrong, both with the tribesmen and the Moslems of British India. I propose, therefore, not to interfere if the Government of India agree."

Our views are being formulated.

[N 456/1/97]

No. 25.

Sir F. Humphrys to Government of India.

(No. 82.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, January 23, 1929.

JANUARY 22. North-West Frontier's No. 73 N, received this morning, raises issues of international significance. The following are my preliminary observations :—

- (1) The popular feeling against Amanullah is so bitter that I see no prospect whatever of his being supported by tribes of Eastern or Southern Provinces, who now hold key to situation.
- (2) Even only as Amir of Kabul, Habibullah will not last beyond spring.
- (3) Inayatullah is probably the only man available who could establish his rule over whole of Afghanistan, but he must insist on his brother's *bonâ fide* abdication and be willing to assume responsibility.
- (4) A popular alternative candidate would be Nadir Khan, if he were in country.
- (5) Ali Ahmad is capable of making a bid for throne himself. He might possibly succeed should Inayatullah refuse to stand.
- (6) Ghilzais, who have never forgotten they once furnished Kings of Kandahar and Persia, might put up their own candidate.

It seems to me most important that our tribes should hold aloof from all this turmoil of conflicting interests. If they give tribal support to any candidates it will serve as a ready excuse for the Russians to intervene with troops. To preserve neutrality of Government of India and in order to induce Russia also to stand aside, I would recommend that our tribes (who would be influenced more by hope of free rifles and loot than sympathy with Royal Family) should be clearly warned not to precipitate themselves into domestic conflict of a neighbour. Afghans should be allowed to choose their own King, and anything like general participation by British tribesmen with tribal standards should be prevented. It will no doubt be impossible to prevent individuals from taking some part in hostilities.

[N 515/1/97]

No. 26.

Government of India to India Office.

(No. 330 S.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

January 24, 1929.

FOLLOWING from North-West Frontier, repeated Kabul, the 23rd January :—

"Accession of Bacha Saqao has come as a profound shock to the tribes on both sides of Durand Line. Mahsud say that they will support any orthodox Mahometan, but with this possible exception all are opposed to Habibullah. Mahsuds have sent off 1,100 men under Musa Khan to Kabul, with what precise object is not known. Wazirs will not support Habibullah, but any orthodox member of Durani family. Tribes of Southern Province will not even consider Habibullah, and talk of supporting Nadir Khan. Among Afridis and Mohmands the news of the accession of Habibullah caused a marked reaction in favour of Amanullah. There are indications, however, that they would prefer orthodox member of his family. Shinwaris and other tribes of Eastern Province will certainly not support Amanullah, but it is equally certain that neither will they support Habibullah. They would support an orthodox member of the Royal Family or Nadir Khan, or even a Ghilzai. A Ghilzai movement is reported from Ghazni but has not yet taken shape, and Ghausuddin has not shown his hand yet. Thus, though Habibullah has obtained possession of Kabul, he has only the support of the Kohistan tribes and the Tagao and Kabul mullahs. The tribes of our own frontier and the Jalalabad and Khost Provinces of Ghazni and of Kandahar are all against him.

"I understand that Humphrys does not believe that Habibullah will last long as ruler of Kabul, but whatever period that may be, I consider it as morally certain that he cannot establish himself as King of Afghanistan.

"Notice must also be taken of reactions inside British India. Khilafatists of Lahore and Peshawar have held meetings in support of Amanullah. Former propose to send deputation to Kabul via Kandahar and Jalalabad, and latter a medical mission. It is probable that this movement is only intended to embarrass Government, and is also preparatory to a campaign of accusation of cause of rebellion. Loyal classes are disgusted at accession of Habibullah, and they would like to see restoration of Royal Family in person of some orthodox member.

"The aim of the Khilafatists is to incite our tribes to take part in civil war, and I feel I should have great difficulty in restraining them so long as Habibullah retains Kabul. At present there is no indication of ill-feeling against us on part of tribes, but the collapse of the Afghan Government may result in return here of Ajab and his gang, and a recrudescence of disorder in consequence. In the present atmosphere any rumour gains credence; for instance, at the moment, it is generally believed in Peshawar that Habibullah has been murdered by Ajab.

"General conclusion is that while Amanullah was regarded as dangerous to Islam, accession of Bacha Saqao is insult to Pathan race."

[N 492/1/97]

No. 27.

Government of India to India Office.

(No. 324 S.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

January 24, 1929.

FOLLOWING sent to North-West Frontier:—

“Katodon No. 82 Government of India recognise difficulties of restraining tribes effectively from taking part in Afghan civil war and great complexity of the tribal problem. It is clearly of the utmost importance internationally that we should maintain an appearance of non-interference ourselves, even if it proves actually impossible to prevent the tribes from so doing. Hence you should make it clear that Government would regard tribal intervention in the civil war with disfavour. You should do all you can to induce the elders to restrain hot-heads from embroiling the tribes in what is Afghanistan's affair alone. Possibly the present complexity of the situation, with the many competitors for power, may cause the elders to pause. It is most important to avoid as far as possible the danger you emphasise of our action being interpreted as anti-Amanullah. Hence you should at first remind jirgas impressively of what you said to them in the beginning against taking sides with the rebels against Amanullah, and might show that you understand their natural feelings at the misfortunes of the Royal Family. Your words should be carefully chosen, in view of the fact that it will be almost certainly desirable to give full publicity to what you say.”

[N 546/1/97]

No. 28.

India Office to Government of India.

(No. 305.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, January 25, 1929.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 330 S, of the 24th instant. His Majesty's Government cannot evaluate in every case local factors. It is recognised that Bolton will have difficulty in restraining our tribes, and also that discontented Moslems in India may use our non-intervention to attack Government, with results which may even affect internal political situation. Nevertheless, His Majesty's Government believe that the correct policy is one of non-intervention, and that this must be maintained, and it is our duty to take all possible steps to restrain tribes from interfering.

Situation will require careful watching, and we must adjust our policy to its development. Instructions contained in your telegram No. 324 S, dated the 24th instant, are therefore confirmed, and every possible effort should be made by Bolton to prevent organising of tribal movement across Afghan frontier.

Any symptom of attempts in India to use Afghan question for party purposes against Government should be reported to me.

[N 558/237/97]

No. 29.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain. — (Received January 28, 1929.)

(No. 117.)

Sir,

Kabul, December 31, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to transmit the diary of Mr. L. W. H. D. Best, secretary to this Legation, for the period ending the 29th December, 1928.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Secretary of State for India and the Government of India.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure in No. 29.

*Diary of the Secretary, British Legation, Kabul, for the period ending December 29, 1928.*1. *Attack on Kabul.*

A separate report has been submitted on the attempt of Bachai Saqao to capture Kabul and overthrow the King.

2. *Shinwari Rising.*

The situation from the beginning of December became very difficult to appreciate, and each day produced conflicting reports. As far as could be ascertained, the efforts of the Foreign Minister, Ghulam Sadiq, gradually succeeded in winning the Mohmands, if not definitely to the King's side, at least to neutrality. Negotiations with the Shinwaris were opened in great earnest and a loose armistice patched up pending a settlement of the issues in dispute. While immediate danger to Jalalabad was staved off, the position between Jalalabad and Kabul grew worse for the Government. A number of Khugyani sections decided to throw their hands in against the King, probably not so much for any actual grievances as for the hope of loot in the growing chaos around them. The road was blocked, lorries burnt and looted, bridges destroyed and, finally, Nimla was stormed and the buildings looted and burnt. Yawar Mahmud Jan, who had been sent there to negotiate with the insurgents, was reported to have been killed, but later information shows that he escaped with his life. On the 11th December Ghulam Sadiq arrived in Kabul by air from Jalalabad bringing the terms of the tribesmen for discussion with the King. Ali Ahmed, after spending some days collecting transport for food, money and newly-recruited levies, left Kabul for the eastern province for a final effort to stop the rebellion by any means within his power.

On the 14th December the attack on Kabul by Bachai Saqao cut off the British Legation from any outside communication, and no useful summary of the position in the eastern province can be added after the 14th December. The British consul, Jalalabad, took refuge with the Naqib Sahib of Bagdad, who lives at Charbagh, eight miles from Jalalabad. The British consulate is reported to be looted but not burnt.

3. *Evacuation by Air Operations.*

The evacuation by air of the ladies and children of British and foreign nationalities from Kabul to Peshawar commenced on the 23rd December. A Wapiti machine arrived over Kabul at 8.45 A.M. and, after reading the ground signals at the British Legation, landed at Sherpur aerodrome at 8.50 A.M. Three D.H.9A's landed at 9.20 A.M., and the Victoria, a large passenger-carrying machine, at 9.30 A.M. The ladies and children of the British Legation, numbering twenty-one, were embarked in the Victoria and the luggage loaded on to the D.H.9A's. The Victoria left for Peshawar at 9.45 A.M. and the smaller machines at 10 A.M. On the 24th December the Wapiti arrived at Sherpur aerodrome at 8.30 A.M., acting as escort wireless machine; six D.H.9A's arrived at 11.30 A.M. and five at 11.45 A.M., the Victoria at 12.15 A.M. Eleven ladies and five children with luggage embarked in the Victoria and one lady in each D.H.9A., making a total of twenty-seven in all. An unfortunate accident occurred to a German lady who walked into a revolving propeller; she was seriously injured on the head and the propeller was broken. After the substitution of the propeller for that of the machine which had been shot down on the 18th, the last of the small machines left at 2 P.M., the Victoria having left at 12.15 P.M. With a pause for a rest and refit on Christmas Day, the evacuation was continued on the 26th December. Four D.H.9A's and the Victoria landed at 11.20 A.M. and left at 12.30 P.M., taking away thirteen ladies and ten children. Snow fell throughout the 27th December preventing any renewal of the evacuation, and on the 28th December the weather conditions were still bad for flying, six inches of snow having fallen. On the 29th December the weather conditions were good and the snow was safe for landing. The Victoria arrived on the aerodrome at 11 A.M. and the Hinaidi, another large passenger-carrying machine, at 11.30 A.M. Both machines left with a total load between them of fourteen ladies and eighteen children, with baggage, at 12.50 P.M. Nationalities of ladies and children evacuated up to this date were: British, four ladies and three children; British Indians, fifteen ladies and eighteen children; French, eleven ladies; German, thirteen ladies and seven children; Italian, three ladies and

one child; Persian, three ladies and five children; Turkish, five ladies and seven children; Roumanian, one lady; American, one lady; Swiss, one lady; Syrian, one lady and three children; allowance of kit to be taken by each person was: For a lady 40 lb., for a child 15 lb.

4. Aviation.

The following flights have been observed during the past week:—

December 4, 1928.

A D.H.9A. flew over Kabul for thirty minutes.

A D.H.9A. flew over Kabul for twenty minutes.

Six D.H.9A.'s left Kabul at 12.15 P.M. flying east. Their return was not observed. These six machines were noticed as having been recently fitted with bomb racks.

December 5, 1928.

A D.H.9A. left Kabul at 8.10 A.M., flying north-east. This machine returned to Kabul at 10.45 A.M.

December 6, 1928.

A Junker arrived in Kabul from the north at 3.40 P.M.

December 8, 1928.

A D.H.9A. left Kabul at 12.10 P.M., flying east. This machine returned at 4.15 P.M.

December 9, 1928.

Two Junkers arrived in Kabul from the north at 10.45 A.M.

December 10, 1928.

A D.H.9A. left Kabul at 8 A.M., flying north east. This machine returned at 12.20 P.M.

December 11, 1928.

A D.H.9A. landed at Kabul at 11 A.M.

A Junker flew over Kabul for twenty minutes.

December 13, 1928.

A Junker left Kabul at 11 A.M., flying south-west.

December 14, 1928.

A D.H.9A. flew over Kabul for forty-five minutes.

December 15, 1928.

Three D.H.9A.'s flew over Bagh-i-Bala for thirty-five minutes, dropping bombs.

A D.H.9A. carried out reconnaissance over Bagh-i-Bala for thirty minutes.

December 16, 1928.

Three D.H.9A.'s flew over Bagh-i-Bala for twenty-five minutes dropping bombs.

December 17, 1928.

Two D.H.9A.'s flew over Bagh-i-Bala on reconnaissance for twenty-five minutes.

December 18, 1928.

A D.H.9A. flew over Kabul for twenty minutes.

A further record of flights from the 18th to the end of December is contained in a special report by F/O. Trusk, R.A.F.

5. British Subjects.

The following left Kabul by air on the 23rd December for Peshawar: Lady Humphrys, Mrs. Gould and two children, Mrs. Stranger and one child, Miss Pulford, Mrs. Mahbub Ali Khan, and the wives and children of the Indian staff of the Legation.

Captain Nicholls and Sergeant Peters arrived in Kabul by air from Peshawar on the 23rd December.

Captain Nicholls left Kabul for Peshawar by air on the 29th December.

Major C. E. T. Erskine, C.I.E., D.S.O., M.C., arrived in Kabul by air from Peshawar on the 29th December to take over his duties of Military Attaché.

Up to and including the 29th December, thirty-two women and children, British Indian subjects, were evacuated by air from Kabul to Peshawar.

6. Foreigners.

(a.) *American*.—Reference paragraph 3 (b) of diary for the fortnight ending the 1st December, 1928. Mrs. Isaacson left Kabul by air for Peshawar on the 26th December. Mr. Fullerton left Kabul for Kandahar on the 23rd November, and left Kandahar for Chaman on the 27th November.

(b.) *Egyptians*.—His Excellency Hassan Nachat, Egyptian Minister, Tehran, arrived in Kabul from Tehran by air, via Meshed, Herat and Kandahar, on the 5th December to exchange ratifications of Afghan-Egyptian treaty. He left Kabul as hurriedly as possible by air to Kandahar on the 13th December, intending to travel to Quetta by car from Kandahar. He had no illusions as to the utility of the treaty to either country concerned.

(c.) *French*.—The following left Kabul by air to Peshawar on the 24th December: Mlle. Feit, Mlle. Penin, Mme. Lafond, Mme. Boinet, Mme. Beaudot, Mme. Boudet, Mlle. Colin, Mme. Ott, and Mme. Chassignon.

(d.) *German*.—(i.) The following left Kabul by air to Peshawar on the 24th December: Mrs. Harten and two children, Mrs. Iven, Miss Iven, three Perron children, Mrs. Schmidt, Mrs. Thomas, Mrs. Standke, Mrs. Manger, Mrs. Herbordt, Mrs. Bucholtz, Mrs. Blaich, Mrs. Ellifelt. On the 26th December: Mrs. Christenn and child. On the 29th December: Mrs. Leibig and child, Miss Mittlestrass and Mrs. Strommetzler.

(ii.) Reference paragraph 2 (b) of diary for the week ending the 17th November, 1928. Dr. Hagemann signed an agreement with the King at the beginning of December. He was not optimistic about an early start of the proposed air service, as he thought it quite probable that the Afghan Government would not be able to fulfil the financial conditions stated in the agreement. After an anxious delay he succeeded in leaving Kabul by air for Kandahar on the 22nd December.

(e.) *Italian*.—The following left Kabul by air for Peshawar on the 26th December: Miss Baroni and child, and Miss Romagnoli. On the 29th December: Mme. Cecchi.

(f.) *Roumanian*.—Mme. Vorabchievici left Kabul for Peshawar by air on the 24th December.

(h.) *Persians*.—The following left Kabul for Peshawar by air on the 26th December: Mme. Fatmah Khanam and three children, Mme. Ziban Nessa and two children, and Mme. Baman Ardjomand.

(i.) *Swiss*.—Mlle. Wildi left Kabul for Peshawar by air on the 24th December.

(j.) *Turks*.—The following left Kabul for Peshawar by air on the 26th December: Mme. Halit Asaf and three children, Mme. Mekki and one child. On the 29th December: Mme. Tewfik Bey and one child, Mme. Meziat and two children, and Mme. Kemal Bey.

(k.) *Syrians*.—Mme. Selin-el-Haddeh and three children left Kabul by air for Peshawar on the 29th December.

(l.) *Danes*.—Reference paragraph 3 (c) of diary for the fortnight ending the 1st December. Miss Rassmussen left Kabul on the 23rd November for Chaman via Kandahar.

(m.) *Swedes*.—Reference paragraph 3 (b) of diary for the week ending the 22nd September, 1928. M. Mohn arrived in Kandahar from Kabul on the 17th November, 1928, and left for Herat on the 25th November, 1928.

7. Miscellaneous.

Major C. E. T. Erskine, C.I.E., D.S.O., M.C., took over the duties of Military Attaché from secretary on the 29th December, 1928.

L. W. H. D. BEST, *Secretary*.

[N 559/237/97]

No. 30.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 1.)

Sir,

Kabul, January 7, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to transmit the diary of Major C. E. T. Erskine, C.I.E., D.S.O., M.C., military attaché to this Legation, for the period ending the 5th January, 1929.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Secretary of State for India and the Government of India.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure in No. 30.

Diary of the Military Attaché, British Legation, Kabul, for the week ending January 5, 1929.

1. Military.

(a.) *Moral*.—Except for the Shahi troops, the *moral* of both regulars and irregulars of the Afghan army appears to be at a very low ebb. Men in uniform saunter round Kabul in small parties. They do not appear cheerful, nor do they seem to have any enthusiasm for the cause in which they are fighting.

(b.) *Movement of Troops*.—It has been most difficult to obtain accurate information regarding the numbers and movements of troops in the vicinity of Kabul. On the 29th December, 1928, a detachment under the command of Brigadier-General Abdul Rahim (W.W. 109) arrived in Kabul. The composition of this detachment is roughly—

800 infantry.
200 gunners.
300 cavalry and miscellaneous details.
200 camels (baggage and ammunition).
8 guns.

On the 31st December, 1928, a detachment of from 300 to 400 regulars and ex-regulars arrived from the direction of Ghazni. They have been located at Matab Kila (7 miles from Kabul on the Kandahar road).

(c.) *Operations*.—No authentic news of operations having taken place at Jalalabad or against Bachai Saqao have as yet been received.

On the 31st December, 1928, in a special issue of the "Aman-i-Afghan," a warning appeared that Kila Murad Beg was to be bombarded the following day. A mild bombardment did take place on the 1st January, 1929. The same paper states that 10.5-cm. French guns were used, and that nine hits were obtained at a range of 18,000 yards. (Also see "Aviation," the 1st January, 1929.) It appears impossible that any results whatever were obtained by these guns at the range stated.

(d.) *Pay*.—The pay of the troops in the vicinity of Kabul has been increased to 20 rupees (Afghani) a month. Rations are a free issue during the present operations. The King granted two months' pay as a "reward" to the troops engaged in the recent operations round Kabul against Bachai Saqao. Actually, this was merely arrears of pay and no reward.

2. Aviation.

(a.) A separate report on the Afghan Air Force is being prepared by Flying Officer C. W. L. Trusk, R.A.F., and will be forwarded as soon as completed.

(b.) The following flights have been observed during the past week :—

December 29, 1928—

A single-engined Junker left Kabul at 11.20 A.M. for Termez, carrying a small bag of mails.

December 30, 1928—

A D.H.9A left Kabul at 08.15 hours, flying towards Jalalabad.

A single-engined Junker arrived in Kabul from Kandahar at 09.15 hours, with a small consignment of oil.

Four single-engined Junkers arrived from Termez at 12.20 hours. One flew very low over the King's palace for about five minutes before landing. Three of these aeroplanes did not belong to the Afghan Air Force, and brought mails and petrol, but no passengers.

December 31, 1928—

The four Junkers that had arrived the previous day took off singly, formed wide formation and flew to Termez, *en route* for Tashkent.

A D.H.9A took off at 11.05 hours, circled round at about 2,000 feet, and landed again at 11.50 hours.

A single-engined Junker left for Kandahar at 13.15 hours with mails.

A D.H.9A took off at 15.45 hours, carried out a reconnaissance in a north-westerly direction, and landed at 16.40 hours.

January 1, 1929—

A D.H.9A took off at 10.30 hours, and carried out a reconnaissance in the direction of Kila Murad Beg. Plane dropped four messages on artillery situation on a hill 1 mile north of aerodrome and landed at 11.40 hours.

Two single-engined Junkers arrived from Termez with mails.

A D.H.9A carried out a reconnaissance in the direction of Kila Murad Beg for thirty minutes.

January 2, 1929—

A D.H.9A carried out a reconnaissance in the direction of Kila Murad Beg for one hour twenty-five minutes.

Two D.H.9A's took off at 15.00 hours, flew in formation in a north-westerly direction and landed at 16.15 hours.

January 3, 1929—

A D.H.9A carried out a reconnaissance over Kila Murad Beg for fifty-five minutes.

A D.H.9A carried out the same reconnaissance again. Returned over aerodrome at 12.00 hours and dropped leaflets over public gardens and Kabul city. Proceeded without landing over reconnaissance area again and returned at 12.40 hours. Total, ninety minutes.

A D.H.9A carried out a reconnaissance over same area for fifty minutes.

A D.H.9A carried out a reconnaissance over same area for one hour five minutes.

3. Bachai Saqao.

Nothing much has been heard of Bachai Saqao during the past week. On the 29th December, 1928, Brigadier-General Ahmed Ali Khan, the acting G.O.C. of the Koh-i-Daman area, left Jabal-us-Siraj and returned to Kabul via Tagao. The troops in this area are said to have surrendered to Bachai Saqao, who is in control of Koh-i-Daman as far down as Kila Murad Beg. An offensive against Bachai Saqao (Bachai Saqao's real name is Habibullah) is reported to be developing under the leadership of Muhammed Wali Khan (W.W. 841) and General Muhammed Umar Khan (W.W. 823), commonly known as the "Sur" General. The Hakim of Paghman, appointed by Bachai Saqao, who was arrested by the King's troops, was shot in Kabul on the 29th December. On the other hand, the King has released some forty followers of Bachai Saqao, who had been captured in the recent fighting. The King is said to have offered a reward of 40,000 rupees for either Bachai Saqao or Said Hassan, and 4,000 rupees each for any of the original members of Bachai Saqao's gang.

4. Afghans.

(a.) Ghulam Sadiq Khan (W.W. 398), Foreign Minister, at present on special duty and who went to Kandahar with the Queen, returned to Kabul on the 2nd January, 1929. His efforts to raise irregulars do not appear to have been successful.

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(b.) Sher Ahmed Khan (W.W. 773), who had been appointed G.O.C. in the Jalalabad area, returned to Kabul on the 29th or 30th December, after having handed over his duties to Shahghasi Ali Ahmed Khan (W.W. 214).

(c.) Shah Mahmud (W.W. 504) has been appointed Chief Administrative Officer of Kabul city up to the British Legation exclusive.

5. Russians.

Some Russian ladies have already been evacuated to Tashkent. The wives of Russian pilots in the Afghan Air Force may possibly be evacuated to Kandahar. The reason for this is that M. Stark has been somewhat embarrassed by their presence in Kabul since the Russian pilot was killed in a crash at Kabul on the 17th December, 1928.

6. Miscellaneous.

(a.) A relief fund has been opened for those who suffered in the recent raid by Bachai Saqao. The King opened the fund with a donation of 20,000 rupees (Afghani).

(b.) Petrol is almost unobtainable. The price before the closing of the Peshawar road was about 35 rupees (Afghani) for a two-gallon tin. From 80 to 100 rupees (Afghani) is now being asked.

(c.) News regarding the situation at Jalalabad continues to be reassuring, and the reopening of the road is said to be imminent. Nevertheless, nothing authentic is known.

(d.) The following were evacuated by air to Peshawar on the 1st January, 1929:—

Turks—

Mme. Nazife Aziz.

Mme. Arif Emin.

Son of Ismail Hakki Bey.

Indians—

Norya Begum.

Nawab Begum.

Germans—

Herr Wolff Iven.

Also two Royal Air Force fitters.

C. E. T. ERSKINE, Major.

[N 560/1/97]

No. 31.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 2.)

HIS Majesty's Minister, Kabul, presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of correspondence between His Majesty's Minister and the Afghan Foreign Office respecting the disturbances in Afghanistan.

Kabul, January 8, 1929.

Enclosure 1 in No. 31.

The Afghan Foreign Office to the British Legation, Kabul.

December 24, 1928.

THE Foreign Office has the honour to request an explanation regarding the arrival of two British officers, who arrived by aeroplane on the 2nd Jidi (23rd December, 1928), at the Sherpur landing-ground and who from there proceeded to the exalted Legation. What is the object of their coming and for what business have they come and what is their appointment, because the headquarters of the Air Force state that they were not even in possession of passports and had no papers regarding their arrival?

It is requested that full explanation be furnished regarding this matter.

Enclosure 2 in No. 31.

His Majesty's Minister to the Afghan Foreign Office, Kabul.

December 25, 1928.

HIS Britannic Majesty's Legation has the honour to refer to the note, dated the 24th December, 1928 (corresponding to the 3rd Jidi, 1307), from the Afghan Foreign Office, and to state in reply that His Majesty's Government, having received no telegrams from His Britannic Majesty's Legation for several days, despatched Captain Nicholls and Sergeant Perry by air, with orders to establish wireless telegraph communication between this Legation and His Majesty's Government.

Enclosure 3 in No. 31.

The Afghan Foreign Office to the British Legation, Kabul.

January 1, 1929.

THE Foreign Office wishes to inform the British Legation that, although the Foreign Office regretted the fact that communication between the Legation and the British official centres was interrupted during the disturbance in the Northern Province, yet it cannot regard it a reason for the flight of military and scouting aeroplanes of the British Government, and has the honour to point out that the flight of the military and scouting aeroplanes of the British Government, without permission and also via indirect routes, and, on the top of this, the distribution of many proclamations, the contents of which were not in agreement with the friendly and peaceful policy [existing] between the Governments of Afghanistan and Britain and which had a curious form, has taken place. The Foreign Office regards it as far from the principles of friendly and neighbourly policy between the two States and considers it against the prevalent international principles. These are steps totally different to international rights and diplomatic relations adopted by the States of the world.

The Foreign Office, therefore, cannot overlook the arrival of the military and scouting machines and the circulation of written proclamations, and therefore makes a protest about it in the name of its Government.

Enclosure 4 in No. 31.

His Majesty's Minister to the Afghan Foreign Office, Kabul.

January 4, 1929.

HIS Britannic Majesty's Legation has the honour to refer to note dated the 11th Jidi (corresponding to the 1st January, 1929) from the Afghan Foreign Office.

As regards the flight of aeroplanes, it is true that on the 29th December one large aeroplane, when on its way to Kabul for the evacuation of women and children, had difficulty in discovering the exact location of Kabul, and in consequence and entirely by accident and without intention went to the north of Kabul before landing. With this single exception, the Afghan Government can hardly have failed to notice that the aeroplanes, both passenger and also the D. 11. 9A machines used for the evacuation of women and children, have proceeded direct by the most convenient routes to and from their bases in India, and have selected their routes purely with the object of effecting the evacuation in the safest possible manner.

The distribution of leaflets was effected at a time when His Majesty's Government had for several days received no information, whether from His Britannic Majesty's Legation or from the Afghan Government, of the safety of the Legation.

The only other use of machines by His Majesty's Government has been for the single purpose of ascertaining the welfare of His Britannic Majesty's Legation at a time when all other means of communication had been cut off. These machines read brief messages, laid out on the lawn of the Legation, to the effect that His Britannic Majesty's Legation was safe. They were not capable of establishing regular communication or of ascertaining the situation in detail.

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E 3

It is sincerely hoped that the re-establishment of order will render unnecessary the repetition of such visits, which were considered by His Britannic Majesty's Government to be the only available means at the time of apprising themselves of the welfare of His Britannic Majesty's Legation.

[N 562/1/97]

No. 32.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 4.)
Sir,

Kabul, January 5, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to transmit a report of the fighting which took place between the 14th and the 25th December in the vicinity of His Majesty's Legation which has been written by Mr. L. W. H. D. Best, M.C., secretary of this Legation, who was acting at the time as military attaché.

Pressure of work in dealing with urgent problems as they arise from hour to hour has prevented me from writing a despatch containing my own comments on the events of the past few weeks and my estimate of the general situation. These I have attempted to convey in telegrams within the limited space available, and I shall take the first opportunity to supplement and enlarge my impressions by despatch. His Majesty's Legation has passed through a time of extreme peril without any serious casualties to British subjects, but very extensive material damage to buildings which were struck by sixty-six shells and thousands of bullets. I have to deplore the loss of two faithful Afghan servants, who were shot dead in the performance of their duty, while two others were wounded. One horse and one donkey were killed by a shell in the stables, and two horses were wounded. Another shell passed through a car in the garage. The members of my staff behaved with the greatest gallantry and many had hairbreadth escapes. One was shot through the fleshy part of the thigh, another had his face cut by splinters from a bullet, another was struck by a piece of a shell, while several had bullets through their clothes. A great variety of outside duties, such as laying out of signals for aeroplanes on the lawn, were cheerfully performed under a dangerous cross fire.

2. The ladies of the Legation, as Mr. Best has noticed in his report, splendidly upheld the proud traditions of their race. Their evacuation on foot through the battle zone during the hours of darkness was a perilous adventure which they faced without flinching.

3. On the whole it may be said with thankfulness that the pious wish engraved on the foundation-stone outside the front door of the Legation has been mercifully granted—

Stet Fortuna Domus.

4. A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Secretary of State for India and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure in No. 32.

Mr. Best to Sir F. Humphrys.

Sir,

Kabul, December 31, 1928.

I HAVE the honour to submit an account of the attack made on Kabul by the bandit Bacha-i-Saqao during the period between the 14th and the 25th December when the fighting took place in the vicinity of the British Legation.

For the last few months the activities of Bacha-i-Saqao have been reported from time to time in the weekly diaries of the military attaché and secretary. On the outbreak of the Shinwari rebellion, the operations of this bandit not unnaturally became bolder and more extensive. There was no reason to connect him with the rebels, but he was considered an opportunist ready to make the most of the chances that fortune might throw in his way. He might well be called the man of rumours, because he is the hero or the villain of every fantastic tale in the bazaars of Afghanistan. The events leading up to his attack on Kabul are, however, fairly clear in outline. He practically blocked the main road to the north between Kabul

and Charikar, but his efforts seemed directed only against the King and his Government, ordinary individuals and traffic being allowed to go free. This distinction was so marked that the Bacha quickly earned for himself a sobriquet akin to that of Robin Hood. The Government, who had hitherto not regarded the matter very seriously, were stung to stronger action. In the middle of November a force of over 1,000 infantry with some cavalry and guns were sent out to finish off this impertinent raider. The soldiers at first claimed success, but later news showed they made no headway, rather that some were deserting to this bandit. Later in the month Ahmed Ali, late Minister at Rome, was sent up north to recruit soldiers to fight against the Shinwaris. He, however, found himself immediately up against Bacha-i-Saqao, and so far from gaining any recruits was himself beleaguered in Charikar. Rumour even killed Ahmed Ali; but it also killed the Bacha. The truth was that the Afghan Government, hard pressed in the east, had to recognise a formidable enemy and resorted to negotiations. On the 8th December Bacha-i-Saqao was reported to have come to terms with the Afghan Government; he agreed to refrain, for a consideration, from further attacks on the troops and Government property, to assist recruiting in the Northern Province, and to send his men to help the King. This armistice was broadcasted by means of leaflets dropped by Afghan aeroplanes over Kabul City, and the "Aman-i-Afghan" broke out into rhapsodies over the way in which even the hearts of robbers were touched to help the King in his troubles. The full truth of this agreement is not yet known, but it seems either that Bacha-i-Saqao used this means as an artifice to secure money for himself and arms for his followers, or that something caused him to doubt the *bona fides* of the Afghan Government and to turn him fanatically against the King. He augmented his original band with a following of disaffected tribesmen from Kohistan, and with a force not exceeding 3,000 men made a surprise attack on Kabul on the 14th December with the object of killing the King and setting up an Administration of his own. The details of this attempted *coup d'Etat* are given in the form of a daily diary, which suffers from completeness owing to the close confinement of the members of the Legation within the Legation walls during this period.

December 14.

About 3.30 p.m., the fort on Bagh-i-Bala Hill, west of the Legation, was surprised and taken by tribesmen from Kohistan under leadership of Bacha-i-Saqao. King's troops in neighbourhood, including the Afghan guard over Legation, fled. The insurgents, numbering some 2,000 or 3,000, advanced on Kabul City past the Legation. Legation gates were closed at once. Tribesmen did not attempt to break in, and in course of a parley at the gate gave assurance that they would do no harm to the Legation. Heavy rifle fire was heard between Legation and Kabul up to nightfall, and it was afterwards ascertained that the rebels penetrated as far as the cavalry school and Sharara and had taken Sharara Fort. It was first reported that three Turkish officers found in Afghan Staff College buildings were killed, but this has been officially denied by Turkish Ambassador. It is said that complete panic supervened in the Palace itself. The tale goes that the King changed his uniform three times, then rushed out into the street pressing rifles into the hands of men and women, crying: "Save me!" There is little doubt that the raiders could have been in complete possession of the city and its defences if they had pressed home their attack that evening, but probably the very completeness of their initial success caused them to pause. All European staff with ladies and children were concentrated in Minister's house, leaving the houses to be guarded by private servants and orderlies. It was realised that no defence was possible against armed attack on Legation, and that reliance must be placed on appeal to the reason and feelings of any intruders. Communication with city and other Legations completely cut off.

December 15.

Fighting to-day very obscure. Rebels boasted that they had captured two more forts and that with the arrival of reinforcements that evening they would capture the Palace next day. Actually no change in the position appeared to have taken place. Bacha-i-Saqao's men reported to have captured the fort on the top of Asmai Hills, but were thrown out soon after. In the afternoon three Afghan aeroplanes took off from the aerodrome and dropped bombs on the rebels, including three near the crossroads 200 yards from Legation, and killed two men. The rebels established a cordon between the city and the Legation, and refused to allow any person to pass in or out. Movement within the Legation grounds unrestricted, though a

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certain number of overs from the fighting in front necessitated caution. The King's troops reported to be very apathetic if not actually in sympathy with the rebels, so that King was depending on his bodyguard, army officers, and tribal levies for the defence of the capital. Wireless messages from Peshawar radio station at pre-arranged time were received satisfactorily on long-wave set, but as Peshawar were unaware that Legation was cut off from Kabul, these messages contained news-items only. Short-wave wireless a complete failure for perarranged signals, but ordinary Royal Air Force messages in India were intercepted.

December 16.

The rebels made an attack towards the aerodrome from the Bimaru hill side without success. The King's troops advanced slightly, and the rebels seemed to be holding Baraki village. In the afternoon large bodies of tribesmen were seen concentrating on the reverse side of the hill immediately west of the Lulu Pushtu fort. The rebels said that they were going to make a night attack and take the fort, but if any attack took place it was unsuccessful. Two or three guns fired spasmodically from within the King's lines bursting shrapnel over the rebel positions and over the Chaman. In the afternoon Afghan aeroplanes flew over rebel positions and along the Charikar road, dropping bombs. Eight bombs were dropped on the Bagh-i-Bala fort, one securing a direct hit. One Afghan aeroplane, rising from the aerodrome loaded with bombs, stalled in turning and crashed in the Foreign Office grounds. The pilot and observer, both Russians, were killed; the machine went up in flames. An orderly got through with two telegrams to Kabul wireless station this morning, being escorted up to and from the city by a Bacha-i-Saqao's man.

December 17.

The position of the combatants on this day was very obscure. Heavy rifle fire all day, much of it passing over the Legation, and the first shells fired by the Afghan artillery fell within the Legation. At 3 P.M., two Europeans were seen lying in a ditch outside the main entrance of the Legation, one of whom was waving a German flag at the end of a walking stick. Rifle fire over that area was particularly hot at the moment, but the gates were opened and the two men were brought safely into the Minister's house. They turned out to be Herr Beitz and Herr Kotz, two Germans employed in Afghanistan. They had been sent from the German Legation at Bagh-i-Babar, by the back of the town, across the Chardeh plain with a letter to Minister from the German Minister giving the details of the ladies and children of the German colony, and requesting their evacuation by air if and when possible. They had no idea until they reached the vicinity of the Legation that the latter was so much in the fighting area.

About 4 P.M., a large number of rebels collected outside the Nauburji, a fortified village situated a few yards from the western corner of the Legation. A party of rebels came to the main gate and demanded kerosene oil, ostensibly to clean their rifles. After some parleying a cigarette tin lid containing some very thin oil was handed to them through the bars of the gate with the remark that there was no more in the Legation. The men said that the amount and type of oil was useless, and left the gate in a good-natured manner. Their attitude was not hostile, one of the party truly remarking that if they had wanted to take the Legation they could have done so three days ago. The rebels outside the Nauburji ordered the gate to be opened, and on the refusal of the inmates proceeded to light a fire to burn in the gates. The gate was then opened and the tribesmen took up their position within the Nauburji, manning the towers which overlooked every part of the Legation. All this time wireless messages to Kabul wireless station were being intercepted on the long-wave set, while Royal Air Force messages in India regarding preparations for flights to Kabul were constantly intercepted on the short-wave set.

December 18.

Signals laid out on lawn in white block letters in preparation for arrival of machines from India: "All well." "Do not land." "Fly very high." As communication with Kabul was cut off, landing of an aeroplane was useless, while, owing to the dropping of bombs by Afghan aeroplanes on the rebels, the appearance of any machine in the air was a signal for a tremendous fusillade of rifle fire by the insurgents who were surrounding the Legation. The day commenced

with heavy firing on both sides, and the rebels retired slowly on Bagh-i-Bala fort and Nauburji. Some 300 to 400 returned westwards across the Chaman north of the Legation under rifle fire and occasional shell fire; only two men were seen to drop dead. At 9 A.M. a message was received on long-wave set that a machine was leaving Peshawar at 9:30 A.M. (Peshawar time) to establish communication with the Legation. At 10:30 A.M. a British aeroplane (D.H.9A) appeared over the Legation at a height of about 5,000 feet, and after circling several times descended to 1,500 feet, and finally dived to within a few feet of the top of the Minister's house, dropping a message close to the northern verandah. During the dive the machine was hit by a number of bullets penetrating the oil pump and radiator. The pilot was able to climb high enough to send a wireless message to India that he was hit and then landed at Sherpur. The fate of the machine and the occupants was unknown in the Legation at the time. Actually the machine landed, and after the papers carried by the pilot, showing that he had come only for the purpose of establishing communication with the British Legation, had been examined, the commandant of the Afghan Air Force showed the British airmen every courtesy and tried to assist them as far as possible in the circumstances. The message dropped by the aeroplane was to the effect that the machine would drop a Popham panel with code and instructions for use, and that another aeroplane would come up at 1 P.M. and read the signals. As the machine had been hit before the Popham panel could be dropped, nothing more could be done than to leave the block letter signals as before. At 3:15 P.M. the second British machine appeared at a good height to the north; after one circle it glided down steeply and dropped a parcel on the lawn in front of Minister's house. Although heavily fired on the aeroplane escaped material damage and flew away safely. The package was found to contain a Popham panel with a letter to the effect that a machine would come the next day to read the signals. Meanwhile, the fighting developed in intensity round the Legation. The rebels retired into Nauburji and on Bagh-i-Bala, but still held the heights to the south of the Legation. At 4 P.M. the King's troops advanced to the main gate of the Legation. The fire from the towers of the Nauburji was too hot for them, and at dusk they returned to positions level with the eastern wall of the Legation. Before retiring they threw a package which was found to contain a Popham panel. Although no message, verbal or written, from the Afghans accompanied the package, it was guessed, correctly as it subsequently transpired, that this had been sent by the pilot of the machine which had been shot down. The code enclosed differed materially from that dropped by the second machine, but fortunately a wireless message was intercepted the same evening announcing that the second code was the correct one. At the end of the day's fighting the British Legation thus found itself between the opposing lines. Fortunately no rebels entered into the Legation grounds during the retirement, and, in the advance of the King's troops, only a small party of Wardak levies entered through a hole in the eastern wall. They endeavoured to enter the secretary's and surgeon's house, but were kept out by the Indian servants who were posted within. While they were parleying one Wardak was killed and two wounded by rifle fire from the Nauburji, and the party then retired from the Legation grounds. During the night the long-wave wireless set with aerial was removed from the garage superintendent's house and set up in the library of the Minister's house. Popham panel was also laid out on the ground and an "X" put out denoting the non-landing signal. King's troops prevented any messengers going through from the Legation to the city.

December 19.

After an unexpectedly quiet night, the battle did not commence with any vigour till 9 A.M. The King's troops made no attempt to advance, but confined themselves to constant rifle fire on the Nauburji. Afghan artillery started firing shrapnel and high explosive, presumably at the Nauburji, but most of it went into the Legation grounds. Movement out of cover by day became more and more dangerous and even at night risky. Communication, except by telephone, was now completely cut off from the oriental quarters outside the Legation main wall. British aeroplane appeared over Legation at 8:30 A.M., and the following messages were signalled on the Popham panel: "Peshawar W/T is being received." "We are confined to Legation." "Do not land at Sherpur." "Come again to-morrow." The block letter signals remained out on the lawn as before. The machine dropped leaflets and returned to India. The shell fire grew more rapid during the afternoon, and more bombs were dropped round the Bagh-i-Bala fort with little apparent

damage. All the buildings suffered direct hits, but fortunately no personnel were injured. Some of these shells struck military attaché's house, and about 3.30 p.m. smoke was seen issuing therefrom. A party was organised under the resident engineer to extinguish the fire, and despite a constant stream of rifle fire and shell bursts over their heads and in the neighbourhood the fire was temporarily got under. The party was deliberately fired on when leaving this house for the shelter of the Minister's house, but without casualties. About an hour later the fire burnt up again and the house was totally burnt by 8 p.m. Night fell with no change in the position of the combatants.

December 20.

Brisk firing all night at long range. Herren Beitz and Kotz left with an orderly at 6.45 a.m., to get through Afghan lines. Picquet of King's troops on east side of Legation wall refused to let anyone pass, saying they would fire on anything they saw in the Legation. The orderly returned to Minister's house to report, and was shot up on the way. The Germans remained marooned in the Chancery. Meanwhile, at 7 a.m., the superintendent left Big House to go to Chancery, but was fired on immediately he went outside the porch, getting one bullet through the fleshy part of the thigh. A few minutes later counsellor, trying to spot an aeroplane out of an observation window on top of house, was fired on, and his face was cut with shower of plaster and wood splinters from a bullet in the window sill. These incidents showed that King's troops were determined to fire on anything seen moving inside or outside the Legation buildings. All communication during the day outside Big House was stopped. At 8.30 a.m., wireless message received that one aeroplane was coming up about 9 hours (Peshawar time), also message from Foreign Secretary that he had returned to Delhi and sending his best wishes. Aeroplane appeared at 9.15 a.m. Messages in block letters on ground read "All Well." "Fly very High." "Do not Land." A white cross denoting "Don't land," also remained out. The Popham panel signalled figure No. 12: "Come again to-morrow." The machine flew round at fair height for several circles and then came low to drop message; not a good shot, landing outside water tower. Retrieved by Legation bodyguard. Man bringing message to Big House heavily fired on by King's troops, but escaped. Message was to the effect that a telegram had been received from pilot of machine which had landed at Sherpur, saying that, at the request of chief of Afghan Air Force, a machine might be sent up to Kabul to land at Sherpur; Foreign Secretary was anxious that machine should land; if Minister agreed a signal of two T's should be laid out, if not, a cross and also the letters "No"; an aeroplane would come up for answer in about three hours. Meanwhile, the attack on Nauburji developed. Heavy rifle fire was maintained by both sides, and soon after midday a gun started firing on Nauburji almost at open sights. A number of shells fell short among the garage and stable buildings, but, fortunately, no serious damage was done. One horse was grazed. The Nauburji towers were repeatedly hit, though still stood, despite being riddled through and through. The King's troops moved up along the lane the south side of the Legation wall, and arrived at the main entrance gate about 2 o'clock. As it was impossible to get on to the lawn from the Big House to make signals not to land at Sherpur, which Minister had decided should be given, they were prepared and laid out on top of the roof of the Big House. A parapet 2 feet high gave cover from rifle fire to a man in the prone position, and arrangements were made to draw the attention of the observer on to these signals by helio signals with a looking-glass. A message by wireless was received that a second aeroplane would also drop an Aldis lamp by means of a parachute. The second aeroplane arrived about 2.30 p.m. It flew round the Legation fairly low several times, and before leaving released a parachute containing lamp, which came to ground just within Legation walls on the north side in the vegetable garden. The machine, however, did not observe the signals on the roof, as was shown by its wireless messages, which were intercepted both on its outward and return journey. The signals on the lawn were correctly read. The attack on Nauburji now reached its culminating stage. Some half a dozen troops rushed a two-storied house overlooking the main entrance of the Legation under the wall of the Nauburji and captured one or two of the insurgents. A large body collected under the shelter of the main gates of the Legation, but were unable to advance owing to fierce fire from the Nauburji. The main gates were forced open in some way, but the troops were kept out of the Legation by objections from the Minister talking to them from the verandah of the Big House, reinforced by a stream of bullets from the Nauburji, which made any

advance across an open space between the entrance and any other Legation building very dangerous. The situation remained in the balance for about an hour; the King's troops not being able to advance then retired, leaving the men in the darzi's shop isolated. Seizing advantage of a slight lull, the main entrance gates were again closed and fastened. The King's troops made a vain attempt to swing in from the left flank, and an armoured car was seen waiting about one and a half miles back on the road to Kabul. The fire was too hot, and by 4 p.m. the attempt to take the fort this day was abandoned. During the fighting the watchman on the gate of the oriental quarters' compound, an Afghan employee, was shot through the head while observing the battle, being killed instantly. At dusk, the men isolated in the captured house fled into the old guard-house, and made their way through a shell-hole into the Legation grounds. Some of the party went back to their lines behind the eastern wall of the Legation at once; the remainder tried to make their way into the stable buildings, but were kept off by the remonstrances of the dafadar. They eventually found a refuge for a time behind the water tower, and it is thought that they later returned to their lines. They gave no more trouble to the Legation, and the grounds were once more clear of troops for the night. Soon after nightfall firing died down to almost nothing from the exhaustion of both sides. The Germans returned from the Chancery at 5.30 p.m., and the Legation electric light, despite a direct hit on the power house, again functioned all right. After one unsuccessful search the parachute and the lamp were retrieved from the end of the garden at 10.30 p.m. The messages on the lawn were also changed to read as follows:—

- (1.) In block letters: "All well; fly to north of Legation."
- (2.) A white cross denoting "don't land."
- (3.) The letters "No" in reply to the morning message, as it had apparently not been picked up by the afternoon aeroplane.
- (4.) Popham panel displaying No. 12, meaning "come again to-morrow."

The object of the message to fly to the north was to keep the aeroplane in a good position to receive Aldis lamp messages, which could only be transmitted under a certain amount of cover from northern verandah, and also to keep the machine away from rifle and shell fire.

The night passed very quietly.

December 21.

After a quiet night the day started with a heavy shelling of the Nauburji fort, especially of the towers, up to 2 p.m. The firing from this position grew less and less. The guns suddenly lifted on to the Bagh-i-Bala hospital and fort and intervening ground, and soon afterwards a man in uniform was seen waving a red blanket from one of the Nauburji towers, showing that the King's troops were in possession of this fortified position at last. There was no assault, the men of Bacha-i-Saqao apparently left the place during the shelling of the morning. Meanwhile, about 10.30 a.m., a British aeroplane appeared over the Legation, and after reading signals on the lawn flew for some twenty minutes up and down to the north of the Legation at a height of about 3,000 feet. Messages were signalled to the machine on the Aldis lamp, but, as subsequently ascertained, without success. The machine also sent a message by lamp which was not understood. The aeroplane flew back to India about 11 a.m., after dropping leaflets. Following the occupation of the Nauburji, the King's troops attempted to advance towards Bagh-i-Bala, but a strong rifle fire from that direction and from the hill immediately south of the Legation, which was still held by the rebels, stopped any further forward movement. Although the machine was not observed from the Legation, it was afterwards ascertained that the Queen, Queen Mother, younger members of the Royal Family, and Ghulam Sadiq, Foreign Minister, flew to-day from Kabul to Kandahar in the big three-engined Junker. During the shelling of this day, two or three shells dropped into the bodyguard stables, killing one horse and one donkey and wounding another horse.

December 22.

Quiet day. King's troops made no attempt to advance further towards rebel positions on Bagh-i-Bala and high hill south-west of Legation. Occasional bombardment by King's forces. Reconnaissance machine flew over Legation at 9 a.m. Signals displayed were in block letters: "All well. Fly to north of

Legation." On Popham panel: "We are receiving Peshawar W.T." "Come again to-morrow." Attempt made to communicate with Aldis lamp, but apparently without success, though messages were repeated several times. At 11 A.M. representatives of the Afghan Government, Ghulam Yahya and Abdul Samad, arrived for the first time since the commencement of hostilities in Kabul to establish communication with Legation. They agreed to allow machines to land at Sherpur Aerodrome for the purpose of evacuating the ladies and children, and a telegram to that effect was sent off to India asking for arrangements to be made as soon as possible. The Afghan Government asked that the Legation staff should remove themselves to the Wali Hotel for safety and to facilitate military operations. Minister gave a definite refusal to move, as there was no serious danger now that the King's troops had advanced beyond the Legation, and warned the Government that the sanctity of the Legation grounds should be respected as had already been done by the rebels. The first telegrams from Kabul telegraph office since the 16th were received to-day. At 7 P.M. a wireless message was intercepted that the Victoria would arrive about 9 A.M. next day to evacuate the ladies and children of the Legation. Contact was established with other Legations, who were informed that the ladies and children of this Legation were being evacuated by air as soon as possible, and offering to evacuate in due course the women and children of other Legations who wanted to leave at once for India. Flying Officer Trusk and Leading Aircraftsman Donaldson arrived at the Legation at 10 A.M., with an Afghan interpreter, from the Wali Hotel, where they had been staying since their forced landing at Sherpur on the 18th December. They remained at the Legation.

December 23.

The ladies and children of the Legation left Legation on foot with baggage at 5.30 A.M., and passed safely through the zone of fire to Italian Legation at 6.30 A.M. Wapite arrived over Kabul at 8.45 A.M., and, after reading ground signals at Legation and distributing leaflets, landed at Sherpur Aerodrome at 8.50 A.M. All preparations made for arrival of Victoria and accompanying D.H.9A's. Three D.H.9A's landed at 9.20 A.M., and Victoria at 9.30 A.M. Ladies and children of British Legation were brought from Italian Legation in cars and embarked straight into Victoria, the luggage being loaded on to the D.H.9A's. The Victoria left for Peshawar at 9.45 A.M., and the D.H.9A's at 10 A.M. Wapite took off at 9.50 A.M., but returned to aerodrome at 10.15 A.M. to repair a minor defect, leaving again at 10.20 A.M. Evacuation completed without a hitch. Captain Nicholls and Sergeant Peters came up in the Victoria bringing a transmitting set, which was conveyed to Legation for installation. As officer-in-charge of evacuation aeroplanes said that the Victoria would be returning to-morrow to take away luggage of British Legation, Minister decided that space available should be used for evacuating other ladies and children who wanted to leave Kabul. Owing to short notice, it was arranged that the available space should be taken up by those most immediately accessible: Ten French ladies, one Roumanian and one Swiss. No change in the military position. Rebel positions bombarded intermittently throughout the day and rifle fire brisk on both sides, but no attack made.

December 24.

Wapite machine arrived at Sherpur Aerodrome at 8.30 A.M. with instructions to order up twelve D.H.9A's in addition to Victoria if required. This was requested, and arrangements were made at once with the German Legation to fill up the extra space. By 11.15 A.M. all foreigners for evacuation were ready on aerodrome with luggage. Six D.H.9A's arrived at 11.30 A.M. and five at 11.45 A.M. Victoria at 12.15 P.M. D.H.9A's loaded with passengers and luggage and left by 12.20, except two, owing to the breaking of a propeller. Victoria left at 12.40 P.M. The last two D.H.9A's took off at 2 P.M. Total evacuation: Eleven French ladies, eleven German ladies and five German children. Operation was marred by accident to German lady, Mme. Bietz, who walked into a revolving propeller and was seriously injured on the head. As mentioned above, the propeller was broken. Rebels remained in occupation of same position as before until evening, when King's troops stormed high hill south-west of Legation after a bombardment throughout the day. Rifle fire over the Legation less, but some troops continued to fire from positions behind as well as in front of Legation.

December 25.

Bacha-i-Saqao's men left Bagh-i-Bala fort and hospital, retiring to Paghman and Jabal Siraj. Legation out of firing zone for first time since the 14th December. Message received by wireless that no evacuation planes would be sent up to-day unless urgently required. A reconnaissance machine came up at midday, and, after reading signal to land, came down at Sherpur. Instructions were given through the pilot of this machine to have the Victoria and three D.H.9A's sent up at 11 A.M. next day to continue the evacuation of women and children of British subjects and foreigners in Kabul. Considerable numbers of the King's troops and levies streamed back into Kabul from the direction of Paghman during the day in high fettle. They boasted of having dispersed the remainder of Bacha-i-Saqao's band at the point of the bayonet, but, after eight days' close observation of their tactics, their stories were difficult to believe. The big German Junker returned from Kandahar at 1 P.M. without passengers, carrying a load of benzine only. In the evening communication was established with India through the transmitter brought up on the 23rd December, but traffic greatly interfered with by Kabul wireless station, whether accidentally or on purpose it is difficult to say at present. From a rough examination of damage done, sixty-two direct hits by shells on Legation buildings were counted; of these, eleven were on Minister's house. Bullet holes too numerous to estimate.

After Christmas Day the immediate investment of Kabul was cleared up. But it cannot be said that the invaders have been completely driven off or dispersed up to the present. Desultory fighting continues to the north of Kabul, and another attack on Kabul by the Bacha-i-Saqao, if not by another rebel, is still very likely. It is to be hoped that such attack, if it comes off, will be delivered through another avenue of approach, the British Legation thereby escaping a repetition of the events which have been all too sketchily narrated above.

No account of this siege would be complete without mention of the magnificent behaviour of the ladies of the Legation. Under the most trying conditions, far from ever showing any signs of panic, they quietly went about their self-appointed tasks seeing to the comfort of the rest of the staff collected in the Minister's house with a cheerful demeanour that was an inspiration to the rest. The memory of their heroism only deepens the resentment felt at garbled accounts which have been appearing in the papers in India. Far from skulking behind barricades, it was with difficulty that the ladies and children could be kept away from exposed windows. It is a privilege to be able to record how worthily they maintained the high standard of courage set in the history of the British in Afghanistan by British women.

I have, &c.

L. W. H. D. BEST, *Secretary.*

British Legation, Kabul.

[N 657/1/97]

No. 33.

Sir F. Humphrys to Mr. Oliphant.—(Received January 28.)

My dear Lancelot,

Kabul, January 9, 1929.

I WISH I could answer your last letter in a similar vein, but I am a trifle pushed. My note on withdrawal, sent separately, is very rough. Please remember that the British Legation, Kabul, is the only stabilising influence in Kabul, and if it goes, things are likely to peter out, if not explode.

Thank God, the ladies and children got away without a scratch. Their evacuation in the dark through the battle zone was the hairiest thing I have ever had to stage-manage. The Afghan commander refused to take it on, so I did all the arrangements myself.

We have all had charmed lives. My house looks like a radiator in places. Between the two windows of my upstairs study—on extreme left of photograph I sent you of Legation—there are forty bullet holes. Not one came through the window, in front of which I was constantly moving. On the other hand many came through my bathroom window, one hitting my shaving glass and singeing my moustache, while a shell missed my head by 9 inches and lodged in the wall. Others had more hairy experiences. A lot of V.C. work was done outside. All my staff behaved magnificently.

I have told my wife to look you up when she arrives in town—about the 20th January; she has the news up to the 23rd December. I am sorry I have written so little. I am putting in fourteen hours a day dealing with emergent problems as they arise. We are not by any means out of the wood. "Percy" has given way at last. If it is not too late he may save himself with our moral support. You see, he *would* drive too fast. Now he knows.

Best wishes for 1929.

Yours ever,
FRANCIS HUMPHRYS.

P.S.—Thanks most awfully for all you have done for us.—F. H.

[N 529/1/97]

No. 34.

Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 66.)

Sir,

Berlin, January 24, 1929.

EVENTS in Afghanistan have been accorded wide publicity in the German papers, who have for the most part confined themselves to reprinting under tendentious headlines messages received from the British and Soviet agencies, more especially the latter. The interest shown in the fortunes of King Amanullah is largely to be explained by the fact that his picturesque and pleasing figure remains fresh in the memory of the Berlin public. It is unfortunate that the "news-value" thus accidentally acquired by Afghanistan should have been exploited in particular by the Nationalist organs of the German press in a sense hostile to Great Britain. That element of jealousy which corrodes the heart of many Germans, their abiding irritation at the fact that we, although devoid of intelligence, culture, energy or thoroughness, should, as recently in China, be so incomprehensibly successful tempts them to attribute to our peasant cunning what they cannot explain in terms of their own national temperament or education. They have thus swallowed the fables circulated by the Russian agencies, and papers of every complexion have indicated, either directly or indirectly, that the rising against King Amanullah was fostered by British officials who feared the independence which he had displayed.

2. The "Kreuz-Zeitung," for instance, in a leading article observes that the fate of the Durani dynasty, which has ruled Afghanistan since 1747, is now at stake. Habibullah, according to this paper, is a usurper, and is supported by England. Amanullah is supported by Russia. The civil war in Afghanistan is, therefore, but one further example of the many conflicts between the outposts of the two great colonial Powers in Asia. This tangled situation, continues the "Kreuz-Zeitung," is a result of English intrigues. Both as a friend of Russia and as a reformer, Amanullah was considered dangerous; moreover, when Afghanistan is split up by internal disputes, there is, the paper contends, peace on the Indian frontier. "As a means," so the article continues, "of sowing discord in Moslem countries, this latest British enterprise would appear to have been more successful than earlier experiments, such as the attempt to revive the Caliphate question. It remains, however, to be seen whether the British will be able to cope with the spirits which they have called up. It is reported that there is a movement of considerable importance among Indian Moslems in favour of Amanullah. The British Minister at Kabul has taken the precaution of reserving for the Government of India another trump card in the shape of Inayatullah, who 'at his own request,' was evacuated to Peshawar, and not to Kandahar, as he wished, on the pretext that weather conditions rendered it impossible to reach the latter locality. When the time comes he can, if need be, be used against Amanullah."

3. In the same edition of the "Kreuz-Zeitung" prominence is given to a Moscow message to the effect that King Habibullah has now concluded an arrangement with the British Minister at Kabul by virtue of which, in return for British support, he has expressed his readiness to renounce the independence of Afghanistan and to accept a British protectorate. This report goes on to state that a treaty is at once to be signed between Great Britain and Afghanistan, according to the provisions of which all foreign missions are immediately to leave the capital, the Afghan Ministry for Foreign Affairs is to be dissolved and its place taken by an office which shall not have the right to conclude any agreements with other countries except with the consent of Sir Francis Humphrys.

4. The above is typical of what is being written or hinted in many papers, who frequently, as in the enclosed extract from the "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," repeat the story of the presence among the rebels of Colonel T. E. Lawrence. That these stories are not due to mere sensationalism, and cannot be excused on the ground of ignorance, is proved by the fact that the press section of the German Foreign Office have made a loyal endeavour to discredit all such rumours and to point out to the press that the stories of British intervention are not merely impossible but also improbable. In the "Deutsche diplomatisch-politische Korrespondenz," which is a holographed sheet circulated by the Press Bureau to German papers, and of which I have obtained a copy, stress is laid on the fact that it is not in British interests that chaos should rule in Afghanistan. "A connexion has been sought," so runs this statement, "between this purely reactionary movement, which is the inevitable result of the fanaticism of wild hill tribes and has long been foreseen by competent observers of Asiatic politics, and the machinations of Great Britain in Central Asia. The reason for this is, perhaps, to be found in Colonel Lawrence's presence on the Indian frontier, but it would be absurd to underestimate the astuteness of British policy in Central Asia and to suppose that she would prefer the present reaction and chaos—so favourable a forcing-ground for the Asiatic form of bolshevism—to a modernised State anxious only for complete independence on all sides." The political correspondent of Wolff's Agency drew my attention several days ago to the above statement which he had himself prepared. He dwelt on the absurdity of the legend that British intrigue was at the bottom of the present troubles in Afghanistan.

5. Not only have the press without exception ignored the above-mentioned hint from headquarters and continued their dissemination of Russian legends, but only one paper (the "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung") has had the grace to speak with gratitude of the successful efforts of British aviators to rescue German women and children. Here, again, I am given to understand, the German Foreign Office protested through the Press Bureau against such singular lack of courtesy. The papers did not respond, and the majority of them recorded merely that German women and children had been evacuated "by air," allowing it to be supposed that their rescuers were either Junker or Soviet aeroplanes. The whole circumstance is illustrative of the inherent ungraciousness of the German character, at all events as it is reflected in the German press. It is in matters such as this, rather than in the give and take of European affairs, that their lack of average amiability is disclosed. Having written the foregoing, I am bound in fairness to add that individual Germans of standing here have expressed to me their admiration of the performance of the British air service in connexion with the evacuation of nationals of all countries from Kabul.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

Enclosure in No. 34.

Extract from the "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" of January 12, 1929.

EVERYWHERE in Afghanistan the belief is widespread that the rebels have the support of the British Government. This belief is based not only upon the mysterious rôle played by Colonel Lawrence, the notorious instigator of the Arab revolt, but also upon the discussions between the British Legation and the rebel leaders, which immediately preceded the capture of Kabul by the latter. It was clear on King Amanullah's return from his European journey that he had been but little impressed by the melancholy atmosphere of Moscow, and his impressions were reflected for a time in the increased cordiality of Anglo-Afghan relations. Since the outbreak of the new rebellion, however, the pendulum has swung back to its old position, and the whole of the Soviet press has displayed an astonishing unanimity in its support of this oriental despot in his struggle against the forces of revolution. The reason is clear. The Soviet Government, whose intensive sociological propaganda necessitates an attitude of hostility to all forms of religion, and whose propaganda has hitherto met with but scant success in Central Asia, have at least as much to fear from an accretion of the power of the mullahs as from the spread of British influence in Afghanistan.

[N 568/1/97]

No. 35.

*Shuja-ed-Dowleh Khan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 28.)**Afghan Legation, London,
January 28, 1929.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my note of the 14th instant, I have the honour to inform you that I have received a telegram from the Foreign Office at Kandahar stating that King Amanullah Khan has, in view of the events recently happened in Afghanistan, rescinded his abdication order in response to the incessant appeals made by the overwhelming majority of the Afghan nation requesting him to assume once again the supreme powers, and has, consequently, announced himself at Kandahar as the King of Afghanistan.

I have, &c.

SHUJA-ED-DOWLEH.

[N 593/1/97]

No. 36.

Government of India to Sir F. Humphrys (Kabul).(No. 116 K.)
(Telegraphic.)*January 28, 1929.*

JANUARY 28. It is reported by Baluchistan that Amanullah contemplates purchasing lorries in India, and they enquire whether we should place any restrictions on their export across the frontier. Government of India are replying in the negative.

[N 663/1/97]

No. 37.

Extract from Lady Humphrys' Diary of recent Events in Kabul.

[These notes, copied from Lady Humphrys' Diary, show the appalling circumstances in which the Staff of the Legation carried on until the time of Lady Humphrys' departure. They speak for themselves, and comment would only spoil them.—A.C. January 29, 1929.]

December 14th, 1928. 2:30 P.M.—Feit (French Minister) calls to discuss situation. I am reading in the library. B.J. comes in to ask whereabouts of Minister, as an interesting situation has arisen on Bagh-i-Bala which he might like to see. Minister is seeing Feit off at front door. Parting words are fewer than usual, as on Minister saying "It's begun" French car leaves at great pace. We all stand outside and watch the taking of the Fort, which is a leisurely proceeding. The Bacha Saqau's men begin marching along the main road to Kabul, but gradually a large crowd collects at the corner shops, and I see it sweep across to our further gate. I dash down to find Minister and hear his voice from the front porch, "Shut the gates, Best." The scene then became one of racing orderlies, while Power House Mistri locks the big iron gates. Our Afghan guards press their rifles into the willing hands of the orderlies, who, however, are forced by Minister to return them, and the guard vanishes under nearest cover and are seen no more. The next news of them is that they are sitting under the back wall with their rifles buried. The mob is now at our gates and Minister goes out to face them. The Bacha Saqau makes an impassioned speech, declaring his aims and saying that the King is an infidel and must be dethroned. Minister explains that this is the British Legation and that we are the guests of the country. Bacha Saqau replies that he has no quarrel with us, and Minister warns him to respect all Legations. Bacha Saqau leaves a guard at our gates, who, however, soon melt away. He orders his men to respect Legations and forbids all looting. In the meantime the rest of the British Legation comes up to us at the big house and take up their abode. The Bacha Saqau's troops pass on with much cheering and many standards, many Mullahs amongst them on horses and firing at random as they go, hitting the house

and conservatory. The Bacha Saqau take the Sharara Fort and the Turkish School, and there is spasmodic firing all through the night. Members of the British Legation, however, are still able to come and go to their houses, and make sorties to fetch bedding and mattresses to help out the over-strained resources of the big house. O.S., who is caught in the City, has his car fired on, but on explaining who he is, is given an escort by the Bacha to bring him back by Dar-ul-Aman. Nazir forced to remove his hat.

15th.—An unrefreshing night. Members of the British Legation spend morning in their houses, collecting and packing kit, and, except for B.J. and family, feed in their houses. A noisy afternoon which is spent in the billiard room. The night is quieter, and we have some sleep; but Minister patrols the house most of the night. Arsenal collected in Minister's bath-room on night of 14th. L.S. occupied all day of 15th cleaning it.

16th.—Great activity between the Lulu Pushta and Sharara forts, which we watch from the O.P. Still fairly safe in the garden and members of the British Legation continue to come and go. Shelling begun and Scott's kitchen and Stranger's chimney hit; Russian aeroplanes up and Bagh-i-Bala is bombed. British Legation family settles down in the big house, as journeys to and from are far too dangerous. Very noisy night and Minister very active patrolling throughout.

17th.—Battle now centres round the British Legation and region round our gates is very hot. Secretary dashes down from the O.P. to say that two men waving German flag are trying to get in. Beitz and Kutz arrive with messages from the G.L., where the German colony is collected. Report that all was quiet there, and that the danger was only in crossing the road from the vineyards. The battle continues too fiercely for them to return. During the afternoon shell burst on front lawn. Power House Mistri comes in to report trouble at the gate, where the rebels, who are now attacking the Nau Burja from which they had been fired upon, are demanding entrance. They say that they require oil, obviously because they want to burn down the Burj. The Power House Mistri offers them some in a saucer, but they beg for lamp oil; Minister and Secretary go out to gate. Minister, as usual, pipe in hand, explains that we cannot let them in nor supply oil; they ask how we light our houses and when we say by electricity are disconcerted. They then disperse and the battle rages anew, and continues all night. Minister walks round the house all night, and the east wing does not sleep much. Before retiring for the night, Minister, who has revised plans owing to change in situation, 3,000 tribesmen in retreat being now round the British Legation, explains he will not fight if an entry is forced. Baits in the way of loot are left downstairs, and the arsenal is removed from our bath-room. We do not undress.

18th.—At 10:30 A.M. British D.II. 9 flies over us. It flies very low and is heavily fired at, hit, and has to come down on Sherpur. Message taken and dropped. Fine work on all sides in putting out messages under fire and fetching in messages. A second flies over at 2:30 P.M. and drops another message. Heavy shelling, and three shells hit the house, between 9 and 10:30, very disturbing to the Minister's ablutions, and the shell is afterwards found within 9 inches of the bath. The big Junker is seen trying to get off. Corridor windows becoming unhealthy. Hospital and O.S.'s house hit, operation theatre's plate-glass windows smashed. King's troops on Bagh-i-Bala side and on Takht, and much fighting near the gates. Mongols try to take shelter in Cr.'s house and doctor's house, where one mortal casualty is left. A wounded man is found in Cr.'s kitchen. Our orderlies patrol to keep the combatants off British territory. The day is indecisive, as the Bacha Saqau is still holding the Nau Burja. Evening and night are quieter.

19th.—A D.II. over us at 10 A.M. No message. Very noisy day, heavy shelling. Machine gun on Bagh-i-Bala. Russian aeroplane up again bombing (as each day). Shells in garden, M.A.'s house hit. Very fine work by R.E.N. and sowers who got the hose on it. Shell just missed R.E.N., whose coat is torn by it. In spite of all, however, the house bursts into flames and blazes till midnight. Mercifully there is no wind or the big house would have been in great danger. Our back and front porch both hit, and three bullets through my east windows, one through Minister's dressing room. We see the Mongols firing behind the wall on the left of gate. The Mongols fire at everyone, and in reply to a message from Minister say that they will fire at anyone they see. The Bacha Saqau's men, however, cease fire when our aeroplane comes over on receiving notice that it is ours and do not fire on our people.

20th.—To-day even billiards becomes an unhealthy game, house-keeping very difficult with offices in line of fire, no supplies coming in and servants disorganised.

[20088]

Strict rationing the order of the day. Our wood piles are in the centre of the battle and fuel has to be used with great care. Glorious weather and fortunately warmer, though heavy snowfall might damp enthusiasm. Our garden man has continued to drive his two donkeys about our garden each day with complete unconcern, but the day has come when there is only one donkey left. No messages through to Kabul wireless for three days now, as our men have not been able to get through the cordon. The face of the big clock lit in countless places. From the 17th Secretary, Nash and Scott sleep in hall, and take turn to watch. Stock of hospital comforts and provisions moved upstairs, in case entrance is forced and looting takes place in our godowns. O.B. duty no longer possible. Cr. is hurt, and Scott has a bullet through his leg when retrieving papers from the Chancery.

21st.—Quiet night. Morning reveals some of the study windows shattered. Fifty shells up to date in the B.L. A machine gun now in the country house overlooking our east wall. Shelling begins early (9 A.M.).

At 9:30 Daffadar rings up to say that a horse has been killed and several wounded. Minister hears two more shells burst in stables while he is telephoning. King's men are said to have tried to parley with the Koran last night. Bacha Saqau, however, determined to force advance to-day, and sends a message that no one to leave the Legation. Three bullets through drawing room and a chair smashed. Cr.'s house hit, big hole through bath-room, and later through dining room and nurseries. King's troops are in possession of the Fort and the Bacha Saqau has cleared out of the Burj. Heavy firing from guns. Dressing difficult to-day. Bath filled with water as a reserve because of pumping difficulties and wash basin in fire zone. Another shell in Cr.'s house, one in doctor's. Pump got going just in time. Only 2 gallons of water left, as it has been impossible to cut the cable to M.A.'s house. The shell that killed No. 7 raked the stables, the electric wire in stables fused but that is right now. Germans' Afghan orderly gets through with a message from German Legation. Reports Junker has left with Royal family. I see the King's men trying to break down the gates and rush to warn them. In another second they are in and, led by an officer, are charging for the big house. Minister goes out. A soldier levels his rifle, but the officer dashes it down. Minister commands them to leave British territory, and the officer calls off his men; but it takes an hour to clear them all out, and Minister has to go out so often that relays of tobacco are necessary. Nothing calms our servants so much as the Minister's pipe nor so disarms the invaders. It is evening before the guard house is cleared of combatants. The tailor's house over the wall is now full of them and makes the region near the far gate (garage, servants' quarters, &c.) hotter than ever. We women and children are sent to our rooms when the gates are broken in, and our only consolation at the critical moment is the arrival of our aeroplane, which is a great moral support. A Russian aeroplane comes over and complicates the situation, as we fear it may drop bombs and cause the Bacha to suspect us of double dealing. From now a Russian aeroplane always goes up to watch ours when it comes over.

4:30 p.m.—Stranger back from a very hairy walk to the Power House, carrying one of the two shells which fell in the Power House, missing the crude oil and engine by a small margin. All the servants' houses have been hit, and their compound a mass of debris. The big clock is riddled everywhere. North side of the house is now very unhealthy, and even big dining room dangerous. We feed in relays in small dining room. Our places for cover change daily.

5 p.m.—The German company's man in, with one of our Afghan syces, who has been in the city for five days. Way clear for the Germans, who leave amidst warm good wishes. They have been perfect guests. The man says that three Junkers have left. It seems the King has gone. Wireless says our aeroplane picked up messages of this morning. All messages have had to be put out under fire—everybody has been simply splendid. Bullets in Squash Court, three in bedroom, several in east corridors, many in gallery, three near my bed, three in our bathroom, one missing Minister by 6 inches. Cr.'s house badly shelled and kitchen destroyed. At about 2:30 much fighting at the gate.

Closing of the gate is a fine piece of work. Our orderlies charge to lock the gates. Ahwab Gul smashes the window of the sentry-box with his hand to get the keys, and the sowars rush across under heavy fire to shut and lock the gates after them. Their clothes riddled with bullets, but no casualties. Some men are still in the guard-house. Armoured car appears on the scene, but is overturned at the corner, where it remains and probably will remain. Military situation seems to be exactly the same as it has been for the last three days, by the evening.

22nd.—Quiet night. Bacha Saqau's men on hills, and still in Bagh-i-Bala. Shelling starts early again. Bullets in our bathroom, shell just misses end of it. Airmen from our first machine at last arrive with an Afghan interpreter, who feels the danger of the situation keenly. Our aeroplane comes over. Burley, who has been at the wireless all morning, asked at 11 A.M. if he had better have some breakfast, says he has had it, but when pressed suddenly remembers he hasn't. The spirit of our team is magnificent; no one thinks of himself.

A message from the Chancery gate that a man from the Foreign Office wishes to come in. This is first effort of Afghan Government to get in touch with us, doubtless due to Sir Austen's stiff telegram. Minister interviews him. When he leaves Minister informs us that we must be ready to leave following morning by air. Rest of day is spent in arrangements for evacuation and packing. A cheery farewell dinner, with toasts all round with musical honours, but it is not easy for any of us to keep smiling.

23rd—Before dawn we leave under escort of Afghan soldiers by lanes and by-ways between the plain and the Legation. Firing has already begun, and the first half-mile, through which the Minister escorts us, bristles with risks. Secretary sees us all to Italian Legation, where we stay until the aeroplanes arrive. Engines are kept running, and we are driven down to the aeroplane at once. The Vickers is a glorious sight, and our splendid airmen amongst the crowd of Russian and Afghan airmen make one thrill with pride of country. The Legation becomes a tiny white speck amongst the grim hills. Since we have left, it has become possible for the British Legation to move about the garden, and fifty-nine shells have been identified on the buildings alone, many more in the gardens; bullets everywhere.

[N 589/1/97]

No. 38.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 113.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, January 28, 1929.

TELEGRAM dated the 26th January received from consul, Kandahar, to the following effect:—

"I was sent for to-day by Ghulam Sadiq and he informed me that Amanullah, with approval of Kandahar, Farah, Herat, Mainana and Turkestan, had resumed the throne which he had temporarily abdicated. He wished definitely to know within seven days the policy of the British Government towards himself. He asked whether the British Government recognise Amanullah or Habibullah as King of Afghanistan. Ghulam Sadiq then went on to say long awaited hour was at hand, and if Great Britain took wrong step world war was imminent with ominous consequences for India. Finally he pressed for visa for Tarzi."

Whatever may be the effect judicially of Amanullah's cancellation of his official abdication, I regard his chances of re-establishing himself as King of Afghanistan to be nil. He is regarded as a traitor to his religion throughout south-east of Afghanistan, while in Kabul he is universally condemned for his cowardly flight from here.

The tribes of the south-east are more than a match for the provinces mentioned by Ghulam Sadiq as supporting Amanullah.

In my opinion it is more than doubtful that Soviet would back such a forlorn hope as Amanullah has proved himself to be. In any case, I am convinced that non-intervention is the correct policy for His Majesty's Government to pursue.

I request that I may be authorised to instruct consul to reply to Ghulam Sadiq as follows:—

"The settled policy of His Majesty's Government is one of non-interference in Afghan internal affairs. It is for Afghan people alone to determine who is to be their King, and His Britannic Majesty's Government await their decision."

Regarding visa for Tarzi, I will telegraph separately.

[N 399/42/97]

No. 39.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir F. Humphrys (Kabul).

(No. 22.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, January 29, 1929.

FOLLOWING is text of letter to Afghan Minister.—

"My dear Minister, on 18th January you communicated to Mr. Villiers a personal message from King Amanullah asking His Majesty's Government to supply him with arms and ammunition.

"His Majesty's Government have given this request their most sympathetic consideration, but they much regret that international considerations prevent their interfering in internal affairs of Afghanistan by giving assistance in form of arms to one or other party when there is no generally acknowledged ruler or Government in country. I need not add if His Majesty's Government can show their friendship for His Majesty which does not involve such interference they will be most pleased to do so. Yours sincerely, AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN."

[N 644/1/97]

No. 40.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain—(Received January 30)

(No. 118.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, January 29, 1929.

REFERENCE my telegram No. 98 dated the 25th instant. The delay which has occurred in telegraphing my views regarding evacuation is due to the hesitating attitude adopted by my colleagues. None of them have clear orders from their Governments except my French colleague, who says that he will withdraw his Legation provided that his nationals have already left.

With the exception of the Persian, all my other colleagues are hampered by attitude of their nationals, few of whom are ready to travel by air unless their Governments guarantee that they will receive compensation for the property which they must necessarily leave behind. The majority of foreigners are trying to arrange to leave by road, which I do not regard as safe under present conditions. The following are the numbers of those who wish to travel by air as communicated to me by my colleagues:—

"Turks 14, Germans 10, French 2, Persians 2."

These figures are exclusive of Legation staffs. List does not include Italians. It is at present impossible to calculate number of British Indian subjects who wish to leave by air. Total may be as many as 400.

British and foreign subjects who are employees of the late Government are in difficulties as their contracts have not yet expired, and the present Government is in no hurry to dismiss them.

I am exerting utmost pressure to obtain release of British Indian employees of the Afghan Government, who number forty, all of whom want to return to India.

My present intention is to carry out evacuation programme by means of two large aeroplanes a day, in which will be evacuated as many British subjects as possible and those foreigners who have already applied. At the same time I plan to reduce the numbers of His Majesty's Legation to a skeleton so that in an emergency they could be evacuated by four large aeroplanes in a single journey.

I am telegraphing separately pros and cons effecting complete withdrawal of this Legation for consideration of His Majesty's Government. Complete withdrawal could not in any case be effected for several days.

[N 268/1/97]

No. 41.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir F. Humphrys (Kabul).

(No. 19.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 30, 1929.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 44 of the 14th instant, I enclose a copy of a note* from the Afghan Minister announcing the abdication of King Amanulla and the succession of Sardar Inayatulla Khan, and stating that the foreign relations of Afghanistan will remain the same. You will see that the terms of this communication are very similar to those of the communication made to the Government of India by the Afghan consul-general in Delhi and reported in their No. 1863 of the 15th instant.

2. As King Inayatulla succeeded peaceably to the throne of his own younger half-brother, who had abdicated of his own accord, and as this involved no change in the form or constitution of the Afghan Government, I was advised that the question of recognition, in the technical sense of the word, did not arise, and that His Majesty's Government would only be required to do what they ordinarily do when a ruler dies and is succeeded by his heir—that is to say, send new credentials to their diplomatic representative. If this had been done in the present instance, the Afghan Minister, who would have been expected to produce new credentials himself in due course, would have been informed accordingly when his note was acknowledged and no further formalities would have been necessary.

3. I did not, of course, contemplate any action on these lines unless you recommended that it was desirable to do so. As it happens, the supersession of King Inayatulla by Habibulla Khan has now rendered further consideration of the question unnecessary, and, in the circumstances, I am not sending any reply to the Afghan Minister's note.

I am, &c

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[N 665/1/97]

No. 42.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain—(Received January 31.)

(No. 124.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, January 31, 1929.

JANUARY 30. Your telegram No. 20, the 29th January, containing Afghan Minister's note and Foreign Office Kabul note quoted in Government of India's telegram No. 16 S [433 S], dated the 31st January [30th]. As both these represent such a grotesque travesty of actual facts I feel I must now sum up present situation in Afghanistan: (1) Only a portion of the inhabitants of Kandahar recognise Amanullah as King. This is a temporary face-saving arrangement which will not be backed up by force. Amanullah's cause is dead. (2) Habibullah's authority extends to Kabul city and a radius of about 12 miles, except to the north, where his power extends 70 miles as far as Jabal Siraj. There is no chance that Habibullah will be recognised by Pathan tribes. (3) Provinces of Ghazni, Farah, Kataghan and Badakhan are in open revolt and will support neither Habibullah nor Amanullah. (4) Herat and Turkestan have not declared themselves, but will follow the lead of the majority. (5) Ali Ahmed is supported by the tribes of the Eastern Province except Mohmands and Shinwaris, also by Ahmadzai Ghilzais and secretly by Hazaras. (6) Shinwaris Mohmands and tribes of Southern Province are in favour of Nadir Khan, but they would support Ali Ahmed in absence of Nadir Khan. (7) Inayatullah would be a popular candidate, but it is generally believed that he is unwilling to stand.

Great majority of Afghans are looking for a way out of present ridiculous impasse, and the two favourites for Royal honours are Ali Ahmed and Nadir Khan. It is believed that Habibullah would be ready to make terms with latter.

Unless Habibullah and Syed Hussain fall out it is unlikely that there will be any serious fighting before the middle of March on account of snow and bitter cold. If some agreement is not in sight by the middle of March stage will be set up for a

* No. 16.

[20088]

F 3

devastating conflict. It would be best for country if Nadir Khan and his brothers returned soon, in which case Habibullah would negotiate terms for the surrender of Kabul, and if Amanullah and his family retired to Switzerland. Provided we remain strictly neutral, I see no reason why Russia should interfere.

[N 682/1/97]

No. 43.

Sir R. Graham to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 73.)

Rome January 25, 1929.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that in most of the numerous articles and messages on the Afghan crisis, including several which come from London, it is taken as a matter of course that the downfall of King Amanullah was due to British intrigue. And in numerous comments it is stated that Colonel Lawrence, acting on behalf of "that marvellous instrument the Intelligence Service," had stirred up the primitive tribesmen against the modernising King. Commenting on the news that Colonel Lawrence had embarked for England, "A and Z," Signor Settimelli's new Fascist battle-sheet, says simply: "To draw his wages."

2. The general argument is that Afghanistan remains a battle ground between England and Russia. The "Stampa" points out that the latter had failed to wound England permanently through Turkey and China, but she had tried once more through Amanullah. As England preferred a quiet, isolated Afghanistan, she had raised the mullahs and the fanatical tribesmen against Amanullah and put her own man on the throne. But he had failed to maintain his position and now there was civil war. The newspapers have not made up their minds whether Habibullah Ghazi will have British or Russian support.

3. The "Lavoro" (19th January) suggests that in deposing Amanullah England has repeated the mistake she made when she deposed the Khedive Abbas Hilmi.

4. The "Tevere" (23rd January) publishes a long and eulogistic article of Colonel Lawrence's achievements with the Arabs, says that later he "roused revolt in Syria against the French" [*sic*] and that "the latest events in Afghanistan show what this extraordinary man is capable of with Arabs" [*sic*], and it was thanks to him that, for the moment at least, England was rid of Amanullah.

5. I have asked Mr. McClure to inform the Press Bureau of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the numerous errors published in regard to Colonel Lawrence, and to suggest that before commenting on his activities the newspapers should satisfy themselves whether Afghanistan is really populated by Arabs.

I have, &c.

R. GRAHAM.

[N 699/1/97]

No. 44.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 129.)

Kabul, February 1, 1929.

(Telegraphic.) P.

JANUARY 31. My telegram of the 29th January. The following arguments appear to me to be against complete withdrawal of His Majesty's Legation: (1) If Legation goes, interests of British subjects will certainly suffer and there will be no one in Kabul to protect them; (2) as foreign Governments have been so slow in issuing orders to their representatives in Kabul and immediate British withdrawal would be accompanied only by French Legation, and that only on condition that all French nationals were first evacuated; (3) if we go, foreign community will be left in a deplorable condition. Even though this is largely due to their own lack of foresight, the fact remains that they look to our Legation for everything; (4) we shall to a large extent lose touch with rapid changes of situation; (5) should other Legations remain on in Kabul, the Soviet Embassy will certainly not leave, and it will have many opportunities for making mischief; (6) solitary, or nearly solitary, withdrawal of this Legation would cause a feeling of resentment in Afghanistan against British nation and be likely to wound Afghan pride. This opportunity would be taken advantage of by a near rival to increase his influence and popularity. The following are the arguments in favour of early withdrawal: (a) Danger of a

sudden *débâcle*, and of a general loot and massacre by an unrestrained mob, from which even foreign diplomatic representatives would not be exempt. Whilst I admit such a risk does exist, I am optimist enough to believe His Majesty's Legation would survive such a *débâcle*. (b) Increasingly embarrassing and undignified position of a diplomatic mission which is officially warned that it is unsafe to venture beyond Legation grounds and which at any time may be wooed simultaneously by three or four different candidates for the throne. Position is all the more bizarre since King, to whose Court I am accredited, has fled from his capital, and after a short abdication pretends to reign in Kandahar, while *de facto* ruler is an illiterate highwayman who is being daily threatened by another powerful claimant in Jalalabad.

After careful consideration of this difficult question, there does not appear to be [? group omitted], but mainly for the reasons explained in (b) above, I recommend that I should be instructed to aim at arranging the complete withdrawal of His Majesty's Legation by a date which should not be later than first week in March unless in meantime present position had radically changed and establishment of a settled Government throughout country was clearly in sight.

Given average weather and a sufficiency of aeroplanes, this would give me time to fulfil every reasonable obligation to evacuate British subjects and foreigners, to reduce this Legation to a minimum, and to give my colleagues a chance of evacuating their own Legations before I myself left Kabul.

[N 589/1/97]

No. 45.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir F. Humphrys (Kabul).

(No. 31.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, February 2, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 113, dated the 28th ultimo, and Government of India's telegram No. 443 S, dated the 30th January.

For attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the present disturbances in Afghanistan see my immediately preceding telegram No. 30, for terms of my reply to question in Parliament the 30th January.*

Instructions should be issued to British consul at Kandahar to communicate a copy of this statement to Ghulam Sadiq.

[N 85/1/97]

No. 46.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir F. Humphrys (Kabul).

(No. 22.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 2, 1929.

WITH reference to the disappearance from Allahabad of Muhammed Umar Khan, I enclose a copy of a note which was addressed to me on the 4th January by the Afghan Minister asking for an explanation of the circumstances in which this disappearance took place. You will see that the tone of this note is highly offensive, and that it contains what is practically a direct accusation of bad faith on the part of His Majesty's Government.

2. In ordinary circumstances I should have declined to accept a note couched in such terms, but in view of the situation prevailing in Kabul I felt that this course might prove embarrassing, and even dangerous, to His Majesty's Legation. I decided, therefore, to ignore the note altogether and to inform Shuja-ud-Dowleh Khan, should he press for a reply, that you had been instructed to give all necessary information to the Afghan Government. A telegram notifying you of this decision and instructing you to reply to the letter from Ghulam Sadiq Khan on the same subject, reported in your telegram No. 38 of the 13th January, was accordingly prepared, but the successive abdications of Kings Amanulla and Inayatulla rendered its despatch unnecessary.

3. A copy of this despatch is being sent by the India Office to the Government of India.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

* See No. 74.

[20088]

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Shuja-ud-Dowleh to Sir Austen Chamberlain.

Sir,
 I HAVE the honour to state that I have read in the press that Mohamed Omar Khan, son of Sirdar Mohamed Ayub Khan, escaped from his detention at Allahabad on the 20th December last, and am surprised to learn that his escape was not known to the Indian Government authorities before a period of ten days had elapsed.
 2. I also express surprise at such coincidences as when, four years ago, there was a rebellion in the southern province of Afghanistan, Abdul Karim escaped into Afghanistan, and when, now that there is a rising in the eastern province, Mohamed Omar disappears from his place of detention, apparently into Afghanistan.
 3. I have the honour to request for full particulars and explanations regarding this new and strange coincidence.

I have, &c.
 SHUJA-UD-DOWLEH, *Afghan Minister.*

[N 835/1/97]

No. 47.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 156.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, February 6, 1929.

I HAVE received a telegram from British consul, Kandahar, saying that a copy of your statement of the 30th January* in House of Commons was handed by him to Ghulam Sadiq, who replied to following effect:—

“Amanullah has already been recognised as King of Afghanistan by the British Government, and a treaty exists to that effect. An internal rebellion does not cancel Amanullah's right to recognition. If British Government refuses to recognise Amanullah, it is a violation of treaty and tantamount to interference in internal affairs of Afghanistan, which will have evil results. The reply is obscure. A clear answer should be given early.”

Ghulam Sadiq then went on to explain his meaning to consul more fully:—

“Amanullah's abdication was only a ruse. Attitude of Russia is the real danger. Amanullah does not intend to ask for either British or Russian troops, but fact that British Government has published that it does not recognise Amanullah will be seized upon as an excuse by Russians to occupy Turkestan and Herat on plea of self-protection. Afghan consul-general at Tashkend reports that 150,000 Russians are already concentrating on Herat and other border. It is not understood why the British should not recognise Amanullah when he is recognised by Russia, Germany, Italy, Persia and Turkey. I solemnly warn Sir Francis Humphrys that war [? between England and Russia] will be inevitable if Amanullah Government is overthrown.”

Above is typical of Ghulam Sadiq's confused, ill-balanced and bombastic utterances.

It is a sad fact that neither Amanullah nor Ghulam Sadiq have hardly a friend between them in the country.

There seems nothing to be gained by acceding to his request for a “clear reply,” which he has already received.

[N 686/42/97]

No. 48.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir F. Humphrys (Kabul).

(No. 36.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, February 6, 1929.

A VERBAL message from Shuja was recently brought by Yunus Khan asking for permission to purchase from the War Office surplus stores, 2,000 rifles and 1 million cartridges, and take them with him through Germany and U.S.S.R. to Herat. Yunus also said that Shuja had been summoned back by Amanullah and proposed to leave on the 8th February. We are refusing request without giving our reasons.

* See No. 74

[N 859/1/97]

No. 49.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 159.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Kabul, February 7, 1929.

FEBRUARY 7. I cancelled request for aeroplanes to-day on account of weather conditions, which seem likely to be unsettled for a day or two. Evacuation programme has been carried out exactly according to plan during the last few days and reflects greatest credit on the pilots and arrangements of Royal Air Force. I am very grateful for despatch of more “Victorias” from Bagdad.

It will be convenient to give summary of evacuation effected to date and an estimate of future requirements. Between 23rd December and 6th February forty-four R.A.F. machines conveyed from Kabul 308 persons, each with 20 pounds weight baggage. Details below:—

British Legation.—Women and children: British, 7; Indian, 14; men: British, 6; Indian, 28; total, 55.

French Legation.—3 women; 1 Indian servant; total, 4.

Italian Legation.—Wife of Minister.

Turkish Embassy.—2 women.

Persian Legation.—6 women and children.

Outside Legations.—British Indian subjects: 87 women and children; 22 men; total, 109.

Austrian.—1 man.

French.—7 women and children; 1 man; total, 8.

Italian.—Women and children, 3.

German.—Women and children, 27; men, 2; total, 29.

Turkish.—Women and children, 40.

Persian.—Women and children, 12.

French Protected Syrian.—Women and children, 4; man, 1; total, 5.

American, Swiss, Roumanian.—1 woman each; total, 3.

Afghan.—Women and children, 14; men, 16; total, 30.

Of these, all but five men belonged to ex-King Inayatullah's party.

As regards future. I have on my list sixty-eight British Indian subjects who are ready to go at once. About 150 more wish to go. Fifty-four of these have unexpired contracts with Afghan Government which they are trying to terminate, while majority of remainder have doubtful claim on generosity of Government of India. Numbers of British Legation have been reduced from 109 to 55 (10 British and 45 Indian). It will not be possible to cut down this figure below 50 until final decision to withdraw has been taken and date has been fixed.

Foreigners, other than Legation staffs, from whom applications have been received are: Persians, 8; Italians, 3; Turks, 2; total, 13. It is believed that there are about 20 Germans, 10 French, 8 Italians and 7 Turks who would apply if they could arrange for their contracts to be terminated. Foreign Legation staffs are as follows: Italians, 8; French, 6; Germans, 6; Turks, 4; Persians, 4; total, 28, including 11 Indian servants.

There are therefore about 208 [? 218] British subjects and about 75 foreigners who might still be candidates for evacuation. Latter figure does not include those foreigners, numbering perhaps 70 more, who cannot bring themselves to part from their baggage.

My German, French and Italian colleagues wish to leave if I do, but are tied by their nationals. The Persian has received no orders from his Government and is terrified at the prospect of remaining. Turk with Kiazim Pasha's mission is waiting for Armageddon.

[N 848/1/97]

No. 50.

Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 99.)

Sir,

Berlin, February 4, 1929.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 66 of the 24th January, I have the honour to report that at an interview which I had with Dr. Stresemann to-day he alluded to the answer which you had returned in Parliament on the subject of the silence of the

German press with regard to the services rendered by the British Air Force in conveying German women from Kabul to Peshawar. He gratefully acknowledged your reference to the fact that the German Government had, both through the German Ambassador in London and through this Embassy, expressed their thanks for the action of the British authorities in this connexion.

2. I told Dr. Stresemann that your answer had been based on the report which I had made from here.

3. Dr. Stresemann then said that two papers, namely, the "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" and the "Börsen-Zeitung," which, I understand, is an insignificant organ, had drawn attention to the services rendered by the British Air Force in this matter. I replied that it was, nevertheless, a fact that the efforts of the Press Department of the German Foreign Office to get the German press as a whole to take some notice of the services of the Air Force had been unsuccessful. I had myself read accounts in the German press merely stating that German women had been conveyed "from Kabul by air" without any indication as to whether they had been conveyed in British, Russian or Junker aeroplanes. The silence of the German press on the subject was the sort of thing which was calculated to produce an unfavourable impression in England, especially in view of the fact that the German and other foreign women had been brought away from Kabul at some risk to the Air Force. That such an impression existed was proved by the question put to you in the House.

4. Dr. Stresemann, who seemed to be genuinely exercised by the ingratitude of the German press, said that events at Kabul struck Germans in a different light to that in which they struck British public opinion. For instance, in view of the many telegrams which had at first reported that all was quiet at Kabul, the Germans here had been inclined to consider that their compatriots at Kabul had been guilty of cowardice in sending away their womenfolk and in some cases leaving themselves. They now knew, of course, that a serious state of things prevailed at Kabul. He could assure me that it would be far from the wish of the Germans to be thought ungrateful for the services which we had rendered to their countrymen, and he would greatly regret if such an opinion were prevalent in England.

5. Dr. Stresemann then alluded to a recent statement attributed to Habibullah Khan that the latter wished to get rid of all foreign Legations except the British Legation. This alleged statement was calculated to strengthen the opinion formed by some persons that Amanullah had been driven from Kabul and Habibullah installed in his place as a result of British intrigue. I said that this opinion was, of course, quite absurd, and that its absurdity had been recognised by the political director of Wolff's Agency. Persons holding the above-mentioned view had evidently swallowed the propagandist telegrams sent from Moscow regarding events at Kabul. Dr. Stresemann quite admitted that we were not responsible for the disturbances in Afghanistan. He had only wished to point out how the matter might strike the man in the street. Since his visit to Berlin Amanullah had been rather a popular figure with the German public, who had regretted his overthrow.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD.

[N 849/1/97]

No. 51.

Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 103.)

Sir,

Berlin, February 6, 1929.

IN my despatch No. 99 of the 4th February, I had the honour to report the regret expressed to me by Dr. Stresemann that public opinion in England should have misunderstood the reticence shown by the German press in expressing gratitude to the British air force for rescuing German women and children at Kabul.

2. I am now glad to observe that within the last few days a change has come over the German papers, and the more recent exploits of our airmen at Peshawar are recorded with full appreciation and under such headings as "The rescue work of the British aviators at Kabul." I cannot but feel that this improvement in the tone of the press is probably due to the personal intervention of Dr. Stresemann, and is a further evidence of his good intentions and courtesy.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD.

[N 917/1/97]

No. 52.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 166.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, February 9, 1929.

SHAH MAHMUD, who is Nadir Khan's younger brother, paid me a six-hour visit on evening of the 5th February. He said that he was leaving next day to tour the eastern and southern provinces, where he was being sent on a mission by Habibullah to persuade tribes to stop fighting and to agree to an early conference to elect a King who would be acceptable to Afghan nation.

He said that for last few days he had been private secretary to Habibullah who, though illiterate, had great strength of character and was just. He compared Habibullah's *coup* to that of Reza Shah, but was of opinion that Habibullah could not last. He was certain that Habibullah would be prepared to abdicate in favour of an Afghan nobleman who was generally approved by tribes and provided that he was not a member of Amanullah's family.

He went on to say that every Pathan hated Amanullah for his interference with religion and customs, for breaking faith with them and for his cowardly flight from Kabul. Kandaharis and people of Northern Province would not fight for Amanullah, and neither Pathans nor Tajiks would support him. Shah Mahmud proposed to try to get in touch with Ali Ahmed, who was possible candidate for throne. In his opinion everything depended on early arrival of Nadir Khan and his brothers. He was sure that Nadir Khan would not fight, and he did not think he would accept throne. His influence [gr. corrupt in] settlement by conference, however, would be immense. Shah Mahmud himself proposed to do what he could to reconcile Habibullah and Ali Ahmed before his brothers arrived, but he feared that omens pointed to war.

I questioned him as to what the position of diplomatic missions was likely to be in these circumstances. He said that, at the time when Habibullah launched his attack on Kabul, British Legation was in extreme danger and materially saved itself and other Legations by firm and cool impartiality. British Legation saved Kabul from complete destruction by immediately consenting to evacuation by air of Inayatullah from Kabul. If, in the future, the tribes seriously considered an agreement by conference, presence of British Legation would be invaluable, as it was only institution in Kabul in which people placed any confidence. British efforts in cause of peace and their policy of non-interference were universally acknowledged. But if a fresh outbreak of civil war occurred when snow melted, and he feared this was probable, unrestrained passions would be freed and whole of Kabul, including Legations, would be in imminent danger of destruction. In his opinion decision for settlement by conference or by force of arms would be taken within next fifteen days, and if it was to be war he hoped Legations would not remain to witness ruin of his country.

[N 918/1/97]

No. 53.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 168.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, February 9, 1929.

MY telegram No. 124 of the 30th January.

The following important developments have occurred since I wrote my last summary of situation: (1) Habibullah has sent by Ahmed Shah a letter to Nadir Khan inviting him and his brothers to return to Afghanistan to find a peaceful solution out of the present *impasse*. (2) General Shah Mahmud, younger brother of Nadir Khan, has been sent to Southern Province by Habibullah to urge the tribes to stop fighting amongst themselves and hold a conference. I am reporting by separate telegram a conversation which I had with Shah Mahmud before he left yesterday for Hariob. (3) Habibullah's fortunes have slightly improved, whilst Ali Ahmed's seem to be on the decline. (4) Amanullah, realising that he has scarcely a supporter in Afghanistan, is waving the Russian bogey in our face, and at the same time is trying to work up an agitation in his favour in India.

One of the two following contingencies seem to me likely to happen when snow melts in March.

Either Pathan tribes from east and south will converge on Kabul under leadership of Ali Ahmed and tribal chiefs. In this case chaos will ensue for months and country will be laid waste.

Or a representative conference will be held by the tribes, and they will elect a King acceptable to the nation at large. In this case, Habibullah would probably agree to surrender the Ark on reasonable terms and Amanullah would leave for Europe. In my opinion such a tribal conference would result in failure without the assistance of Nadir Khan or his brothers.

It does not follow that Nadir Khan himself would be elected King, and it is said that he does not desire such an honour.

It would be a great help if British tribes of Indo-Afghan frontier could be induced to discuss the advantages of settlement by conference rather than by continuation of civil war. I am using all my influence to further cause of peace without consciously committing any un-neutral act.

[N 699/1/97]

No. 54.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir F. Humphrys (Kabul).

(No. 43.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, February 9, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 129, dated the 31st ultimo.

Balance of three considerations apparently determines proposed date for complete withdrawal of British Legation:—

- (a) Need for additional air transport.
- (b) Present indecision as to withdrawal of other missions.
- (c) Probable renewal by middle of March of intensive hostilities.

With reference to (a), please see my telegram No. 33, dated the 4th instant.

(b) The paramount consideration of His Majesty's Government is safety of Minister and members of mission. Inconveniences which may follow on withdrawal of mission if other missions remain and survive whilst we are not represented are fully recognised by His Majesty's Government, but whilst desire of all Governments must be presumed to be the same in not risking unduly the safety of their personnel, yet an attack on our mission carries far graver consequences for us than a similar attack on any other mission does for any other country, except perhaps the Russians.

Our course must, therefore, be decided irrespective of action of other countries, but it seems probable that if other missions only realise at last moment that departure of British mission is fixed, they will place both you and us in an intolerable position by requesting that, before air facilities cease, their missions, &c., may be withdrawn, thus obliging us to refuse their request and to detain you at Kabul longer than we think safe, or to leave them to their fate.

Determination of latest date for withdrawal is no doubt largely dependent on consideration (c).

His Majesty's Government appreciate force of argument for retaining as long as possible our Legation at Kabul, but consider that [group undecipherable] withdrawal has become inevitable, in view of improbability of early establishment of settled Government, and for reasons stated above that it should take place as soon as appears feasible to you.

Objections raised by you to any premature announcement are appreciated, but it seems necessary, for above reasons, to terminate indecision of other Legations. I would, therefore, propose to inform Paris, Rome, Berlin and perhaps Tehran and Angora as follows:—

“His Britannic Majesty's Government have decided that, unless a settled Government generally accepted in Afghanistan is established, they will be obliged to withdraw the British mission to India as soon as can conveniently be arranged, and in any case within next few weeks, in order that this may be completed before, with improvement of weather conditions, fighting is renewed on an intensive scale.

“His Britannic Majesty's Government regard it as essential that details of arrangements for evacuation from Kabul to India by air of members of foreign missions, if they are also to be withdrawn, and of other foreigners at Kabul for whom such facilities are desired, should now be concerted with His Majesty's representative without delay, as it is unlikely that the continuance of these facilities will be possible after the British mission has been withdrawn.”

When you have been informed of full requirements of foreign Legations, you may find it possible to arrange for immediate evacuation of all non-diplomatic foreigners and non-essential personnel of Legations, only skeleton staffs, if necessary, being retained to await developments, and these could be withdrawn at short notice.

You realise His Majesty's Government have confidence in your judgment and are prepared to be guided and to act on your advice, subject to paramount consideration set forth above. Please telegraph your considered opinion on points raised herein.

[N 874/874/97]

No. 55.

LEADING PERSONALITIES IN AFGHANISTAN.

(NOTE.—The numbers preceding most of the names refer to “Who's Who in Afghanistan, 1927,” issued by the General Staff in India. The meanings of the commoner titles are given in an appendix.)

6. ABDUL AHAD, *Wardaki*.—From 1909—1916 was chief Usher (Arzbegi) to Amir Habibulla Khan. Appointed Hakim of Kataghan. In February 1919 was one of the officials who rendered daily reports to the Amir. Was arrested for complicity in the murder of the late Amir and both he and his brother Colonel Abdulla Khan were banished and all their property confiscated by Amanulla in July 1919. Was acquitted of charge and property restored to him. Appointed A.D.-C. to King Amanullah in 1922 and is a great favourite with the King. Sent to Wardak Valley during Mangal rebellion 1924-25 to maintain loyalty amongst Wardakis. Granted title of “*Sardar-i-Ala*.” Officiating Minister of Interior, November 1928.

15. ABDUL AZIZ KHAN, *Muhammadzai, Colonel*.—Eldest son of *Sardar* Abdulla Khan who was killed fighting for Ayub Khan at Girishk. His mother was the daughter of *Sardar* Muhammad Umar, and he is a half-brother of *Sardar* Abdul Majid. He was a refugee at Tehran and Meshed for about 24 years. About 1906 he returned to Kabul at the invitation of Amir Habibulla Khan and was employed as *Naib Kotwal* of Kabul. He is supposed to be well disposed towards the British Government. Was appointed Afghan Envoy with Indian Government in 1915. He was said to be in risk of dismissal in 1916 in consequence of his brother Abdul Majid's escapades. After *Amir* Amanulla Khan came to the throne he was relieved by *Sardar* Abdur Rahman Khan under suspicion of being a partisan of *Sardar* Nasrulla, and Afghan Postmaster at Peshawar had orders to send his private correspondence under separate cover to Mahmud Tarzi, 1919. Arrived Herat, December 1919, *en route* for Tehran where he was to be Afghan Minister. Arrived Meshed, 31st March 1920. Arrived Tehran, May 1920. Considered by the Persians to be a very stupid man, ill-informed of the events of his own country, and had no knowledge of general international politics and few, if any, ideas regarding the role and duties of a diplomatic envoy. Remained Afghan Minister at Teheran until 1925 when he returned to Kabul; created *Sardar-i-Ala* and appointed an Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office. Officiated as Foreign Minister during absence on leave of Mahmud Tarzi, April 1926. Appointed Afghan Minister at Rome, June 1926, and left Kabul for Rome *via* India, 8th August 1927. Appointed Afghan Minister at Tehran, February 1927. Rapidly going deaf and generally lacking in intelligence. Relieved by Sultan Ahmed, November 1928. Received permission to proceed to India *en route* to Europe by British aeroplane, February 1929, with Ahmed Shah. Born 1878.

17. ABDUL AZIZ KHAN, *Yusufzai (Kandak Mishar)*.—Artillery. Son of the late Ghulam Haidar of Charkhi and brother of Ghulam Sadiq. Was on Asmar front in 1919. Commanding Afghan troops in Arandu, October 1919, and refused to move back across Afghan border, saying that he had received no orders to do so from the Amir. Promoted to *Ghund Mishar* in June 1920. Left Kabul with *Ghund Mishar* Ghulam Sadiq Khan and three battalions for Mazar-i-Sharif on 25th June 1920. G. O. C., Kunar Valley, 1922. Hakim of Laghman 1923-24. Under-Secretary to Ministry of Interior, 1926. Visited Lahore, May 1926. Governor of Mazar November 1928. Born 1891.

18. **ABDUL AZIZ, Barakzai.**—Born 1876. Minister of War November 1928. One of the few men really trusted by the Amir and a great favourite of his. Son of Mazullah Khan, *Barakzai* and cousin of the *Ulya Hazrat*. Formerly a Sergeant Usher at Durbars. Appointed *Yawar* (personal assistant) to the Amir in 1919. *Amin-ul-Wajuh* (Octroi Superintendent) 1920. Proceeded from Kabul to Kandahar in November 1920 to raise seven new battalions from the Durani Tribes and also to raise a new bodyguard to be known as the "*Zamarai Ghund*" (Tiger Corps) for the Amir. His recruiting activities caused a great deal of discontent in Kandahar. On 30th December 1920 held a Durbar at Kandahar and presented gold and silver medals to those *Sardars* who had rendered notable service in the late war (1919). Left Kandahar for Kabul on 31st December 1920 and arrived there early in January 1921. Appointed Minister for Home Affairs, 1921. Also *Ishak Aghasi Mulki* (Civil Chamberlain) to the Amir. Said to belong to Mahmud Tarzi's party. Appointed *Naib-ul-Hukuma* of Kandahar in December 1921 in succession to Abdul Qudus. Arrived Kandahar, 10th January 1922. Replaced as Governor of Kandahar early in 1923 by Muhammad Sarwar Khan (*q.v.*), but remained at Kandahar until middle of 1924 when he returned to Kabul. Appointed to officiate as War Minister for Muhammad Wali Khan (*q.v.*) whilst the latter was absent on service in Khost during the Mangal rebellion 1924-25. Appointed Minister of the Interior June 1925. A good Persian scholar; very conceited. Holds the title of "*Sardar-i-Ala*."

46. **ABDUL HADI KHAN, Kakar.**—Son of Abdul Ahad, a *Hakim* of Kandahar. Member of Afghan Peace Delegation, June 1919. Formerly editor of the *Aman-i-Afghan*. Assistant to Mahmud Tarzi, the Foreign Minister, as *Mustasher* (Councillor) in charge of Indian affairs. A leader of the *Mashrutis*. Member, Afghan Delegation, Mussoorie Conference, 1920. Arrived Herat on 11th October 1920 together with *Sardar* Abdul Rahman (Afghan Envoy in India, 1919) and a Brigadier *en route* for Kushk. Mission of party was to enquire into events in Bokhara and the position of the Afghan Consul there. Left Herat with his Mission on 1st November 1920. Arrived Kushk, November 1920. Mission proceeded to Tashkent. Appointed Afghan representative in Bokhara. Left Bokhara on 23rd May 1921 for Kabul *via* Mazar-i-Sharif. Arrived Kabul, 6th July 1921, and took up his duties again in the Indian Section of the Foreign Office. Appointed Envoy and Plenipotentiary of the Afghan Government in London, January 1922. Replaced as Minister in London by Shuja-ed-Dauleh, August 1924. Appointed Minister of Commerce on return from London. Is fanatically anti-foreign. Writes a lot for the "*Aman-i-Afghan*." Being of no important family his appointment as a Minister is distasteful to the Afghan *Sardars*. He is a *Dawai*, a sub-section of the *Kakars* of Kandahar, by tribe (1927). Suspected of "*Republican*" intrigues during King Amanulla's absence in Europe 1928. Retired from Ministry of Commerce October 1928 to become candidate for National Assembly.

51. **ABDUL HAKIM KHAN.**—Appointed to relieve Mirza Mir Akbar as Trade Agent at Peshawar, September 1926. Originally on domestic staff of *Amir* Abdur Rahman; occupied a similar position at Court of *Amir* Habibullah. Latest position was head of Trading Association in Kabul. Elderly and intelligent and enjoys confidence of King Amanulla. Arrived at Peshawar, 20th October 1926, to take up appointment.

53. **ABDUL HAMID, Mulla, Akundzada.**—Born in the Nazian valley, but resides chiefly at Kabul. A *Mullah* of Ningrahar who was several times employed by the Afghan authorities as intermediary with the Turkish emissaries who were in Tirah during the Great War. He first came to notice when he accompanied Mulla Muhammad Rasul of Morcha, on his visit to the Turks and Afridi allowance holders in Tirah in 1916. In 1917 he returned to Tirah, apparently with the object of persuading the Turks to return with him to Kabul. Having remained in Tirah for about 2½ months without success, he returned to Afghanistan in November. So far as is known he was merely a bearer of orders and did not identify himself with the *anti-British* party. In June 1918 he was again in Tirah with the object of summoning the chief

Afridi *mullahs* to Kabul, and informed all the leading *mullahs* and allowance holders that a *jirga* of Afridis and Orakzais had been invited by *Amir* Habibullah Khan to come to Kabul after the *Id*. He did not meet with much success and was eventually driven to ask the leading Afridi and Orakzai *mullahs* to provide him with an escort as far as the Afghan border. One of the religious heads in Kandahar and has much influence over populace (1925). A learned theologian and respectable.

61. **ABDUL KARIM KHAN, Barakzai, Gund Mishar.**—Eldest son of *Qazi* Saad-ud-Din Khan and grandson of the late Khan-i-Mulla Khan, chief *Qazi* of Afghanistan. Was *Naib-ul-Hukma* of Jalalabad from February 1903 till early in 1905, when he was dismissed and summoned to Kabul and imprisoned. Was subsequently appointed Inspector-General of Education at Kabul. In 1916 he was said to have been appointed *Kotwali* Colonel, and later to be unemployed and in receipt of a pension of Rs. 700 per annum. Reported in May 1908 to have been appointed head Tahsildar. Was unemployed in Kabul in 1913, but in 1914 was Governor of Hazarajat. The Hazaras appear to have complained to *Amir* Habibullah Khan of his corrupt practices, and he was again unemployed in 1917. Was arrested in July 1919, together with his son Azim Jan, both being accused of having attempted to murder the *Amir*, and Azim Jan was reported to have been executed. In October 1919 was reported in Kandahar. Promoted Civil Brigadier and confirmed as *Hakim* of Ghazni, 1921. Arrived in Jalalabad to take over the Governorship of Eastern Provinces, January 1922, where he apparently had civil powers only; relieved temporarily by Ahmad Ali Khan in July 1922; Governor again in September 1922. Experienced difficulties with Shinwaris and Khugianis. Appointed Governor of Turkestan, November 1923, and still holds that appointment in 1927. Is extremely corrupt, and reported to be pro-Russian. Governor of Kandahar, November 1928.

104. **ABDUR RAHIM, Indian, Maulvi (alias MAULVI BASHIR alias MUHAMMAD NASIR).**—Son of *Maulvi* Rahim Baksh, *ex-Imam* of Chinianwala Mosque, Lahore. Preached *jihad* to students. Escaped to Frontier and endeavoured to incite Swat, Buner, and Mohmand tribes in 1905. Reported trying to stir up Mohmands in June 1919. Later reported with the Hindustani Fanatics. Lives usually at Chamarkhand. Left for Kabul with Obeidulla and Abdul Karim, October 1919. Rewarded by the *Amir*. In Waziristan, 1921. In March of the same year issued a circular letter to sepoys of the Indian Army inciting them to desert with their arms and bombs. Purchased for Rs. 400 from the Bannuchi and Marwat deserters, who deserted from the 2/25th Punjabis at Kotkai on 13th December 1920, the Lewis gun which they stole. Incited the Mahsuds for several months to continue their resistance against us. The agent of Haji Abdul Razak in Mahsud country from whom he receives money, ammunition and supplies for distribution to the tribesmen. Later in Makin. Said to have had with him ten Hindustani Fanatics who were Punjabis and the six Bannuchis who deserted from the 2/25th Punjabis. Also said to have received money and supplies direct from the Afghan authorities at Matum (Khost). In Kabul, 1922. In February 1922 he was reported to be in trouble owing to his having assisted the Russians in their intrigues with Indian revolutionaries. In April he was severely censured by *Amir* who had received an anonymous letter in which he was accused of lack of zeal in the cause of Islam. Moved his quarters from Chamarkand to Pashat on the Kunar River. He got in touch with M. Stark (Russian Minister at Kabul) at Jalalabad in March 1925. Wrote several articles for *Ittihad-i-Mashraqi* and himself set up an office there. Returned to Chamarkand in April 1925. In July 1925 he was in Kabul, in touch with M. Stark, and Harnam Singh, Punjabi. In March 1926 it was reported he was being financed with Russian money with the object of winning over the fanatical Asmar Colony. In May 1926 reported as having arrived in Jalalabad when the *Amir* was visiting there, and as having received Rs. 6,000. Reported in Kabul on 24th September 1926 when he attended an anti-British meeting. Was at a Tea party given by Mohendra Pratab in November 1926 in Kabul: spoke at the newly formed Indian National Club. Reported in Chamarkand in January 1927 and was declared *Amir* of Chamarkand Colony *vice* Fazal

Illahi. In Kabul, March 1927, and received Rs. 3,000 from Governor of Eastern Provinces. In May 1927 reported to have received Rs. 24,000 (K) from Minister of Interior, Kabul, as allowance for two years and to have left Kabul for Chamarkand.

127. ABDUR RAHMAN (*or* RAHIM KHAN), *Jabar Khel, Ghilzai*.—Son of Asmatulla Khan, Chief of the Ghilzais, who led the latter against us in 1879 and who was eventually hanged by Abdur Rahman in 1882. Was a refugee in Peshawar for many years. Permitted to return and sent to reside in Herat (1905). Appointed in the summer of 1907 *Hakim* of Andarab and reported in 1908 to be still in Turkestan. One brother in Kabul, and one Paimda Khan in Jalalabad. Unemployed (1913). One of the first acts of Amir Amanulla Khan on ascending the throne was to summon him to Kabul. He was given a *Khillat* of Rs. 10,000 (*Kabuli*) in cash, 12 ·303 rifles and the *jagir* worth Rs. 50,000 (*Kabuli*) previously enjoyed by his father. This pleased the Ghilzais. Reported to have been sent to Kahi in July 1919 to raise the Shinwaris against the British. In March 1920 said to have been made head of the Ghilzais in Kabul district. In May 1924 was sent to settle the *Hasht-Nafri* question with the Shinwaris, and stated to *jirga* that the *Amir* had promised them exemption. Has considerable influence with the tribe. Interviewed by Amir in August 1924 and promised to send *lashkar* to Gardez to help troops.
158. ABDUL SHAKUR KHAN.—Afghan Envoy in Kagan, 1919. Active in counter-espionage. Reported to have been replaced by Muhammad Usman Khan, March 1920. Was arrested and interned by Bolsheviks when they over-ran Bokhara in September 1920. Reported interned in Bokhara city, October 1920. In Mazar-i-Sharif *en route* for Kabul, June 1921, with Abdul Hadi. Arrived in Kabul, July 1921. Under Secretary of Turkey and Persia Department of Foreign Office; appointed assistant to Governor of Badakhshan and Qataghan, January 1926, to deal with Badakhshan. A native of the Jalalabad district. Was employed in the Afghan Post Office for some time, and knows the Peshawar district well. Governor of Jalalabad November 1928.
161. ABDUL TAWAB KHAN, *Muhammadzai*.—Son of Mahmud Tarzi. Proceeded to Europe for his education in company with a party of Afghan students in October 1921. Admitted to St. Cyr early in 1924, and completed course of nearly three years' duration there. Appointed instructor in Cavalry School, Kabul, February 1927. A smart, well-mannered youth of whom more should be heard in the future. Head of Cavalry School, 1928. With King Amanulla in Europe, 1928. Escaped with Inayatulla to Peshawar by British aeroplane, January 1929. Born 1902.
164. ABDUL WAIHAB, *Muhammadzai*.—Son of Mahmud Tarzi. Born about 1900. Accompanied his father to the Afghan-Mussoorie Conference, 1920. Said to be a smart and promising lad. Left Kabul on 14th August 1921, bound for London *via* Bombay, with despatches. An undergraduate, Exeter College, Oxford. Visited Kabul, July–September 1925. Escaped with Inayatulla to Peshawar by British aeroplane, January 1929.
165. ABDUL WAHID—A *Safi* of Chouki, Kunar, whose parents migrated to Shinwari country when he was a boy. Went to Australia at an early age and remained there many years, making a good deal of money, and marrying an Australian woman. In 1924 obtained gold mining concessions for Kandahar district, and went to Europe where he formed "The Durani Syndicate" and returned to Afghanistan with engineers who prospected the district and reported unfavourably. Made a bid for Khanate of Kunar and paid a good deal for the estate of Mir Zaman Khan of Kunar. Visited Peshawar in 1925 and married a Peshawari woman of low birth. Returned to Kabul in May 1926 and earned King's displeasure at uncompromising attitude *re* Kunar dispute, in which his chances of gaining anything for his money seemed to be waning. He returned again to Peshawar in August 1926. Reported in September 1926 to be attempting to stir up trouble amongst Mohmands against Mir Zaman and the King. Offered to ensure safety of

British Legation from attacks by tribesmen, December 1928. Said then to have great influence with Chaknaur Mulla. Is also known as Mr. Wade, and reputed to be a Shinwari by tribe.

170. ABDUL WAKIL KHAN, *Kafir, Naib Salar*.—Formerly a *Ghulam Bacha* of Amir Habibulla Khan. Took over command of the Kandahar garrison on the 5th June, 1913. Showed himself a keen officer anxious to improve the training of the troops. Took prominent part in the disorders in Kandahar in 1913 in opposition to the *Naib-ul-Hukuma*, Muhammad Usman Khan (*q.v.*) and was thanked by Amir Habibulla Khan for his services. In 1916 he was recalled to Kabul and appointed to command the *Police Brigade (Ghund-i-Kotwali)*. He was promoted Major-General by Amanulla Khan about the beginning of March 1919. Commanding Afghan forces in Kumar (June 1919). Unpopular with his troops. Chitral front, 1920, carrying on *jihad* propaganda. Married a daughter of Muhammad Ali Khan, *Malik* of Lambabat, June 1920. Summoned to Kabul from Asmar, September 1920. Officiating Commander at Jalalabad, October 1920. Returned to Kabul, 12th November, 1920. Said to be commanding all the recruits (some 600) under training at Kabul, July 1921. Commander of Kabul Corps, 1923. *Naib Salar*. Appointed G.O.C., Badakhshan and Qataghan, August 1925. A man of progressive ideas. Called to Jalalabad during rebellion, December 1928. Said to be fighting for Ali Ahmad Khan, January 1929.
- AFZAL, MUIHAMMAD, *Shinwari*.—Formerly a Colonel in the army. A leader of the Shinwari rebellion, November 1928.
186. AHMAD ALI KHAN, *Colonel*.—Son of Abdul Wahid Khan. Appointed Afghan Agent at Bombay towards the end of 1916, and took over from Colonel Ghulam Rasul Khan, the former Envoy, on the 10th January 1917. Was said to have been ordered to reform the spy system and increase the staff on a large scale. About the end of March 1919 he was in Kabul, and in a letter to his brother stated that he had been offered the appointment of Afghan Envoy to the Government of India, but that he had asked for a job at Kabul instead. Came down to the Khaibar in November 1919 under orders from Mahmud Tarzi to assume duties of Afghan Consul at Peshawar, but was not permitted to enter British territory. Wrote to the Amir saying this was due to his having been *Mehmandar* to the Bolsheviks (in Kabul ?) who corresponded with the Amir through him. Ordered by Amir to stay with General Nadir Khan in Jalalabad till further orders. Collecting revenue, Ningrahar, March 1920. Took over *Sarhang* of Dakka from Abdul Hakim, September 1920. Relieved of his appointment, March 1921, but remained at Dakka as a sort of Political Officer. Said to be much trusted by the Amir who refused to listen to complaints against him, communicated with him direct and increased his political allowances to Rs. 100 per mensem, June 1921. Said to have come successfully out of an enquiry into his conduct, August 1921. Still *Sarhang* of Dakka, November 1921. Relieved and left Dakka for Kabul on 1st November 1921. Appointed *Hakim-i-Kalan* of Kohistan, December 1921. In Kohistan, 1923. Governor of Simat-i-Mashriqi during crisis over the Landi Kotal murders, and organised pursuit of Ardali and Daud Shah which resulted in death of Ardali. A clever man; governed his province harshly; disgraced Mir Zaman of Kunar. Appointed Afghan Minister at Berlin, August 1925, and left Kabul for India *en route* to Berlin, 14th September 1925. Chief of Kabul municipality November 1928. Sent to Chanikar to raise recruits during rebellion, December 1928. Lost his men and himself returned to Kabul with difficulty. A Tajik by tribe.
195. AHMAD SHAH KHAN, *Sardar, Muhammadzai, Colonel*.—Son of Sardar Muhammad Asaf Khan, Commander of the *Mir Aspor* bodyguard at Kabul. Accompanied Amir Habibulla Khan to India in 1907. On the night of the murder of Amir Habibulla Khan, he was in command of the guard which was that night composed of men of the *Sari-Os* and *Shahi Rikabi* whose duty it was to protect the Amir in his tent in Laghman. They were actually inside the *kanats* surrounding the Amir's tent, but neither made any attempt to deter the assassin nor to arrest him after the Amir was murdered. The sepoy of [20088]

the *Ghund-i-Ardalian*, whose Colonel, Ali Shah Raza, was executed as the actual murderer, believed that Ahmad Shah Khan was the real murderer and that their Colonel had been made a scapegoat. After the *darbar* at which the trial of those accused of the murder took place, all the relatives of the *Musahiban-i-Khas*, Sardars Muhammad Asaf Khan and Muhammad Yusuf Khan, who had been under suspicion, were not only liberated but had favours showered on them by Amir Amanulla Khan, in order to compensate them for the trials they had been through. Ahmad Shah Khan was betrothed to one of Amir Amanulla Khan's sisters. In Khost, June 1919. Said to be brother-in-law of Ali Ahmad Khan and so son-in-law of Luinab Kuhushdil Khan. Arrived in Quetta from the Chaman Front *en route* to Kabul with the son of Abdul Qudus, August 1919. A.-D.-C. to the King. Speaks English and Urdu. A pleasant, well-mannered man. Allowed to go to Peshawar by British aeroplane February 1929 in order to proceed to Europe with message from Habibulla Khan to Nadir Khan. Born 1891.

196. AJAB.—Son of Ghulam Haidar, Bosti Khel, of Kohat Pass. A member of the gang responsible for the Ellis and Watts murders, April 1923. Under arrest in Kabul in January 1924. Sent to Mazar-i-Sharif, January 1924. Threatened to kill the Governor of Mazar. Still believed to be in prison at Mazar, 1926. Said to have petitioned the King for permission to return to E. Afghanistan in May 1927, but to have received a non-committal reply.

211. ALAM KHAN, MUHAMMAD, *Shinwari of Marez, Mulki Brigadier*.—Nephew of Habibulla Khan, Shinwari. In 1904 he commenced raising three regiments of Shinwaris apparently without orders; he was summoned to Kabul and deprived of employment; unemployed in 1913. About the beginning of March 1919, Amir Amanulla Khan issued orders for his arrest, on the ground that he had endeavoured to raise trouble on behalf of Sardar Nasrulla Khan. He contrived, however, to evade arrest. Granted a yearly allowance of Rs. 3,000 in June 1921 and living in Kabul. Left Kabul for his home, June 1921. To Kabul in August 1922. Chief instigator of Shinwari opposition against *Hasht Nafri*. A great friend of the Sultan Muhammad Khel family of which *Sardar* Nadir Khan is the head. A leader of the Shinwari rebellion November 1928.

214. ALI AHMAD KHAN (ALI AHMAD JAN), *Barakzai*.—Son of Loe Naib Khushdil Khan by a daughter of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan, nephew of the Ulya Hazrat and brother-in-law of King Amanulla. Born about 1883 and educated at Murree. Knows English, Urdu and Pushtu very well and was described in 1904 as a smart young fellow. Accompanied *Sardar* Inayatulla Khan to India. Appointed *Ihsak Aghasi Mulki* in January 1905. Accompanied *Amir* Habibulla Khan to India in 1907, and during his Herat tour that year, was said to have much influence with him. In 1915 he was sent to Ningrahar to enquire into the participation of Afghans in the Mohmand disturbance near Shabkadar in April of that year, and to prevent such participation in future. He was said to have *Amir* Habibulla Khan's confidence and to be *pro-British*, but lazy and forgetful. In February 1919 he was said to have fallen into disgrace by reason of his failure to carry out *Amir* Habibulla Khan's orders regarding road repairs, for which the *Ishak Aghasi Mulki* is responsible. *Amir* Habibulla Khan was also said to be incensed against him owing to his having endeavoured to obtain one of his daughters in marriage through the influence of the Ulya Hazrat. He was fined Rs. 2,000 and his pay was suspended. When *Amir* Amanulla Khan ascended the throne he shared in the trials of those who were at Jalalabad and had supported *Sardar* Nasrulla Khan's designs on the throne. He was arrested by the soldiers at Jalalabad, and the *Amir* was said to be much annoyed by the warm and zealous speech which he had delivered in Jalalabad at the *darbar* held there by Nasrulla when the latter was acclaimed *Amir*. He was, however, released and was said to be acting on Amanulla Khan's staff early in April. Later in the month he was apparently again in trouble in connection with a sum of Rs. 11,00,000 for road repairs of which he seemed unable to render any account. *Amir* Amanulla Khan ordered him to pay it up within one year, and he was apparently able to get a few wealthy men to go surety for

him. Appointed President of Afghan Peace Delegates (June 1919). Leader of the *pro-Peace* party. Appointed Home Minister (*Nazar-i-Mulki*), August 1919. Left Kabul, end of September 1919, according to rumour, for Bokhara to bring a daughter of *Amir* of Bokhara to wed Amanulla. Returned November 1919. Married a sister of the *Amir* Amanulla in 1919. Said to have fallen into disfavour and to be distrusted by the *Amir*, June 1920. Had a violent quarrel with Ghulam Nabi, during which both drew their swords, July 1920. Shortly after he was released from confinement but placed under restriction. Relieved of appointment of Home Minister. In September 1920 he was at liberty but unemployed, about the same time it was reported that the *Amir* had ordered him refund 11 lacs due from him. In the beginning of 1921 he was again reported as placed under arrest, and that his property would be auctioned in order to obtain the balance of 12½ lacs which he is said to owe to the State. Again reported to be in close arrest in Kabul, December 1921. Was in arrest in his house in 1922 and 1923. Restored to favour at end of 1923. Appointed Chief of administrative reforms (*Rais Tanzeem*) in Jalalabad Province during Mangal rising of 1924. Succeeded in collecting a large body of Mohmands, Afridis, and other tribesmen, and inflicted losses on rebels which broke the back of the rebellion. Granted title of *Tazi Afghan* and appointed Governor of Kabul, June 1925. Has considerable influence with tribesmen, especially Mohmands. Second wife is sister of King Amanullah. Has three sons Ghulam Muhammad, Mir Ahmed, and Sultan Ahmed; the last by his second wife. Headed successful punitive expedition against Kohistan raiders, April and May 1926. Rendered valuable assistance on occasion of burning of British Legation, Kabul, December 1926. A personal friend of the members of the British Legation at Kabul. A popular man with great force of character: ruthless, and courageous. With King Amanulla in Europe 1928. Unemployed on return. Made Commander and Administrator-in-Chief for suppression of Shinwari rebellion December 1928. Reported to be intriguing with the tribes of the Eastern Province at Jalalabad for recognition as *Amir*, but to have assured King Amanulla this was only a ruse, January 1929. Consequently distrusted by all. After capture of Kabul by Habibulla Khan, January 1929, proclaimed *Amir* with assistance of Khugionis and some Ghilzais and started to march on Kabul.

227. ALI MUHAMMAD KHAN, *Mirza*.—Has travelled in Europe, whence he returned in 1923. Appointed *Rais* in the Ministry of Education on return from Europe, and promoted Under-Secretary of Ministry of Education in 1925. Visited India to attend Aligarh University celebrations in January 1926, and gave exaggerated reports of Afghan educational progress to Indian press. Is a brother-in-law of late *Amir* Habibulla. Speaks English, and is a sound, sensible man. Appointed Afghan Minister at Rome, *vice* Abdul Aziz, February 1927. With King Amanulla in London, March 1928. Minister of Commerce, November 1928.

231. AMANULLA KHAN, *Siraj-ul-Milat-wa-ud-din*, King of Afghanistan.—Born 1st June 1892 and is the third son of *Amir* Habibulla Khan by the Ulya Hazrat. Was a favourite of *Amir* Habibulla Khan and held the title of *Ain-ud-Daulah* (Eye of the State) and head of the *Khassudars*. In 1914, he married Souriya, daughter of the foreign minister, *Sardar* Mahmud Tarzi. In 1916, was reported to be friendly with the German mission in Kabul and in favour of intervention in the war against Britain. In 1917 he appeared to lose favour with *Amir* Habibulla Khan. When the court moved to Jalalabad in winter of 1918-19 he remained behind as Governor of Kabul and was in a very strong position with control of the chief military strength, treasure and stores when the *Amir* was murdered in February 1919. On receiving the news of his father's death and of the succession of *Sardar* Nasrulla, he proclaimed himself *Amir*, declared Nasrulla a usurper and accused him of complicity in the murder. The troops at Jalalabad and at Kabul sided with him, and Nasrulla was compelled to submit. On February 27th at a *darbar* he was formally crowned by the Tagao Mulla and made a speech in which he stated that Inayatulla had, by his recognition of the usurpation of the throne by Nasrulla, forfeited his claim to it. On March 3rd he addressed a letter to H. E. the Viceroy informing him that he had been

universally accepted as *Amir* by the people of Afghanistan. He appointed *Sardar* Abdul Qudus (*q.v.*), his Prime Minister and *Sardar* Mahmud Tarzi, Foreign Minister. On April 13th, he held a special *darbar* at the Qaumi Bagh at Kabul for the trial of those accused of the *Amir's* murder. All civil and military officials were invited, as well as the leading men, *mullahs*, Muhammadzai *sardars* and every tenth man of the army in Kabul. A colonel in the Household troops named Ali Shah Raza who was made the scapegoat was sentenced to death and executed on the conclusion of the *darbar*, *Sardar* Nasrulla and others were sentenced to imprisonment for life. It appears probable that, about this time, he began to encounter difficulties, including, intrigues on behalf of *Sardar* Inayatulla, and finding an outlet in the then disturbed state of India, to divert the attention of the Army from home affairs, he embarked on the 3rd Afghan War. Until the end of 1925 he remained in Kabul consolidating his position in the capital. In 1926 he made visits to Jalalabad and Kandahar and thoroughly overhauled the administration of those districts. In April 1927 paid a visit to Afghan Turkestan returning to Kabul, 14th June. He is described as a cruel, ambitious and not very clever young man, but has considerable force of character, energy and drive. Toured Europe 1927-1928. On return started intensive campaign for social and educational reform. This led to rising by the Shinwaris, which spread to other parts. Attacked at Kabul by Habibulla Khan (Bacha-i-Saqao) December 14th-25th, 1928, and again in January 1929. Announced his abdication in favour of Inayatulla January 14th and fled to Kandahar a day or two later. At Kandahar attempted to rally support for Durani dynasty, and formally rescinded abdication January 23rd or 24th, official communication to H.M. Consul being made on January 27th, 1929. His sons are Hadayatulla (*q.v.*), Rahmatulla (*q.v.*) and Ihsanulla. The last two, and his four daughters, are by Queen Souriya.

235. AMIN KHAN MUHAMMAD.—Secretary to Afghan Legation, Berlin, to November 1926. Appointed Under Secretary in charge of Visa and Passport Branch of Foreign Office at end of 1926. With King Amanulla in Europe 1928.

236. AMINULLAH JAN (or AMIN KHAN) MUHAMMAD, *Sardar, Muhammadzai*.—Born 12th October 1885. Third surviving son of Amir Abdul Rahman. His mother was a slave girl belonging to the late Bibi Halima who was said to have adopted him before her own son was born. Was formerly in charge of the *Shara* (Muhammadan law) Department at Kabul and was also in charge of the *Jobba Khana* (magazine). In 1917 he held the appointment of *Sardar i-Madafa* (director of military stores). Has one son born about 1903, and a daughter said to have been married to Sardar Abdul Qudus, August 1919, at Kandahar. He is profoundly dissatisfied with life in Afghanistan and has made several attempts to obtain permission to reside in India, but the Amir has definitely refused him permission to leave Afghanistan (1926). He is very eccentric and at present has no following. Appointed A.D.-C. to the King, 1926. Arrested by Habibulla Khan, January 1929.

241. AMIR MUHAMMAD, *Akhunzada, the Chaknaur Mulla*.—Has much influence among the Mohmands and is a disciple of the Chaharmung *mulla*, Saiyid Ahmad. In April 1915 he led 4,000 Mohmands against the British at Shabkadr and in September 1915 he joined the Babra *mulla* in another attack. Was reported to be about to raise a force of Khwaezai and Baezai Mohmands in 1916, but was detained by order of the Afghan authorities and was not allowed to enter Mohmand territory. Amir Amanulla Khan gave orders for his arrest at Jalalabad in the beginning of March 1919, on the ground that he had endeavoured to raise trouble on behalf of Sardar Nasrulla Khan. Before he could be arrested, however, he escaped. Present with lashkars opposed to British at Dakka, June 1919. Reported to be in Kabul, October 1920. Left Kabul for his home on 15th October 1920. Arrived at Hada on 26th January 1921, where he was summoned by the Amir, together with several other prominent *Mullas*, to advise, if called upon, regarding negotiations with the British Mission. Visited the Amir at Paghman, September 1921. Arrived in the Tirah from Jalalabad, October 1921. Left

Jalalabad for Kabul, December 1921. Building mosque in Gandao, 1923. Attended the *Loe Jirga* at Paghman in 1924. Persuaded by Governor of Jalalabad to carry out propaganda tour in favour of *Amir*, during which he addressed large gatherings of Mohmands, August and September 1925. Returned to his home, October 1925, and reported to have received 6,000 rupees from *Amir*. Sent Rs. 500 to Gandab school in Mohmand territory, an effort to support *Amir's* educational policy. Left Jalalabad, April 1926, to perform *Haj*, but recalled by *Amir* to assist in Kunar settlement and promised *Haj* expenses at a later date. Left for Bombay, May 1926, to catch steamer for *Haj* but could not get berth and so returned, 14th June 1926. Relations between *Mullah* and Afghan Government very cordial, September 1926. Considerable sum of money sent him by Afghan Government to assist him in soothing disturbed feelings of Mohmands. Held feasts and *jirgas* in Mohmand country, October 1926, to influence feeling in favour of *Amir*. Visited Lalpura, November 1926. Instructed by Afghan Government not to visit Mohmand country again until further orders, November 1926. In January 1927, Afghan Government's attitude towards the *Mulla* seemed to have undergone a change, as they forbade him to maintain armed retinues or summon *lashkars*; they seemed to fear change of attitude on *Mulla's* part whilst large party of armed men were at his disposal. He proposes to proceed on *Haj* in 1927. Getting old but is still the most influential *Mulla* in the Simat-i-Mashriqi, especially amongst the Mohmands. At outbreak of Shinwari rebellion kept the Mohmands in check.

252. ASADULLA KHAN.—A son of Amir Habibullah Khan by Ulya Janab, sister of *Sardar* Nadir Khan. Aged 15 (1926). A possible claimant to the throne (February 1929), as he may be the nominee of Sultan Muhammad Khel party, of which *Sardar* Nadir Khan is the head.

ATA-UL-HAQ, [?] *Uzbek*.—Born about 1885. Eldest son of the late Khwaja Jan, who was formerly an important refugee in India, and a brother of Sher Jan (*q.v.*) and General Muhammad Sadiq (*q.v.*). The family comes from a village near Charikar and is well respected. Lived in India until he was 16. Has served in many civil appointments. Accompanied Amir Habibulla on his Indian tour 1906-7. Recently spent two years in Moscow in charge of Afghan students. Described as well-educated and having a pleasant manner (1928). Appointed Foreign Minister by Habibulla Khan on latter's accession to power at Kabul, January, 1929.

280. AZIMULLAH KHAN, *Wazirzada Saddozai, Peshawari, Civil Brigadier*.—Son of Abbas Khan and nephew of Colonel Muhammad Aslam Khan, who was formerly Court Interpreter at Kabul. Well mannered and clever but untrustworthy. Visited India in 1905 to purchase arms, etc., for Amir Habibulla Khan and returned to Kabul in June 1906. Accompanied Amir Habibulla Khan to India, and was there treated very favourably, and so earned the dislike and jealousy of the *Sardars*, especially of Muhammad Yusuf and Muhammad Asaf. Also accompanied the late Amir on his Herat tour. From that time till 1916 he was employed as English Interpreter, and Superintendent of Amir Habibulla Khan's Translation Office. He was said to have lost favour owing to being suspected of showing his friends Government papers. In 1916 he was reported to be looked down on by the nobility, but to have made himself indispensable to Amir Habibulla Khan, over whom he had great influence. He was described as a "Grafter" of the first order, who got money from everybody and everything. Talks English very fluently. In 1917 he had official dealings with Europeans employed by the Afghan Government and interfered frequently in their business. In Kabul, 1919, but not of Amanulla's party and therefore not in high favour. Appointed officer in charge of confiscated property, June 1920. Sent to Maimana, July 1921, on account of some trouble with Abdul Aziz. Reported to be returning to Kabul shortly to take up the post of Minister of Agriculture 1922, and remained in that post till end of 1923, when he was appointed Minister at Rome. Replaced by Abdul Aziz June 1926, and arrived in Kabul from Rome 21st November 1926. Appointed 2nd Under-Secretary in Foreign Office, January 1927. Officiating Governor of Badakshan and Kataghan 1928.

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BACHA-I-SAQAO.—(See Habibulla Khan).

292. BADSHAH GUL.—Son of the *Haji* of Turangzai. Summoned to Jalalabad by the Amir, May 1926, in connection with Kunar disturbances. One of the leading men through whom the Afghan government hope to conciliate the Mohmands, January 1927. Interviewed by the King at Jalalabad re the Mohmand question January 1927. Returned to Lakavai. Paid a flying visit to Kabul in May returning on 6th June 1927. Reported to have received a large sum of money for distribution to the tribesmen. Believed to correspond with Soviet Embassy, November 1928.

302. BASHIR, MUHAMMAD, *Maulvi*.—See Abdur Rahim.

311. CHAKNAUR MULLA.—(See Amir Muhammad, *Akhunzada*).

337. FAZAL ILAHI, *Maulvi*.—Was born at Wazirabad (Gujranwala) in 1882 and is the son of *Haji* Mian Baksh. After matriculating from the Scotch Mission School, he joined the Canal Department to learn survey work. He worked there for 10 months, and then found a post in the office of the S. D. O., N. W. Railway, at Wazirabad, where he learnt draftsmanship. Fazal Elahi had always been religiously inclined, and had long been receiving instruction in *Sufism* by *Sufi* Wali Mohammad of Fatuhi-Walla in the Lahore District. In 1905 he visited Asmas on a month's leave, and was very well treated. In 1907 he resigned his post, and devoted himself to the study of the *Quran*. A year afterwards, he accompanied a messenger of the *Amir-ul-Mujahidin* on a tour through India, collecting for the *Mujahidin* cause. Soon after his return home, Fazal Elahi again visited Asmas, and was given a present of Rs. 200 by the Amir. Later he was made trustee of the *Mujahidin* fund for the Punjab. From there about Rs. 2,000 were remitted annually to Asmas. He still continued to pay occasional visits to Asmas, and, at the beginning of 1915, he and his brother facilitated the flight of the Lahore students to the *Mujahidin* Colony. In the middle of 1915, at the request of the new *Amir-ul-Mujahidin* (Niamatullah) Fazal Elahi again visited Asmas, and was asked to head a deputation to Kabul. His condition, that he should be allowed to settle in Asmas on his return, was refused by Niamatullah, so he returned home. During the Mohmand disturbances of 1915, Fazal Elahi toured India collecting subscription for the *Mujahidin* troops, who were taking part. On his return to Wazirabad, he was arrested and interned in Jullunder jail. He subsequently made a statement outlining his various activities in the cause of *Jihad*. He was released in 1918, and restricted to the Wazirabad *tehsil*. In the middle of 1920, however, he slipped off to Kabul and thence to the *Mujahidin* colony at Chamarkand, where with the help of *Maulvi* Bashir, he worked for the downfall of Niamatullah, *Amir* at Asmas. In 1921, Abdul Karim, the *Amir* of the Chamarkand party, was recalled to Asmas, and Fazal Elahi proclaimed himself *Amir* at Chamarkand. He was the chief instigator of the murder of Amir Niamatullah. In 1923 a dispute arose between *Maulvi* Bashir and Fazal Elahi over the *Amir*-ship at Chamarkand, and the years 1924 and 1925 were spent in a struggle for power between Fazal Elahi and Bashir. The latter gradually forged ahead and slowly, but surely, undermined the power and prestige of his own chief, whose internal efforts to make his Chamarkand colony self-supporting gradually failed. Eventually, in November 1925, Bashir succeeded in suborning the loyalty of his followers, and in persuading the *Amir* of Asmas to join him in evicting Fazal Elahi. The latter, realising the weakness of his own position, abdicated at beginning of 1926, leaving Bashir in sole command at Chamarkand. He left Chamarkand in January 1926 with 10 followers for Asmas and took an oath before *Amir* Rahmatullah that he had had no hand in the murder of the late *Amir* Niamatullah and *Amir* Rahmatullah made peace with him. In February he and his small following performed "*bait*" (oath of allegiance) and agreed to live permanently in Asmas, leaving Chamarkand in the hands of Bashir for the time being. His presence in Asmas, however, proved most uncomfortable for all and at the end of March 1926 he returned to Chamarkand, but did not take charge, the colony being run by a Committee. He paid a visit to Jalalabad in June, July. In January 1927, the dispute

between Bashir and Fazl Ilahi was settled by a *jirga* of *Mullahs* and the *Haji* of Turangzai at Chamarkand. The settlement and property were divided equally, but Bashir, having a following of about 60, was declared the *Amir*. Joined the *Haji* during the Mohmand unrest in May-June 1927.

FAZAL-I-UMAR, *alias* SHER AGHA.—One of the Hazrats of Shor Bazar (*q.v.*). Has been in communication with *Sardars* Azam and Akram, of the "refugee" colony in Afghanistan, and was expelled from the North-West Frontier Province under the Security Regulation in March, 1928, for reactionary preaching against the Afghan Government. In September, 1928, when his brothers were arrested for plotting against King Amanulla, the Afghan Government asked that particular care should be taken to prevent his return to Afghanistan. At same time an emissary of Afghan Government, Amir-ud-Din visited him at Gondal in Kathiawar, with object of inducing him to return. He remained however, in Gondal.

338. FAZAL-I-WAHID, *Haji* (known as *Haji Sahib* of Turangzai).—Son of Fazali Ahmed, *Haji Khel*, Mohmand, Pirzada of Umarzai, P. S. Tangi. Born in 1858. Is an influential man among the followers of the late *Mulla* of Adda and most of the villages in Peshawar District. Feelings towards Government very hostile. Is a British subject. Owns very little land. Was given some land in the *maira* near Turangzai and built a large mosque and hostel for his *Sheiks* and disciples. In 1908 he was released from Jail on ten of the leading Hadhtnagar *Maliks* giving Rs. 5,000 security that he would not preach in an inflammatory style or leave Charsadda without permission. Visited Kabul in the same year. In 1914 he tried but with little success to induce the villagers of the District to boycott Government schools in favour of the mosque. His principal endeavour has been to abolish payment for women. His security lapsed March, 1915. In June 1915 he left British territory and started an agitation against Government in Buner which came to a head in an attack on Rustam, in August. He subsequently moved to Bagh in Mohmand (Kandahari) country and has since been un placably hostile to Government losing no opportunity to suborn the assured clans. Recently he has acted as Afghan Agent for the distribution of Afghan allowances and has largely alienated the Mohmands by his display of favouritism. He took a prominent part against Government in the 3rd Afghan War and went to Afghanistan for service against the Mangals. His influence in Mohmand and neighbouring country is confined to the Mitai Musakhel, the Qandaharis, the Utmanzai and Dawezai and Bajaur. His activities in alienating the Mohmands have increased and aided by his son Badshah Gul and the *Faqir* of Alingar (see Who's Who, N.-W. F. P.) in May-June 1927 he succeeded in rousing the tribesmen to make an attack on our frontier posts in the vicinity of Shabkadr. The attack was half-hearted and our aerial bombing convinced them of the futility of further advance. The *Haji* retired to Lakarai to think out further plans for creating trouble.

FAZAL RAHIM.—(See Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazar).

348. GH AUS-UD-DIN, *Ghilzai*.—Son of the late Jehandad Khan, implicated the Ahmadzai Mangal revolt in 1912, and executed for insolence in 1914. Ghaus-ud-din was concerned in a conspiracy against Amir Habibulla in 1915, with Muhammad Akram and Muhammad Khan, sons of the late Ayub Khan. Was confined in the Jubbulpore Jail. Said to have been given permission by Amanulla to return to Afghanistan. Brother of Chanud Khan. Amir ordered the restoration of his father's family lands and properties, November 1920. Left Kabul with 500 armed tribesmen for Bokhara, September 1920. Arrived Kabul with his brother Momen Shah, August 1920. Arrested March 1924, and detained in the Arq whilst there was trouble in Khost but later released and proceeded to Khost where his handling of the Ahmedzai Ghilzais in the *Amir's* favour gained him the title of "Mir-i-Afghan." Awarded a *lakh* and a half of rupees for his services. Made overtures to British Government after flight of King Amanulla to Kandahar, January 1929.

358. GHULAM HAIDAR, *Mirza*, *Wardaki*.—Son of Ghulam Raza, and brother of Mirza Ghulam Muhammad, *Wardaki*. He was Afghan postmaster in [20088]

Peshawar 1903—1919. Trusted by Amir Habibullah. His office was one of the centres of espionage in India. Received greater financial powers for secret service work on his return from Kabul in 1916, and the order of *Shujat* (bravery) and the title of Colonel was conferred on him. Pay also raised to Rs. 12,000 (Kabuli) per annum. Held lucrative post of Forwarding Agent at Peshawar, but relieved in 1916 by Ali Ahmed Khan. Accompanied by his nephew and Nur Muhammad Khan, *Sadbashi*, passed up the Khaibar to see the new *Sipah Salar* and returned in May 1919 to Peshawar. Arrested in May 1919 for violent *anti-British* intrigue and interned in Burma. Released and returned to Afghanistan on conclusion of peace. Left Kabul on 29th September 1920 with four men for Bokhara to act as Afghan Envoy there. Sent to replace Abdus Shakur Khan who is said to be interned. In November 1920 he was reported to be Head Clerk to the special Mission to Russia, headed by Abdul Hadi. During March 1921, returned to Bokhara from Tashkent with Abdul Hadi's Mission. At Mazar-i-Sharif *en route* for Kabul, June 1921. Arrived Kabul, July 1921. Appointed Under-Secretary in charge of Russia and Turkestan Branch of Foreign Office in 1923. In January, 1924, appointed Collector of Customs, Kandahar. Was praised and rewarded by the King during visit of inspection, November 1925.

370. GHULAM JILANI KHAN, *Firqa Mishar, Yusufzai*.—Son of *Sipah Salar* Ghulam Haidar Khan, *Charkhi*, and brother of Brigadier Ghulam Nabi Khan, and Ghulam Sadiq. Once commanded *Kohistani Shahi* regiment at Kabul. Appointed Brigadier, 1906. Has successfully conducted small expeditions against tribesmen. Appointed a Superintendent of the Military College, Kabul, 1912. Popular with Amir Habibulla. In 1913 he and his brother Ghulam Nabi Khan were arrested and deprived of military rank for the murder of Brigadier Abdul Ahmed Khan in the Logar valley. Continued to be kept under restraint till 1914, when they appear to have been banished to Afghan Turkistan. In 1918 they were pardoned by Amir Habibulla. In February 1919 Ghulam Jilani Khan was appointed *Hakim* of Ghazni. Partisan of Amanulla. Commanding the *Arg* at Kabul (*Kila Begi*) December 1919. Said to be of Nadir Khan's party, and approves of a Treaty of Friendship with the British. Commanding the *Ghund-i-Ardal* December 1920. Left Kabul for Mazar-i-Sharif on 23rd October 1921 to take over command of the Turkistan Corps from his brother. Left Turkestan, July 1925, on transfer to Angora as Minister, *vice* Sultan Ahmed. Left Kabul for India, *en route* to Angora, 15th December 1925. Acted as President of the Afghan deputation to Ibn Saud's All-Muslim conference, June 1926. Issued statements to Turkish press complaining of British attitude to Afghanistan, February 1929. Born 1886.

382. GHULAM MUHAMMAD.—Nephew of the late *Sipah Salar*. Amir Muhammad Khan and own brother of Ulya Jan, mother of Inayatulla. Accompanied Sardar Inayatulla to Calcutta. Born 1886. Appointed Governor of Tagao, 1905. Dismissed, 1906, and was succeeded by Saleh Muhammad, *Barakzai*. Commanding *Ghund-i-Ardal*, Kabul, 1917. Promoted General, March 1919. Said to have given a lakh of rupees for *ghaza* and to have promised to recruit and maintain 2,000 men for the war, July 1919. Member of Afghan Peace Delegation, June 1919, and said to be the most openly hostile of the Delegates. Appointed Afghan Envoy at Andijan, December 1919. Returned to Kabul with Ferghana Mission, March 1920. Left Kabul for Mazar-i-Sharif, April 1920. Said to be going to Russian Turkistan. Reported killed in the Bolshevik attack on Bokhara, but later a man of his name arrived in Kabul from Bokhara. Summoned to Kabul by the Amir, December 1921. Reported to have gone to Bamian as *Hakim* and to be still there June 1925. Said to have raised a force in Tagao, December 1928, but whether for or against Amanulla not clear.

388. GHULAM NABI KHAN, of *Charki, Yusufzai, Lewa Mishar*.—Son of the late *Sipah Salar* Ghulam Haidar Khan of Logar and brother of Brigadier Ghulam Jilani Khan and of Ghulam Sadiq. Appointed Orderly Colonel in June 1904. Promoted Orderly Brigadier in 1905. Appointed to command

the forces in Ningrahar (June 1906). Anxious to learn English. Reported in November 1907 to have assumed command of all the troops in Kabul city. Fell into disfavour in 1909 when in command of Afghan forces at Patan, which crossed into British territory near Kharlachi and were driven back by Kurram Militia. Ghulam Nabi Khan was thought by Nasrullah's party to have shown cowardice, and was never given any military post till in 1912, he accompanied troops against the Mangals in a subordinate position and in a measure regained his former status. Transferred in December 1912 to command at Jabal-us-Siraj. Dismissed from the Amir's service in 1913 on account of the murder of a *Khan* of the Charkhi district in the Upper Logar Valley. In 1918 Ghulam Nabi Khan, and his brother Ghulam Jilani, as well as others of their relatives were pardoned by Amir Habibulla. Commanding at Jalalabad (June 1919). Partisan of Amanulla. Accompanied Dakka Boundary Commission, August 1919. Touring in Ningrahar to collect looted rifles, September 1919. Left Jalalabad for Asmar, August 1920, to replace Brigadier Usman Khan, recalled, but soon returned to Kabul, where he was preparing to go to Mazar-i-Sharif September 1920, in which month he left and took over command of the Corps at Mazar-i-Sharif. Transferred to Bokhara, October 1921. In November he left Mazar-i-Sharif for Bokhara, but was believed to be on his way to Moscow. His efforts in Bokhara, to induce the Bolsheviks to restore the property confiscated from traders, was fruitless. He therefore continued his journey to Moscow. Minister in Moscow 1922–23. Earning a reputation for evil living and corruption. Recalled in the spring of 1924. On return from Moscow he was appointed Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, was sent to Logar during Mangal rebellion 1924–25 to exercise his influence to maintain peace. Appointed Governor of Simat-i-Janubi at end of 1925, which post he held until appointed Afghan Minister at Paris August 1926. Left Kabul for India, *en route* to Paris, 17th October 1926. Relieved November 1928, by Habibulla Tarzi.

398. GHULAM SADIQ KHAN, *Yusufzai*.—Son of late Ghulam Haidar, of Charkhi. Assistant to Gul Muhammad Khan, Afghan Envoy in India, October 1919. Said to be *anti-British* and of Mahmud Tarzi's party. Antagonistic to Gul Muhammad Khan. Passed up Khaibar, June 1920. Refused admittance to India when returning owing to intrigues with seditionists. Appointed Assistant President to the *Muhajarin* Committee, Kabul, August 1920. Reported to have proceeded to Mazar-i-Sharif from Kabul, October 1921. Second Councillor of the Afghan Mission under General Wali Muhammad Khan which visited Europe in 1920. He returned from London to Kabul with despatches in September 1921. Left again for Europe *via* Peshawar, October 30th, 1921. Three Afghan students accompanied him. Was with Afghan peace delegates at Mussoorie in 1920. Appointed Afghan Minister at Berlin 1922, where he remained until April 1926, when he was relieved by Ahmed Ali. Visited Angora whilst *en route* to Kabul from Berlin. Appointed 1st personal Secretary to the King and Minister at Court, January 1927. Appointed to officiate as Foreign Minister, January 1927, during absence of Mahmud Tarzi in Europe. A young man, vain, with no pronounced prejudices. A close personal friend of the King and greatly trusted by him. With King Amanulla in Europe 1928. Foreign Minister, November 1928. Sent to Jalalabad to bargain with rebels December 1928. Fled with King Amanulla to Kandahar January 1929. Born 1894.

401. GHULAM YAHYA KHAN.—Son of *Naib* Habibullah Khan deceased, and a nephew of Mahmud Beg Tarzi. Appointed Under-Secretary in charge of newly formed visa and Passport Branch of Foreign Office, June 1926: formerly Secretary of Afghan Legation, Berlin. Transferred to charge of Persia and Turkey section of Foreign Office, November 1926. Is still quite a youth, but has gained a good deal of experience. A well-mannered lad. Received order of "Astor" 1st Class, February 1927. With King Amanulla in Europe, 1928. Roughly handled by Habibulla Khan's men, but still at Foreign Office, January 1929. Born 1898. *Muhammadzai*.

GUL AGHA.—(See Hazrat of Shor Bazar).

413. HABIBULLA KHAN, Lieutenant-General.—His forefathers were Khans of Jandol. Arrived Tashkent, June 1919, with Wali Muhammad Khan as member of Afghan Peace Mission to Europe *via* Moscow. In Europe and America 1921–22. Appointed permanent Under-Secretary in War Ministry, June 1924, with rank of *Ghund Mishar*. *Firqa Mishar* 1926. Visited Western Command manœuvres and carried out a tour in India at invitation of Commander-in-Chief, November 1926. A corrupt man, but frequently visits the British Legation and keeps in close touch with and is a personal friend of the British Military Attaché. Speaks Russian fluently and a little English: reads English military books a good deal, and is a student of military history. With King Amanulla in Europe 1928.

HABIBULLA KHAN, *Tajik* of Kala Kar, between Kabul and Charikar. Born about 1890. Generally known as Bacha-i-Saqao ("son of the water-carrier"). Spent three years at Suliman Serai in Peshawar City where he served tea from a samovar to travellers. Then visited Parachinar where he was imprisoned for eleven months for breaking into a shop. Later was gardener to an Afghan official at Kila Murad Beg, and afterwards joined Jemel Pasha's regiment in Kabul where he served for three years. He then deserted with his rifle because he sympathised with the Mangal rebellion of 1924, and shot soldiers who tried to arrest him. From that time was a notorious highwayman, merciless to Afghan officials and wealthy travellers, but generous to the poor. During the rebellion of November, 1928, took service under King Amanulla, who supplied him with arms for his men, but later deserted, and on December 14th led an attack on Kabul, which was only driven off after nine days' fighting. He retired towards Paghman, and on January 7th resumed his offensive, and was in possession of a greater part of Kabul, except the Arq, by January 18th, when the three-day King Inayatulla surrendered. He proclaimed himself Amir of Kabul, with the title of His Majesty Ghazi Amir Habibulla Khan.

415. HABIBULLAH TARZI.—Son of Muhammad Zaman and nephew of Mahmud Tarzi. Was a junior Under Secretary in Indo-European branch of the Foreign Office, 1922–23. Proceeded to Paris as secretary to Mahmud Tarzi when latter was Minister at Paris. On his return to Kabul was appointed Under Secretary in charge of branch of Foreign Office dealing with India and Europe. Speaks English fluently: a pleasant, well-mannered man. Minister in Paris, November 1928. Born 1896. *Muhammadzai*.

416. HADAYATULLA.—Eldest son of King Amanulla, by a woman of low birth. About ten years of age (1921). Arrived in Peshawar on 10th October, 1921, together with a party of Afghan students *en route* for Paris. Visited Kabul in July 1925 and again in August 1926 for vacation. Reported on his way to Afghanistan by way of Germany and the U.S.S.R., February 1929.

420. HAIDAR KHAN, MUHAMMAD.—Son of *Sirdar* Abdul Qudus. Employed as a subordinate in the Foreign Office. He is pleasant and friendly, and well educated. Not of much importance at present, but may come to the front later on owing to his birth and education. Appeared to be *pro*-British in 1921. Afghan Consul-General in Delhi, 1922–23. Recalled to Kabul in Spring of 1924. Was Minister-designate to Angora but appointment was cancelled and Ghulam Jilani was sent instead. Muhammad Haidar was appointed Under Secretary of Ministry of Commerce in 1925, and still holds that appointment, 1927. Not a very able man. His wife is a daughter of *Sardar* Nadir Khan. Born 1896. *Muhammadzai*.

425. HAMIDULLA, *Akhundzada*, *Saft*.—Known as the *Mulla Sahib* of Tagao. An old priest influential in Ningrahar and Laghman. Follower of the late Hada Mulla. A leader in the disturbances of 1889. There are two *mullas* of this name—Hamidulla of Tagao and Abdul Hamid of Jarobi, and they are frequently confused with each other. Summoned to Kabul for big *darbar* in 1915. Also called Badshah Sahib of Tagao. Detained in Kabul since 1915, but permitted to return to his home in 1917 by Habibulla. Visited the Hada shrine in 1917 and met Mir Saiyid Jan. Was reported to be at Laghman in 1918. *Anti*-British. Went to Kabul with Mir Saiyid Jan Badshah, August

1919. Again arrived Kabul the 7th November 1920. Summoned chief Ningrahar, Mohmand and Bajaur *Mullas* to meet him at Hada in July 1922. Summoned to Kabul, December 1923, where he arrived with a large following in March 1924. Proceeded on *Haj* shortly afterwards. He was offered Rs. 5,000 by the *Amir* for his expenses but refused. Summoned to Kabul, November 1928. On his refusal troops were sent to arrest him, but were ambushed by Bacha-i-Saqao.

430. HASHIM KHAN, MUHAMMAD, *Naib Salar*, *Muhammadzai*.—Son of Sardar Yusuf Khan and brother of the Nadir Khan. Commanded the *Sarios* Body-guard at Kabul, and accompanied Amir Habibulla to India in 1907. Appointed *Naib Salar* of Herat and left Kabul in 1916. Is a nephew of a former Governor of Herat, *Sardar* Muhammad Suliman Khan. Keen on instituting reforms but checked in this direction by threat of mutiny on the part of the troops. Arrested and sent to Kabul after murder of Habibulla but subsequently released. People of Herat refused to have him back after his release and he was relieved as *Naib Salar* of Herat by General Fateh Muhammad. Said to have been appointed Manager of all Crown lands in Afghanistan, September 1919. Appointed Governor of Jalalabad, December 1919. Civil and Military Governor, Ningrahar, 1920. Took over from Nadir Khan, August 1920. Reported to have married a sister of the Amir, October 1920. Went on tour in July 1921 and distributed rewards to the Mohmands and some Bajauri tribesmen, at the same time doing his best to create an atmosphere of hostility to the British: the next month he warned the tribesmen to be ready for *jihad*. Summoned *jirgas* of the Malikdin Khel and Kambar Khel Afridis to Jalalabad in September 1921. Rewards in the shape of money were doled out to the tribesmen who were informed that Nadir Khan had promised to arrange permanent allowances, and the distribution of rifles for them from the Afghan Government. Reported in August 1921 to have engineered, in conjunction with Nadir Khan, the robbery of one of the British Mission mail bags *en route* from Kabul to India. Went to Kabul from Jalalabad on November 10th, 1921, the reason being fairly general that the whole family were in bad odour with the Amir. Officiating as Minister of War, Kabul, January 1922, *vice* Nadir Khan proceeded on tour. Proceeded to Europe with his father in 1923. Appointed Minister at Moscow in March 1924. Left Moscow 3rd July 1926 to join his brother Nadir Khan at Grasse. Offered position of Minister at Teheran, which he refused, October 1926. Nurus Siraj, the sister of the King, to whom he wished to be married was betrothed to H.M.'s cousin, Muhammad Hassan Jan in October 1926, which was looked upon as an insult by Hashim Khan and his brothers Said that Mahmud Tarzi, who left Kabul for Europe in January 1927, would call on Hashim Khan and his brothers to attempt conciliation. While at Moscow Hashim Khan frequently exposed Soviet intrigues against Afghanistan, and consequently was not popular there. A reliable and very likeable man. A personal friend of members of the British Legation at Kabul. At Grasse December 1928. Was granted diplomatic visa for India in transit to Afghanistan January 1929, and left Marseilles with Nadir Khan and Shah Wali on February 8th, 1929. Born 1886.

435. HASSAN JAN, MUHAMMAD.—Son of *Sardar* Muhammad Umar Jan. A.-D.-C. to the King, 1926. Betrothed to Nurus Siraj, H.M.'s sister, October 1926. Created *Sardar-i-Ali*, February 1926. A nice man, well known to the British Legation at Kabul. With King Amanulla in Europe 1928 as chamberlain. Born 1902. *Muhammadzai*.

436. HAYATULLA KHAN, *Sardar*, *Muhammadzai*.—Second son of Amir Habibulla Khan. Born 29th December 1888. His mother is a sister of Mir Muhammad Ojhor in Chitral. She was sold in Badakhshan by the old Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk. He was appointed Governor of Kataghan in 1905. In 1907 he was reported to be a bad character, slack and unpopular. When Amir Habibulla Khan returned from his 1907 tour in India, he summoned Hayatulla Khan to Kabul to answer charges brought against him by the people of Kataghan. He was kept in Kabul for some time under restraint, but was later said to have mended his ways. During the winters of 1911–12, 1912–13 and 1913–14 he was left in Kabul as Governor during the sojourn of the Court

at Jalalabad, and was said to have carried out his duties to Amir Habibulla Khan's satisfaction. In 1915 his allowance was fixed at Rs. 80,000 *per annum*. About April 1917 he was granted the title of *Aziz-ud-Daulah*. On the 17th February 1919, 3 days before the murder of Amir Habibulla Khan, he left Kabul for Jalalabad. It appears, however, that on hearing of the murder he turned back to Kabul, where he remained with Sardar Amanulla Khan. In March it was reported that he was no longer *Aziz-ud-Douleh* but was expecting his official restoration to the appointment by Amir Amanulla. By the middle of April his appointment appears to have been confirmed, as he was then said to be carrying on his work and holding *darbars* as he did during Habibulla Khan's reign. In 1919 said to have changed the slack ways of his youth and to have improved considerably intellectually. Holding no official post, December 1919. Said to be of Nadir Khan's party and opposed to a treaty of friendship with the British. Appointed Minister for Education, 1923. Went to Europe with his wife in April 1923 and returned to Kabul in March 1924. Appointed Minister for Justice, 1925, which appointment he still holds. His only child died in December 1926. Although a brother of the King and a Minister he does not take a very active part in public life. Although apparently not actively hostile to the British, he is only superficially friendly, possesses unfortunately bad manners. It is not thought that he has any wish to occupy the throne and is trusted by King Amanulla. Speaks English. Reported to have made obeisance to Habibulla Khan, January 1929, but later to have been arrested.

HAZRAT OF SHOR BAZAR.—A name given to a family of Sirhind *Pirs* established in Kabul, the sons of the late Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazar, one of the most influential *mullas* in Afghanistan in the years following King Amanulla's accession. One brother is Fazal-i-Umar (*q.v.*) *alias* Sher Agha. Another, younger, brother is Gul Agha and there is one, Fazal Rahim, who is probably identical with the present Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazar (*q.v.*) There is also Masum Jan, described as a nephew of Gul Agha, who is perhaps identical with a Hazrat Masum who arrived in Peshawar from Kabul by British aeroplane February 1929 and was reviled by Afghan Colony for having, with his family, caused King Amanulla's downfall at instigation of British Government. The family have been described (September 1928) as being considered throughout Afghanistan to be the most influential religious leaders in the country.

HAZRAT SAHIB OF SHOR BAZAR (*see also* HAZRAT OF SHOR BAZAR).—Probably identical with Fazal Rahim. Obtained signatures of 400 *mullas* to a manifesto declaring that King Amanulla's proposals for westernising Afghanistan were contrary to Islam and would not be obeyed, and started for Khost with the manifesto, together with his brother Gul Agha, with the intention of raising the country. They were arrested with some accomplices and brought to Kabul (September 1928), but were later released and the Hazrat Sahib was sent to Tagao after Habibulla Khan's first attack on Kabul in December 1928 to try to detach some of latter's adherents. In this he was not very successful. He appears to have been in relations with Habibulla at outset of latter's second attack in January 1929, and promised British Legation his protection during this attack. Was later intermediary between Sardar Inayatulla, Habibulla Khan and His Majesty's Minister for Inayatulla's removal to Peshawar by aeroplane.

452. **IBRAHIM KHAN, MUHAMMAD**, *Sardar, Barakzai, Naib Salar*.—Son of Sardar Muhammad Sarwar Khan, Governor of Herat. Brother of Ulya Hazrat and uncle of Amanullah. Appointed *Nazir-i-Adalia* (Minister of Justice) by Amir Amanulla in March 1919. Was sent by Amanulla to Jalalabad to proclaim his accession and was later appointed Governor of Kabul (1919). Sent by Amanulla to command in Pusht-i-Rud and Farah, but recalled to Kabul. From August 1919 acted as *Muin-us-Sultanat*, the appointment previously held by Inayatulla, until June 1920. *Nazir-i-Adalia*, June 1920, when he went to Mazar-i-Sharif to inquire into disturbances there. Appointed *Naib Salar* April 1920. In July 1920 he was on bad terms with Nadir Khan, who accused him of causing the downfall of his friend Abdus Samad. Acting Governor of Mazar-i-Sharif, September 1920.

Appointed Minister of Justice at Kabul. He is said to be of Tarzi's party and to be in favour of a Treaty of friendship with the British. Appointed *Naib-ul-Hukuma*, Turkestan, December 1921. Left Kabul for Mazir-i-Sharif, 24th December, to officiate as Governor. Returned to Kabul from Mazar-i-Sharif, March 1924. Was Minister for Justice in 1924, prior to appointment of *Sardar* Hayatulla. Appointed Governor of Herat, January 1925. During journey through India to Herat he wore arms and carried ammunition, and generally adopted an offensive attitude. Visited Kandahar during King's visit to that city in November 1926 to report on various questions. Travelled to and from Kandahar *via* Duzdap and Quetta. Is unpopular in Herat, 1927. Said to have firm control of Herat on behalf of Amanulla, January 1929. Born 1881.

459. **IHSAN KHAN, MUHAMMAD**, *Ghund Mishar*.—Received three years aeronautical training in Italy. Appointed to command Afghan air force, 1924. Visited Western Command manoeuvres and carried out a tour in India at invitation of C.-in-C, November 1926. Speaks Italian and French. Has excellent manners; neither drinks nor smokes. Takes his profession seriously and is an excellent type of officer. Has a pilot's certificate but seldom flies. A personal friend of the British Military Attaché, Kabul. Was helpful to R. A. F. officers who landed at Sherpur, December 1928. Dismissed on Amir Habibulla's accession, January 1929. Said to have reached Kandahar from Herat, February 1929.

462. **INAYATULLA KHAN**, *Sardar, Muhammadzai*.—Eldest son of Amir Habibulla Khan. His mother is the Ulya Jan *Badr-ul-Haram*, of Tageo. Born 20th October 1888. Visited India in December 1904. Held the appointment of *Muin-us-Sultanat* ("Helper of the State") under Amir Habibulla Khan. Was appointed *Sardar-i-Salar* in 1905. Was said to be in favour of reforms and modern movements and to be under no illusion as to the backward state of Afghanistan and the inefficiency of the army. Was appointed Minister for Education in 1916. Was the recognised heir to the throne up to the time of Amir Habibulla Khan's death. In 1915-16 he and *Sardar* Nasrulla were on friendly terms with the German party in Kabul, and he was at that time believed to be in favour of Afghan intervention in the war. He was also said to be unpopular on account of his harsh manner, and brutality, and to have no talents. He is married to a daughter of the present *Nazir-i-Kharjia* (Foreign Minister), *Sardar* Mahmud Khan, Tarzi (another of whose daughters is Queen Souraiya), and was at one time said to be under the latter's influence. During Amir Habibulla Khan's reign he received an allowance of Rs. 1,30,000 *per annum*. In 1917, however, he was said to favour his father's *pro*-British policy. Reports relating to the period immediately preceding the death of Amir Habibulla were to the effect that he was *pro*-British, distinctly progressive and popular with the army, and that he was likely to make a good *Amir* should he ever come to the throne. After the murder of Habibulla Khan, *Sardar* Nasrulla went through the form of offering him the throne in the presence of the *Musahiban-i-Khas* and *Sipah Salar* Nadir Khan and other prominent officials. He, however, refused it, probably well knowing that the decision had already been made in Nasrulla's favour and that no other course was open to him. When Nasrulla, in turn, was compelled to yield to the claims of *Sardar* Amanulla, he had to accompany the former to Kabul, and left Jalalabad with him on March 4th. On arrival at Kabul, though not compelled to share Nasrulla's imprisonment, he was kept under strict surveillance. At the *darbar* at which those accused of the murder of Amir Habibulla Khan were tried, Amir Amanulla decreed that he had forfeited all his claims by his cowardly acquiescence in Nasrulla's usurpation of the throne and by his failure to take any steps to discover the authors of the crime. He was told that, though no punishment was ordered for him, it would be advisable that he should retire into private life and take no further part in public affairs. Although occasionally seen in public, he undertook no Government work, and was presumably deprived of his appointments of *Muin-us-Sultanat*, etc. In October 1919 he was reported to have been arrested by the *Amir* and to be practically confined to his house. Attended a *darbar* in March 1920, but subsequently he was apparently

again confined to his house. There was an abortive rising by the *Safi* Regiment in favour of Inayatullah in June 1920. This regiment was raised in Tagao by Inayatullah, whose mother was a Tagaori. Sanctioned a yearly allowance of 1½ lacs of rupees and an escort of 20 men, March 1921. Inayatullah has consistently refused to take up any Government appointment. He was practically in confinement in his own house until July 1922, when he was allowed a certain measure of freedom which has increased until now he moves about apparently without restriction. He usually accompanies the King on journeys. He is believed to be popular and to hold strong pro-British sympathies. A likely candidate for the throne if Rahmatulla Jan is still a minor at the time of the King's death. When Bacha Saqao attacked Kabul on 14th December, 1928, was summoned by the King and confined in the Arq. Forced to accept throne on abdication of Amanulla, 14th January, 1929, but on being besieged by Habibulla Khan in the Arq a few days later, negotiated its surrender on condition he and his household were sent away by aeroplane to Kandahar. It was arranged he should go to Peshawar by British aeroplane and thence via Quetta to Kandahar, whither King Amanulla had fled. The Arq was accordingly surrendered on January 18th and he left for Peshawar the same day.

481. KABIRULLA JAN, or MUHAMMAD KABIR JAN.—Born 1895, 4th son of *Amir* Habibulla, by a concubine. Escaped to India from Afghanistan in January 1918. Arrested and placed in custody in Lahore Fort. Gave as his reasons for absconding quarrel with *Amir*, and dissatisfaction at his allowance (Rs. 200 per mensem)—said to be intemperate and extravagant, and heavily involved. Left Lahore, April 1918, accompanied by one Abdulla (probably his servant), arrived Burma, and proceeded with *Khan Bahadur* Ghulam Murtaza Khan and suite to Lashio in Northern Shan States. Returned to Afghanistan May 1920. Evincing violent *anti*-British feelings whilst passing up the Khaibar on his return journey, May 1920. Pardoned by *Amir* Amanulla and granted an allowance of Rs. 10,000. Later thought to be implicated in a conspiracy against Amanulla, June 1920. Appointed Postmaster General in Afghanistan, September 1920. Appointed Director of the Medical Department, August 1923. Tendered resignation, March 1926, owing to purchase of X-ray set by Zia Humayun for price 54,000 rupees cheaper than Kabir Jan proposed to spend on a set; resignation was not accepted. Carried out inspection of Jalalabad province and selected winter site for consumption hospital, October 1926. Is despised by most Afghans and as Director of Medical Services is most inefficient and unscrupulous in peculation. Obviously *anti*-British. A man of no force of character and little importance. Proceeded to Lahore, 30th April 1927, accompanied by his sick wife who was to undergo a medical operation. While in Lahore, was reported to have approached several newspaper editors with view to carrying out *anti*-British propaganda. Later proceeded to Kashmir, returning to Kabul, 21st June 1927. Reported to have made submission to Habibulla Khan, January 1929, but later to have been arrested. *Muhammadzai, Sardar*.

504. MAHMUD JAN (SHAH MAHMUD). *Sardar, Muhammadzai*.—Youngest son of Muhammad Yusuf and brother of *Sardar-i-Salar* Nadir Khan. Appointed *Sar Sar-i-os* ranking as General in 1917. Commanded the troops on the Peiwar front, 1919, and is apparently a man of some ability. Was in great favour with the Amir for never having suffered a defeat (he was never attacked). Appointed Civil and Military Governor of the Simt-i-Janubi (Southern Provinces), September 1919. In Khost, February 1920. Arrived in Kabul from Gardez, December 1920. Was married in Kabul during the same month to a step-sister of the Amir. Returned to Gardez soon after. Shah Mahmud is in touch with Muhammad Hassan, B.A., at Makin and Haji Abdur Razak at Shakin in 1920 and early 1921, and undoubtedly supplied them with frequent convoys of ammunition, rations, and money for distribution to the hostile sections of the Wana Wazirs and Mahsuds. Reported to have left Khost for Kabul in June 1921 taking Mazulla Khan, Bannu refugee, with him. During his absence Qazi Shah Buzurg officiated Governor of the *Simat-i-Janubi*. En route to Kabul he was detained at Urgun on account of the death of an infant daughter. He arrived in Kabul

on 27th October 1921, accompanied by his family. He speaks good English. Appointed Governor of Simat-i-Mashriqi, April 1926; assumed duty, June 1926. Interviewed Afridis at Jalalabad, April 1926, and promised them similar treatment to that given by his brother Nadir Khan. Toured Jalalabad Province, visiting Kahi and Achin, and interviewing Afridis at Morgha, July 1926. Visited Kabul for Independence Week, August 1926. Visited Kabul to discuss Mohmand unsettlement with King, November 1926; taken ill and remained at Kabul until January 1927. Interviewed Mohmands at Jalalabad, January 1927; visited Pesh Bolak and distributed money amongst Shinwaris. Efficient and very friendly, although he holds similar views to those of his brother, Nadir Khan, regarding the importance of the frontier tribes to Afghanistan. Was G. O. C., Badakhshan and Qataghan from 1922 to 1925. In Kabul, February 1929, and commissioned by Habibulla Khan to go as his emissary to the tribes of the Eastern and Southern Provinces. Born 1894.

505. MAHMUD JAN, *Shahghassi*.—*Yavar* to the Amir for Cabinet meetings. Son of Shah Muhammad Khan and a distant cousin of Abdul Aziz Khan, Ali Ahmed Khan, and the Ulaya Hazrat. Officiated as Minister of Public Security in 1922 and as Governor of Kabul in 1925. Is in charge of Public Works and Secret Service. Also in charge of the Frontier Tribes department of which Haji Muhammad Akbar is Under Secretary. A personal friend of the King's from boyhood and greatly trusted by him. A stout, pleasant gentleman, friendly to foreigners. Is in trade with Herr Harten, German partnership engineer in charge of Dar-ul-Aman works, and makes a lot of money out of public works. Speaks Pushtu. Created *Sardar-i-Ala*, January 1927. Captured by rebels near Jalalabad, December 1928, where he had been sent to restore order. Born 1885. *Barakzai*.

506. MAHMUD KHAN, (or Mahmud Beg, commonly known as Mahmud Tarzi), *Sardar, Muhammadzai*.—Born 1878. Son of Ghulam Muhammad Khan, *Tarzi*, of the Kandahar Sardar family. His two daughters are married to Amir Amanulla and Sardar Inayatulla. Formerly lived in Damascus and came to Kabul on the accession of Amir Habibulla. He married a Turkish lady. Has literary tastes and writes poetry. Formerly editor of the *Siraj-ul-Akbar*, which paper adopted a strong pro-German tone during the European War and Mahmud Tarzi was reproved for this several times by Amir Habibulla. Is reported to have intrigued with Amanulla and the German Mission in 1916 to bring about Habibulla's death. Owing to his association with the Young Turks is deeply imbued with ideas of absolute freedom and independence in Afghanistan. Appointed *Nazir-i-Kharija* (Foreign Minister) by Amanulla in March 1919. Has great influence with Amanulla and he and Nadir Khan are rivals for the real power behind the throne. Tarzi is a clever, capable man, but rather a visionary. Is not at all bigoted at heart and but for the restraining atmosphere would probably hold and express broad-minded views on religion and the outward observances of Islam. Has always been a staunch advocate of diplomatic relations with Russia and as such, has sometimes come into conflict with British interests. It would be a mistake, though, to call him *anti*-British. His dream is to see a completely independent Afghanistan having Treaty relations with all the powers. His sons are Abdul Wahab and Abdul Tawab. He has however at least three more sons, the eldest of whom is about 11 years old (1921). President, Afghan Delegations, Mussoorie Conference, 1920, and Chief Afghan delegate at the Kabul Conferences, 1921. Officiating as Assistant Minister of War, January 1922. Appointed Afghan Minister in Paris, 1922; replaced by Nadir Khan. Reappointed Foreign Minister on return from Paris in 1924. Left Kabul, 5th January 1927, for Europe to undergo medical treatment, accompanied by his wife and three female members of the King's family. Has always treated the British Legation at Kabul with the greatest courtesy. Although a little elderly for his duties he is still a very able Foreign Minister, broad-minded and sincere. Was to have visited England with King Amanulla 1928 and grant of G.C.M.G. was sanctioned, but cancelled on his non-arrival. Returned to Kabul a little before King Amanulla 1928, but took no part in public work. Said to have been bitterly disappointed at appointment of

Sher Ahmad to stillborn post of Prime Minister, September 1928. With King Amanulla at Kandahar, January 1929, and applied for visa for India *en route* to Europe.

507. MAHMUD SAMI, *Arab, Saiyid, Naib Salar, alias* Baghdadi Keilani-zada Mahmud Sami, son of Saiyid Ahmed.—Is a nephew of Saiyid Abdur Rahman, Naqib of Baghdad. Well known agent of the Pan-Islamic league, and of Saiyid Hasan Effendi, the *Baghdadi Pir*, who owns land at Sultanpur and lives at Zawa in Khugiani country. An agent also of Pir Abdus Salam of Baghdad. Said to have been originally gymnastic instructor, and then Captain and Adjutant Major (*Kal Aghasi*) in the Turkish Army. Knows Turkish, Arabic, French and German. Was born about 1881–1886, and is tall and distinguished looking. Arrived in Peshawar from Karachi, 1906, and went on to Kabul with a letter from the Naqib of Baghdad for the Amir. In 1908 employed to teach drill to the Afghan Army. In 1913 he, with his brother-in-law, Saiyid Abbas, a *rissaldar* in the Amir's *Shahi Risala*, his elder brother Saiyid Ahmad Effendi and some others, arrived at Peshawar reported to have been banished by Amir Habibulla in consequence of a quarrel with the *Naib Salar* of Kabul. Remained in India till January 1915 residing at Peshawar. Visited Charsadda, Abbottabad, Manshera (*en route* for Phulra State), Darband and Haripur. In March 1914 met the notorious Pan-Islamic Qazi Abdul Wali Khan (*q.v.*) and the Afghan Envoy at Peshawar. Was financed by the Afghan Envoy and other Afghan officials and left Peshawar with his servant Amir Muhammad for Kabul in 1915. In 1915 said to have been employed at Herat, but later reported that his services were at the disposal of the *Naib-us-Saltanat*. In 1916 was reported to be assistant to the *Ain-ud-Daula*, as surveyor of bridges and roads. Same year reported to be associated with the Turco-German Mission, and to have incurred Amir Habibulla's displeasure. In April 1919 said to have been appointed a general in the Afghan Army. In Kabul during 1919 campaign. Said to be assistant to Mahmud Tarzi (*q.v.*). Commandant, Harbibia College, 1921. Acting as *Yawar*, January 1922. He hates the Turks as many Arabs do. Was courteously and kindly treated during his stay in India and seems therefore to be genuinely pro-British. Nadir Khan and he gradually forgot their former feud after his return to Afghanistan, and made common cause against the introduction of Turkish officers into the Afghan Army. They are now firm friends, but it is expected that if the Turkish officers are dismissed the old enmity will revive. In the meanwhile the combination of the Commander-in-Chief and of the Amir's old teacher and favourite, has been most useful to the British cause. He was used by the Amir as Private Secretary towards the end of the Kabul negotiations, 1921, and his influence was intelligent and moderating. School closed down in April 1924. Appointed G. O. C. Kabul Corps, and promoted *Naib Sala* in June 1925, with special pay of Rs. 2,500 per mensem. Is a keen soldier, but shows signs of old age. A frequent visitor to the British Legation at Kabul. Said to have made submission to Habibulla Khan, January 1929.

508. MAHMUD TARZI.—See Mahmud Khan

528. MIR MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN, *Saiyid, Amin-i-Nizam*.—A member of the Indo-Afghan Conference, Kabul, 1921. Was probably appointed on the strength of being a *Saiyid* in order to balance *Saiyid* Sir Shams Shah, one of the British delegates. Held an appointment in the War Office but was transferred to the Finance Department as an Under-Secretary in 1921. Appointed Minister of Finance, 1922, and still holds that appointment in 1927. A rich man, greatly trusted by the King. His brother Masjid Khan, owns many motor vehicles running between Kabul and Peshawar on hire. Was under a cloud in July 1926, owing to suspicion that he was concerned in circulation of counterfeit coins of which his brother was accused. Roughly handled by Habibulla Khan's men, January 1929.

534. MIR MUKHTAR.—Of Batikot, also called *Saiyid* Mukhtar, a rival of the late Shakar of Hazarnao, a well-known raider and rifle thief. In 1916 he and Shakur were summoned to Jalalabad by the Governor Muhammad Akbar

Khan. He obeyed and was put under security for Rs. 5,000. In March imprisoned for attempting to aid Nasirulla, but later was released on giving security for good behaviour. Later his annual allowance was doubled on condition that he would be responsible for the safety of the branch roads in Ningrahar. Made overtures to British, May 1919. Went on *Haj* in 1923. Summoned to Kabul, May 1924. Made responsible for safety of Dakka-Jalalabad road. Visited Peshawar for medical treatment in May 1925. Arrested in Jalalabad in May 1926 during King's visit there. Released in June. Summoned to Kabul to account for raids by Mamunds on main road, as he had been made responsible for safety of road between Basawal and Ghora Gali. Arrived Peshawar, 9th May 1927, with intention of proceeding to Sirhind Ziarat. Interviewed Shinwari *jirga* with Ghulam Sadiq, November 1928.

539. MIRZA MUHAMMAD KHAN, *Colonel (Uzbek)*.—Sent to Merv on a special mission about October 1919. Reported to have returned to Herat, December 1919. In Merv, February 1920. Still in Merv, June 1920. Later said to be in Tashkent with Wali Muhammad, Abdul Razak and other Afghans. Left for Moscow, July 1920. Afghan Minister at Moscow, 1921, until relieved by Ghulan Nabi Khan. On return from Russia he was for a short time an Under Secretary in the Ministry of Commerce, and in 1924 he was sent to Europe to negotiate the sale of certain of the Crown jewels. Appointed 1st Under Secretary in the Foreign Office on return from Europe. Appointed chief Afghan member of the Urta Tagai boundary commission, and proceeded to Badakhshan, January 1926, returning in June 1926. Appointed Minister at Moscow, October 1926, having first refused appointment of Minister at Rome. A man of no great standing or marked ability. As Minister at Moscow he preserves a broad outlook and is not noticeably pro-Soviet. Made Under Secretary of Foreign Office, November 1928. Still at Foreign Office under Habibulla Khan, January 1929.

544. MOHENDRA PARTAP SINGH, *alias* RAJAN, *Indian Agitator*.—Sriman Kunwar, an eccentric *tuluqdar* of Oudh and brother of the Maharani of Jhind. Founder of the *Prem Vidyalaya* (the Free Industrial and National Arts College) of Brindaban. Went to England at the end of 1914, and to Berlin in the autumn of 1915, where he posed as an Indian prince. Had an interview with the Kaiser and accompanied the German mission to Kabul in 1916. Arrived at Mazir-i-Sharif in 1917. Endeavoured to come to India but returned owing to our precautions. In 1918 with a party of Afghans left Mazar-i-Sharif for Russian Turkistan, and proceeded to Tashkent. In March 1918 was in Berlin, and later went Petrograd where he received warm welcome from Trostsky and Joffe. Same year visited Constantinople where he delivered Amir's reply to the Sultan. No reliable news in early 1919 as to his whereabouts, but supposed to have gone to Tashkent *via* Bokhara. Came to Kabul with the Suritz Mission, December 1919. Regarded as an imbecile of no importance by the Bolsheviks in Kabul, but Obeidulla (*q.v.*) finds him useful as a figurehead and to attract Hindus to his party. Left Kabul and arrived at Wakhan, 14th June 1920, *en route* for China. Sent a letter to the Governor of Tashkurghan saying that he had been appointed Afghan Envoy to China by the Amir. He soon returned as passage to China was refused by the Chinese authorities. In September 1920 he was in the Pamirs. Did a tour in China and Japan and returned to Kabul in Autumn of 1923. Left Kabul 16th September 1924; visited California, China, attempted to enter Tibet, then went to Japan whence he was deported. Returned to Afghanistan in October 1926. His reception in Kabul was remarkably frigid, and although he held a number of receptions very few people of importance attended. This was mainly due to displeasure of the King at Mohendra having styled himself Afghan representative at a Pan-Islamic conference in Japan, photographs describing him as such and showing his unceremonious arrest and deportation having been seen by the King in English illustrated papers. Left Kabul for the North, 31st January 1927, and arrived Moscow, February 1927. Returned to China, but back in Moscow November 1928, preparing to hold "Pan-Asiatic Conference" in Kabul. Owing to outbreak of rebellion was prevented from leaving Tashkent to come to Kabul by King Amanulla and was believed (January 1929) to be going to Tehran instead.

597. NADIR KHAN, MUHAMMAD, *Sardar, Muhammadzai, Sipah Salar*.—Son of *Sardar* Muhammad Yusuf Khan. Speaks Urdu fluently. Appointed Brigadier and said to be a good military officer, 1906. Accompanied Amir Habibullah during his Indian tour as Orderly Brigadier and during the Herat tour, 1907. Said to be of poor health but clever and active. Commanded the Afghan forces against the Mangals in 1912, promoted *Naib Salar* for his services in December 1912. Hampered by orders from Kabul during the Mangal campaign. His sister was Amir Habibulla's second wife, Ulya Janab *Nur-ul-Harem*. She died in 1910. Appointed *Sipah Salar* in 1914 and said at that time to support the Amir against the *pro*-German and the *pro*-Turkish parties, and to favour neutrality. In 1918 said to be in trouble for dishonesty and inefficiency, and to be in some risk of losing the *Sipa Salarship*. Was present at Laghman when Habibulla was murdered and was arrested by the soldiers for complicity. Released by Amanulla and sent in command of troops in Khost. Surrounded Thal at the end of May 1919, defeated and returned to Matun, June 5th. Had a very good intelligence and *anti*-spy organization. Unpopular with the troops in Khost and said to lack personal courage, but had much influence with the Mangals and Khost tribes. Was very active in *anti*-British propaganda after the armistice, June 1919, and responsible for spreading the rumour that the British were about to cede territory to the Afghans. Is an intriguer of no mean ability and he and his brothers, Mahmud Jan and Shah Wali, have a good deal of influence with the North-West Frontier tribes. Returned to Kabul in October 1919, where he was in great favour with the Amir who is said to be secretly afraid of him. Promoted *Sipah Salar* (Commander-in-Chief) and appointed *Nazar-i-Harbia* (War Minister) and put in charge of all dealings with the frontier tribes. Proceeded to Jalalabad, December 1919, where he gave out that he would interview *jirgas* of North-West Frontier tribes. Summoned Afridi *jirga* in January 1920, with the ostensible motive of settling feuds between Afridis and Shinwaris. Interviewed Afridi and Mohmand *jirgas*, January 1920, and presented them with black standards. Started a newspaper called *Ittihad-i-Mashraqi* (Eastern Unity) in Jalalabad in March 1920; very Pan-Islamic in tone. Distributed money to Afridis, Wazirs and Mahsuds. Said to be opposed to Mahmud Tarzi, but has attended secret meetings with him, between the Amir, Suritz, and Jemal Pasha. In favour of a treaty with the Bolsheviks. Appointed *Sipah Salar*, October 1920, and *Sadr-i-Azam*, November 1920. His son Muhammad Tahir Khan proceeded to Europe to be educated in October 1921 and died in France. Nadir Khan left Kabul for Khanabad on tour, *via* the Pangshir route, on 5th January 1922. Returned to Kabul in the Autumn of 1922. Resumed duties of War Minister, and in addition those of Officer in charge of Frontier Affairs. Succeeded as War Minister by Muhammad Wali, and appointed Afghan Minister at Paris, January 1924. Severely ill at beginning of 1926, and had to resign appointment; replaced by Ghulam Nabi Khan. Proceeded to Grasse on sick leave, where he was joined by his brothers, Muhammad Hashim and Shah Wali. Is said to have chest trouble. He is not *anti*-British, but regards the tribes of the Independent territory as Afghanistan's most useful weapon *vis-à-vis* British; intrigue on the frontier is his speciality. Awarded Grand Officer of Legion of Honour by French Government, October 1926. Quarrelled with King Amanulla who however tried to induce him to return during his visit to Europe 1928. Still at Grasse, December 1928, with Hashim Khan and Shah Wali. Regarded in many quarters as most capable and honest of Afghan statesmen. Said to be a favourite for the throne with many of the tribes (January 1929), but himself declared that he had no desire to be King, but would perform any service his country required of him. Left Marseilles for India with Hashim Khan and Shah Wali, February 8th, 1929. Born 1880.

NAQIB OF BAGHDAD.—An influential religious leader of the neighbourhood of Jalalabad. Brother of Naqib of Chaharbagh (*q.v.*).

NAQIB OF CHAHARBAGH.—(See Saiyid Hassan, *Effendi*.)

634. OBEDULLA KHAN.—Son of *Amir* Habibulla Khan by the Ulya Hazrat; younger brother of King Amanulla. About 11 years of age (1926). Called Shah Agha. Carefully looked after by the Ulya Hazrat, who employs a German tutor for him.

RAHMATULLA JAN.—Eldest son of King Amanulla and Queen Suriya. Born about 1921. Declared Heir-apparent, 1928.

684. SADIQ KHAN, MUHAMMAD, *Firqa Mishar* (Corps Commander).—Born about 1887. Son of Khwaja Jan, *Sahibzada* of Kabul, and brother of Ate-ul-Haq (*q.v.*) and Sher Jan (*q.v.*). Was commanding in Kunar Valley, 1921. G. O. C., Jalalabad, 1922. Did good work during the Mangal rebellion, 1924–25. At close of rebellion was appointed G. O. C. and Governor of Jalalabad province. Relieved as Governor by Shah Mahmud, June 1926. Appointed Civil and Military Governor of Khost Southern Province *vice* Ghulam Nabi, August 1926. Lived a long time in India. Professes *anti*-British feeling probably to disarm suspicion of *pro*-British prejudices arising from fact of his stay in India rather than from real *anti*-British sentiments. Is neglecting badly his duties in Khost, where he is unpopular. Has no personality and takes bribes freely, January 1927. Commanding troops at Gardez, February 1929.

714. SAIYID HASSAN, *Effendi, Turk, Baghdadi Pir*, called also *Naqib* of Chaharbagh.—Brother of the *Naqib* of Baghdad and of Pir Abdus Salam of Baghdad. Owns land at Kabul. Receives an allowance of Rs. 1,000 *per mensem*. Used to act as intermediary, through his brothers, with the Pan-Islamic league. Was said to employ his nephew Mahmud Sami (*q.v.*), who came to Kabul in 1906, for carrying messages to and from Baghdad. Was built a winter residence by Amir Habibulla in Chaharbagh. Is connected by marriage with Mir Saiyid Jan Badshah of Islampur. Was said to have publicly deplored the entry of Turkey into the war, and to have implored Persia and Afghanistan to maintain neutrality. Has a greater reputation and more religious influence in Afghanistan than any local priest or saint. Was treated with the utmost respect by Amir Habibulla Khan and *Sardar* Nasrulla Khan. (1920.) Is a man of peace who takes no part in politics (1927). He appears to have protected H.M. Consul at Jalalabad during the rebellion from December 1928.

SAIYID HUSSAIN, (? *Tajik*) of *Charikar*.—Habibulla Khan's principal lieutenant in attack on Kabul December 1928. Born about 1895. Son of a well-to-do landowner. He succeeded to the family property and quickly squandered it in riotous living. Then, owing to some misunderstanding, left his wife and father-in-law and took to the road. Has never had any profession but highway robbery, and is fearless, cruel and ruthless, without redeeming qualities of Habibulla. When Habibulla became Amir of Kabul, January 1929, was made his Minister of War, and quickly made himself unpopular by his extortions and cruelty. Said to be on bad terms with Habibulla January 1929 (Not to be confused with 714.)

SAIYID MUKHTAR.—(See Mir Mukhtar.)

722. SAIYID QASIM.—Proceeded to Peshawar through the Khyber, December 1921, on his way to London as messenger from the Foreign Office. Brother-in-Law of Mahmud Beg Tarzi.—Member of the Afghan Legation in London, 1924. Acted as *Chargé d'Affaires* in 1924 between departure of Abdul Hadi and arrival of Shuja-ed-Douleh. Returned to Kabul, May 1925, and appointed Under-Secretary in charge of Russia and Turkestan branch of Foreign Office to succeed Hafizullah, February 1926. Appointed Afghan Consul-General, Delhi, October 1926, *vice* Haji Muhammad Akbar, and left Kabul for Delhi, 20th November 1926. Awarded Order of Astor, 1st class, January 1927. Speaks excellent English, well educated and friendly.

730. SAMI, MUHAMMAD, AGHA.—Brother of *Shahghasi* Muhammad Yakub Khan. Son of Muhammad Yusuf Khan, a *Munshi* to *Amir* Habibulla. A Mohmand by birth, but the family have settled in Ghazni for some generations. Was *Mehmandar* to the British Mission in Kabul, 1921. A colourless person; but appears to flourish on his brother's reputation. Appointed Commandant of Police, Kabul, 1922, but was dismissed in 1923, partly due to escape of Ardali and Daud Shah from Kabul gaol and partly due to reports of his complicity in murder of one Abdul Ali. Appointed Political Officer during [20088]

Mangal rebellion and sent to the front where his services earned appreciation of *Amir*. Appointed *Mehmandar* to Wakils of Eastern Provinces during *Amir's* visit of April 1926. Reappointed Commandant of Police, Kabul, August 1926. Is a trusted, personal informer to the *Amir*, and he is a pleasant and efficient man. Controlled a mob with great skill during the fire which gutted the British Legation at Kabul in December 1926. Officiating Governor of Kabul November 1928.

732. SANAK, *Musa Khel, Mangal Malik*.—A leader in the Khost rebellion of 1924-25. Fled to India in March 1925 and interned in Abbottabad. In winter of 1925-1926 he was allowed to return to Afghanistan, in October 1926 he went to Kabul and received the pardon of the King. Said to be working for King Amanulla, January 1929.
738. SARWAR KHAN, MUHAMMAD, *Barakzai, Naib Salar*.—Son of Muhammad Sadiq Khan, and brother of Ghulam Haider. Was formerly a *Ghulam Bacha*. Was highly esteemed by *Amir* Habibulla Khan. Promoted Brigadier in 1906 owing to his success in the manufacture of guns, and appointed Superintendent of the Kabul Arsenal. Promoted Major-General in 1913. In March 1919 he was appointed *Naib Salar* by *Amir* Amanulla Khan, and later on in the same month left for Marzar-i-Sharif to take up the appointment of *Naib-ul-Hukuma* of Turkestan. Granted by civil and military powers in his province. Relieved of his appointment of *Naib-ul-Hukuma*, Turkestan, and proceeded to Kabul in January 1922, where he officiated as Minister of the Interior. Governor of Kandahar, 1923, but the chief power in the province was wielded by the Minister of the Interior who, originally officiating as Governor of Kandahar, remained there on relief to deal with the disorders that were rife in the province during 1923. Muhammad Sarwar's jurisdiction seems then to have been limited. Still Governor of Kandahar at beginning of 1927. Described by the *Amir*, during visit of inspection to Kandahar, November 1925, as "honest and respectable, but slow and negligent." Summoned to Kabul by the *Amir*, June 1926, and travelled by aeroplane to Kabul and return; well received by the King. Visited Kabul for Independence week celebrations, August 1926. Created *Sardar-i-Ala* November 1926. Courteous and friendly, but the King's description fits him well. Governor of Badakshan and Kataghan April-November 1928.

755. SHAH MAHMUD, *Sar Sarios*.—(See Mahmud Jan.)

762. SHAH WALI KHAN, *Sardar, Muhammadzai, Naib Salar*.—Brother of *Sipah Salar* Nadir Khan and son of *Sardar* Muhammad Yusuf Khan. Was formerly *Rikab Bashi* to *Amir* Habibulla Khan. Commanded the *Rikabi* or *Malikzada* bodyguard composed of Kafir converts. Accompanied *Amir* Habibulla Khan to India in 1907. After the latter's murder in February 1919, when the troops at Jalalabad arrested the members of the family of *Sardars* Muhammad Yusuf and Muhammad Asaf, Shah Wali Khan was among those taken and sent as prisoner to Kabul. He was accused of having actually made the arrangements for the murder. At the *darbar* held on the 13th April 1919, however, at which the trial of those accused of the murder took place, he was acquitted and was released. Commanding the troops from Urgun in Lwara, June 1919. Commanded troops on Kharlach front July-October 1919. Promoted General for good work on the Tochi border. Married the sister of the *Amir* Amanulla in May 1920. Appointed to command the 1st Division in Kabul in April 1921. Is on very intimate terms with *Amir* Amanulla and seems to be his greatest personal friend; he is always with him. Was one of the Delegates at the British-Afghan Conference in Kabul 1921. He is an able and quick-witted man. Commanding the 1st Cavalry Corps in December 1921. Promoted *Naib Salar* to command the Kabul Corps, 1923. Appointed Equerry to the King (*Yavar-i-Huzuri*) December 1924. Commanded troops at Logar during the Mangal rebellion, 1924-25. Visited India in May 1925 and again in December 1925, when he persuaded Muhammad Umar to return to Afghanistan from Haidarabad. Created "Tazi Afghan" for Mangal rebellion services. Left Kabul for Paris, September 1926, accompanying Afghan students returning from vacation. Is with his brother Nadir Khan at Grasse. A friendly and pleasant man.

Still at Grasse, January 1929. Was granted visa to go to Afghanistan through India, and left Marseilles with Nadir Khan and Hashim Khan on February 8th, 1929. Born 1892.

773. SIHER AHMAD KHAN, *Sardar, Muhammadzai*.—Son of *Sardar* Fateh Muhammad Khan, the former of *Amin-ul-Asas*. Was acting in the appointment of *Ishak Aghasi Nizam* in 1917. Appointed *Hakim* of Andkhui in 1920. Suspended and arrived in Kabul on 25th May 1921. Appointed Afghan Envoy to Italy in September 1921. Arrived in Peshawar on 10th October *en route* to Italy together with a large party of Afghan students who were proceeding to Europe to be educated. Was Afghan Minister at Rome during 1922, and was engaged in many negotiations for the purchase of arms. Character deteriorated in Rome. Relieved by *Sardar* Azimullah in the Autumn of 1922, but remained in Europe apparently in connection with the purchase of arms, until the Summer of 1923, when he returned to Kabul with an expressed distaste for his own country. Appointed President of the *Shora* in 1924, in place of *Sardar* Muhammad Usman. Officiated as Foreign Minister at end of 1924. Possesses an exaggerated idea of the importance of Afghanistan. Leader of the party in favour of peaceable tactics during Urta Tagai crisis, January 1926. Courteous; appears to be friendly to the British. Is influential. Cordially detests Mahmud Tarzi. With King Amanulla in Europe 1928. Appointed to stillborn post of Prime Minister, September 1928 and subsequently to be head of Public Service Bureau. Held Jalalabad for the King in November 1928. Born 1885.

SHER JAN.—Minister of Court to *Amir* Habibulla, January 1929. Brother of Ata-ul-Haq (*q.v.*).

SHER AGHA.—(See Fazal-i-Umar.)

790. SHUJA-UD-DULA.—Born about 1896 of a Trans-Oxus family. Was *Ghulam Bacha* in August 1916, and was employed looking after the German Mission in Herat. Had returned to Kabul by the beginning of October, and in January 1917 was appointed *Farash Bashi Huzuri* to *Amir* Habibulla Khan, with whom he was a great favourite. *Amir* Amanulla raised him to the high rank of *Kotwal* of Kabul, and *Amin-ul-Asas* (Chief Police Officer). Also commanding the 2nd Regiment in Kabul, January, 1921. One of the Afghan Delegates at the British-Afghan Conference in Kabul, 1921. His title was now *Wazir-i-Amania* (Minister of Security), his office having been raised to a *Wazarat* (Ministry), independent of the Home and War Ministries. Appeared to be a man of considerable ability. In the closest confidence of the *Amir* and believed to run his spy organization in Afghanistan. Officiating as Governor, Herat, in January 1921; relieved as Minister of Security by Mahmud Khan. Relieved as Governor of Herat by Mir Zaman-ud-din, and returned to Kabul at end of 1924. Was deputed to maintain order in Simat-i-Shamali during Mangal rebellion. Appointed Minister at London, August 1924, and arrived at London in April 1925. Played no part in Anglo-Afghan relations. Carried through many rifle deals, out of which he is believed to have made a considerable fortune. Proved himself on occasions ill-mannered and *anti-British*. Gave much trouble by failing to settle debts due by the Legation for rent, &c. Summoned to Kandahar by way of Germany and the U.S.S.R., February, 1929. Comes from Ghorband near Charikar.

801. SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.—Head of the Afghan Mission to Angora. Arrived in Baku on 11th March, 1921. Arrived in Angora on April 14th. Addressed a large crowd, including many prominent Turkish Nationalist Deputies, at the mosque of Namazie, Angora, on 27th August 1921. The subject of the address was the necessity for unity throughout the whole Moslem world, in order that the encroachments and intrigues of European Powers might be successfully resisted. Prayers were offered for the victory of the Turkish arms, and Sultan Ahmad Khan gave a donation of 2,000 liras to the Red Crescent. The Bolshevik Envoy in Kabul, Raskolnikov, instructed his Government early in September 1921, at the request of the Afghan Government, to provide Sultan Ahmad with 40,000 roubles in gold. Payment to be adjusted in Kabul. Returned to Kabul, April 1926, and was appointed [20088]

3rd Under Secretary in Foreign Office. Officiated as 1st Under Secretary during absence of Mirza Muhammad Khan on Urta Tagai boundary commission. Appointed 2nd Under Secretary Foreign Office to relieve Abdul Aziz (q.v.) June 1926, and 1st Under Secretary on departure of Mirza Muhammad Khan for Moscow, October 1926. Is a conceited man and rather an obstructionist in his present appointment; unpopular with foreigners. Granted title of "*Sardar-i-Ala*," February 1927. Ambassador at Tehran, October 1928.

804. SULTAN MIR.—Son of Gulistan, *Adam Khel, Afridi*. A member of the gang responsible for the Ffoulkes murder, and implicated in the kidnapping of Miss Ellis, April 1923. Still believed to be in Tirah or the Adam Khel Dara, 1926.

805. SULTAN MIRZA.—Son of Yaqub Beg of Delhi. Came to Kabul in 1920. Employed in Harbibia College. Returned to India, May 1921, and later returned secretly to Kabul. Reported to be employed on the staff of the Badakhshan Division, June 1926, and in Bejam, 1928. Reported to be intriguing with the Haji of Turangzai and Mashi Bashir on behalf of the Soviet Embassy and to have been disowned by the Afghan Government, October 1928.

SYED HUSSEIN.—(See Saiyid Hussein.)

307. TAGAO, *Mulla Sahib of*.—(See Hamidulla of Tagao.)

818. TURANGZAI, *Haji of*.—(See Fazal-i-Wahid.)

820. ULYA HAZRAT, SIRAJ-UD-KHAWATIN (*Her Majesty the Sun of the Ladies*).—Step-sister of *Leo Naib* Khushdil Khan, daughter of the late *Leo Naib* Sherdil Khan, and step-daughter of *Ishak Aghasi* Muhammad Sarwar Khan. Her name is Sarwar Sultan. Chief wife of Habibulla and mother of Amanulla Khan. In 1916 said to be strongly in favour of neutrality. Very strong character, and dabbles in politics. Supposed to have refused to help Turco-German Mission in 1916. In 1917 and 1918 had numerous quarrels with *Amir* Habibulla owing to her interference in political matters and was eventually said to have been expelled from the *Arg*. After the murder of Habibulla, left for Kabul to negotiate with her son, Amanulla (February 1919). Is believed by many to have been with Amanulla, the organizer of the plot which resulted in the murder of Habibulla. Said to be of Tarzi's party, and in favour of a Treaty of Friendship with the British. Has one other son, Obedulla, known as Shah Agha; aged about 11 (1926), for whom she employs a German tutor. Left for Kandahar with Queen Souriya December, 1928, and proceeded with energy to raise assistance for the Durani dynasty. Reported to have made an aeroplane journey to Jalalabad to bargain with the rebels, January, 1929. Has never been on good terms with Queen Souriya and reported to have quarrelled with her and left King Amanulla's palace, at Kandahar, February 1929.

826. UMAR KHAN, MUHAMMAD, *Ghund Mishar*.—Appointed Chief of Staff, 1924. Visited Delhi Manœuvres, December 1924, at invitation of C.-in-C. Appointed head of an Afghan military mission to Russia to select artillery for the Afghan army, and study Soviet military methods, October 1926. Left Kabul by air for Termez *en route* to Moscow, 3rd November 1926. Speaks Russian and German. One of the most reliable and straightest men in the army. Young, keen and efficient. Again in Moscow 1928. A Tajik by tribe.

UMAR KHAN, MUHAMMAD.—Son of Amir Ayab Khan. Escaped from surveillance at Allahabad December 1928. Reported near Jalalabad, January 1929. His disappearance gave great offence to the Afghan Government, who had asked that he might be specially watched.

834. USMAN KHAN, MUHAMMAD, *Muhammadzai*.—Son of Muhammad Umar Khan. Born about 1857. Brother-in-law of Sardars Asaf and Yusuf Khan. Governor of Kandahar, 1904. Expelled by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan. Joined Ayub Khan in India. Returned to Kabul and given service by Abdur

Rahman. Known as the *Surkh-dastkhat Naib* because he always signed his name in red ink. Very hostile to British. Rank of *Naib Salar Mulki* (Civil General) in 1907. Corrupt and unpopular (1910). Governor of Kandahar, but recalled, 1913, to account for his extortions, and acquitted. In December 1913 deposed from office of Governor (*Naib-ul-Hukuma*) and sent to Kabul under arrest. In 1916 appointed *Naib-ul-Hukuma* of Turkestan, with headquarters at Mazar-i-Sharif, and still Governor there in 1919. Arrested by General Umar Khan and sent to Kabul by order of Amanulla in March 1919. Said to have intended to escape to Bokhara with five lakhs of rupees before arrest. Unemployed in Kabul, September 1919. His property was confiscated in October 1920 by the King for complicity in Nasrulla's intrigues. A member of the Council of State (*Majlis-i-Shora*), December 1921. President of the *Shora* from 1922 to 1924. Relieved by Sher Ahmad Khan. Appointed Chief of School for Oriental Research and Study, 1926. Arrested in September 1928 at same time as Hazrats of Shor Bazar (q.v.). Apparently released later. Promised British Legation his protection during Habibulla Khan's second attack on Kabul, January 1929.

841. WALI KHAN, MUHAMMAD, *Sardar-i-Ala, Sarjamah* (Chief of *Ghulam Bachas*).—A descendant of the old royal family of Darwaz across the Oxus. Was custodian of all Habibulla's secret correspondence and documents. Father was Shah Agha. Is related to General Abdur Rahman, the Afghan Envoy, and has been appointed Ambassador at Bokhara (April 1919). Left for Bokhara with Abdul Wahab Khan (q.v.). Arrived Tashkent, June 3rd, with General Rahman Khan, and Colonel Habibulla Khan and wired to President Wilson that he was head of Afghan Delegates proceeding to Peace Conference. Arrived in Moscow, October 1919, where he conducted preliminary negotiations for an Afghan-Bolshevik alliance. Returned to Herat, January 1920. Said to be incompetent and with no influence. Returned to Tashkent, June 1920. Left Tashkent for Moscow on 25th July 1920, with the Afghan Mission to Turkey, *via* Russia. He eventually headed another mission to Berlin, February 1921. And later visited America, London, Paris and Rome. He arrived in Rome in May 1921 and is reported to have concluded a Treaty, details unknown, with the Italian Government. After ratification it is said that an Italian representative will proceed to Kabul together with an Economic Mission. He arrived in London from America on 8th August 1921, accompanied by Muhammad Faiz Khan, Habibulla Khan, and Ghulam Sadiq Khan. Later he was awaiting in France the arrival of the Afghan students who sailed from Bombay in October 1921. Returned to Kabul, May 1922, having interviewed several *Khilafat* leaders on journey through India. Appointed Foreign Minister, June 1922. Relieved as Foreign Minister by Mahmud Tarzi. Appointed War Minister, 1924. In personal command against Khost rebels, June 1924. Returned to Kabul, April 1925. Greatly trusted by the King for whom he acts at Kabul during H. M.'s visits to the provinces. A sound, capable man. Is friendly with the Soviet, but not unfriendly to the British. Very influential and much liked by the army. Regent during King's tour 1927-1928. Permanent Regent in King's absence from capital, November 1928. Ill-treated by Habibulla Khan's men, January 1929.

854. YAKUB KHAN.—A page to *Amir* Habibulla. Numerous favours have been conferred on him by Amanulla. Appointed a *Musahib-i-Khas* (Privy Councillor) in 1920 and *Shahgassi Huzuri* in January 1921. Still *Shahgassi Huzuri*, 1927. Created *Sardar-i-Ala*, January 1927, and appointed Minister of Court. With King Amanulla in Europe 1928. A brother of Agha Sami (No. 730 q.v.). *Mohmand*.

YAWAR MAHMUD KHAN.—(See Mahmud Khan.)

YUNUS KHAN, MUHAMMAD.—Comes from Jalalabad and is of Pathan stock. Secretary of Afghan Legation in London from 1922. Always showed himself helpful and well disposed. Profuse with pro-British sentiments which are probably sincere.

APPENDIX.

Glossary of Titles in Afghanistan.

Amin	...	Head, Chief Inspector, Superintendent.
Arq	...	Fort or citadel.
Arzbegi	...	Usher.
Asas, Amin-ul-	...	Chief Police officer.
Farash Bashi Hazuri	...	Superintendent of the Household.
Firqa (Mishar)	...	Corps (Commander).
Ghulam bachas	...	Sons of Afghan Nobles and High Officials, employed as pages.
Ghund (Mishar)	...	Brigade (Commander).
Haji	...	Title given to a pilgrim who has been to Mecca.
Hakim	...	Governor of a District.
Hakim-i-Kalan	...	Governor of a District province.
Harbia (Nazir-i-)	...	War Minister.
Ishaq Aghassi (Shah-ghassi)	...	Secretary.
Ishaq Aghassi (Shah-ghassi) Mulki (Nizami)	...	Civil (Military) Chamberlain.
Kandak (Mishar)	...	Battalion (Commander).
Khassadar	...	Irregular soldier.
Kharijia (Nazir-i-)	...	Foreign Minister.
Kila Begi	...	Officer in charge of the Arq.
Kotwal	...	Head of Police.
Majlis-i-Shura	...	Afghan Cabinet (State Council).
Mir	...	Head, Chief.
Mir Aspor	...	A corps of sons of Hazara Khans and Maliks. Done away with by Amir Amanulla.
Mirza	...	Munshi.
Mufti	...	Construer of Muhammadan Law (now a title handed down from father to son).
Mu'in-ul-Saltanat	...	Helper of State.
Mulki	...	Civil.
Musahib-i-Khas	...	Privy Councillor.
Naib	...	Assistant.
Naib Salar	...	General.
Naib-ul-Hukuma	...	Governor of a Province with privilege of stamping papers with Amir's Seal.
Naib-us-Sultanat	...	Viceroy.
Nazar (Nazir)	...	Chief Head, Minister.
Nizami	...	Military.
Pir	...	Saint, Holy Man.
Qazi	...	Judge.
Rikab-Bashi	...	<i>Literally</i> Chief Stirrup—i.e., man who rides by side of Equerry.
Sad bashi	...	Commander of 100 men.
Sadr-i-Azam	...	Premier.

Sardar-i-Salar	...	Commander-in-Chief.
Sardar-i-Ala (Ali)	...	The highest Afghan decoration (first and second grades).
Sar-i-os	...	A corps of the sons of Nobility and High Officials. Done away with by Amir Amanulla.
Sarhang	...	Commander of 600 men.
Sarhaddar	...	Head, Chief, Frontier officer.
Shahi-Rikabi	...	Orderly. Cadets of high families who have been converted to Islam. Done away with by Amir Amanulla.
Shahi Risala	...	Household Cavalry.
Sipah Salar	...	Commander-in-Chief.
Simat-i-Gharbi	...	Western Province.
Simat-i-Janubi	...	Southern Province.
Simat-i-Sharaki (Mash-raqi)	...	Eastern Province.
Simat-i-Shimal	...	Northern Province.
Toli (Mishar)	...	Company (Commander).
Wakil (Vakil)	...	Agent.
Wazir	...	Minister.
Yawar	...	Personal Assistant.

[N 923/923/97]

No. 56.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 174.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, February 10, 1929.

I THINK that we should take all possible steps to prevent a Russian representative being established at Kandahar. Soviet Ambassador has never been permitted to go there even on short visit. In letter III attached to Anglo-Afghan Treaty it is stipulated that exemption for Afghan Government and trade goods from customs duty would always be dependent on exclusion of Russian representative from Kandahar. I suggest that consul, Kandahar, should be instructed to notify Ghulam Sadiq that His Majesty's Government would regard with great disfavour the presence of a Russian representative in Kandahar, and might be compelled to close Chaman frontier altogether under such circumstances.

[N 904/1/97]

No. 57.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 175.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, February 10, 1929.

FEBRUARY 9. Reference your telegram No. 43.

Since it has been decided by His Majesty's Government that it is inevitable to completely withdraw this Legation to India and that withdrawal should take place as soon as it appears to Minister to be feasible, and since the necessity for terminating indecisions of other Legations is stressed, I suggest note should be slightly amended as follows:—

"His Britannic Majesty's Government have decided that, since the early establishment of a settled Government generally accepted in Afghanistan can no longer be reasonably anticipated, they will be obliged to withdraw the British mission to India as soon as can conveniently be arranged. His Britannic Majesty's Government regard it as essential (as in original) concerted with His Majesty's representative without delay as the continuance of these facilities will not be possible after British mission has been withdrawn."

I suggest it would be sufficient to communicate this note to Paris, Rome and Berlin. I am now inclined to believe that withdrawal of three European Legations is entirely dependent on release of their nationals, while two Mahometan missions will in any case probably remain.

It is imperative to prevent information regarding decision of His Majesty's Government reaching Kabul Foreign Office prematurely, since, if Kabul Government were given time to think of consequent embarrassment to themselves, they could easily put obstacles in the way of our final evacuation, and, at the same time, it is necessary to ensure that I shall be first to inform Kabul Government of this decision, as otherwise they would take offence. As actual withdrawal operation will be a delicate task, it would help to decrease my embarrassment here if communication to foreign Powers could be regarded as strictly confidential for secret and personal information of their Kabul representatives only.

Please see my telegram No. 159 for detailed figures for immediate evacuation. If weather is favourable, and given an unrestricted egress for those who wish to go, I could, with aeroplanes now available, complete evacuation of British subjects, foreigners and Legations in a week. Hitherto insuperable obstacle to carrying out of a definite and fixed programme has been reluctance of Kabul Government to expedite release of foreigners whose contracts are unexpired and who wish to leave by air. Numbers of such persons, as finally communicated to me, are as follows: British Indians 54, Germans 40, Italians 9, French 7.

I believe that my European colleagues would obtain permission to withdraw their Legations at once if this question could be solved. All three keenly feel indignity of their present position, while its dangers are also realised by them; but their present orders tie them to movements of their nationals whom Kabul Government has hitherto refused to release: and in spite of proposed note to foreign Governments, it seems doubtful whether these orders will be altered.

I request that I may be urgently issued with instructions for dealing with the fifty-four Indians under contract. I hope by constant pressure to secure their release soon, but even by end of February it is most unlikely that I shall be able to get them all released.

Owing to snowstorms I have been unable to continue evacuation since 6th February.

[N 962/923/97]

No. 58.

Government of India to India Office.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 672 S.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

February 11, 1929.

KATODON No. 174.

We agree with Minister that consul should register an objection at once, and that we should do all we can to prevent a Russian representative being established at Kandahar.

We doubt, however, whether it would be safe to go beyond this as a first step, for it seems by no means certain that we could implement a threat to close the frontier at Chaman in view of the interpretation that would be put on it by interested circles in India, including many who are not unfriendly to us at present. The Soviet, moreover, would take the opportunity of making big propaganda out of blockade of Kandahar, which they would call British intervention in the extreme form.

[N 562/1/97]

No. 59.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir F. Humphrys (Kabul).

(No. 31.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 11, 1929.

I HAVE read with intense interest your despatch No. 4 of the 5th January enclosing Mr. Best's report upon the fighting which took place round His Majesty's Legation last December, and I request that you will inform each member of your staff and household that His Majesty's Government have learned with keen satisfaction of their self-sacrifice and devotion to duty during this dangerous and difficult period, and, in particular, of the heroic conduct of the ladies of the Legation.

2. I shall also be glad if you will convey the deep sympathy of His Majesty's Government to the families of the two Afghan servants who were killed, as well as to the members of your staff who were wounded.

3. It is solely due to the courage and tact of all concerned and especially to your own coolness, firmness and experience that His Majesty's Legation survived an experience which might easily have proved disastrous, and I have pleasure in expressing to you and your staff the high appreciation entertained by His Majesty's Government of these services and to you personally their admiration of the resolute manner in which you secured respect for British soil and upheld your position as His Majesty's representative.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[N 968/1/97]

No. 60.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 191.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, February 12, 1929.

GOVERNMENT of India's telegram No. 672 S of 11th February, and my telegram No. 174.

I assume that on withdrawal of British mission from Kabul, British consul will be withdrawn simultaneously from Kandahar. From local standpoint I recommend consul should be instructed at once to inform Ghulam Sadiq that consulate will be shortly withdrawn to India pending establishment of a settled Government accepted throughout Afghanistan. Also, that His Majesty's Government would regard presence of a Russian representative at Kandahar as unfriendly, and if this were permitted by Kandahar Government result would be as follows: (a) Exemption from customs would cease automatically; (b) grant of permission to all Afghans except tribesmen and petty traders to cross the frontier into India at Chaman would be withheld; (c) war material would not be allowed into Afghanistan via Chaman.

I am satisfied that above measures would give no offence to general public at Kandahar. On the contrary, all reasonable steps taken by us to keep out Russian influence which they dread would be welcome. I consider this is only way to persuade Amanullah to keep a Russian representative out of Kandahar.

I realise, however, that attitude of political India and of Soviet Government towards such measures as I have recommended must be subject of anxious considerations, and I am not entitled to express an opinion on either point.

[N 969/1/97]

No. 61.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 192.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, February 12, 1929.

IN continuation of my telegrams Nos. 160 and 175.

My three European colleagues have been clinging to hope of evacuating most of their nationals with their baggage by road, and at first affected to misunderstand note to their Governments, referred to in your telegram No. 13, as implying I would arrange lorry convoy to Peshawar. I have explained to them that this idea is illusory. I have also pointed out to them that, while it would be possible for a German merchant, a French professor, or an Italian engineer to remain in hiding in a cave in Hindu Kush for months, until expected storm blows over, it would be hardly a dignified solution for representative of a first-class Power. They appear to have taken these arguments to heart, and are now concentrating on trying to get permission of Kabul Government for early evacuation by air of as many of their nationals as possible, and are pressing their own Governments to be allowed to withdraw their Legations when I give signal, which may wait until last of their nationals have left.

I am told by Cecchi that he has definite reasons for believing that Soviet Embassy has made preparations if British Legation leaves Kabul to also withdraw from Kabul by air with entire Russian colony.

[N 1012/1/97]

No. 62.

Government of India to India Office.

(No. 715 S.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

February 13, 1929.

KATODON No. 175.

As the situation has apparently deteriorated since Minister telegraphed, we are inclined to suggest that, even if nothing came of it, it might be preferable to address note to all Governments to whom the earlier note was addressed. Particularly we should like to recognise recent alacrity with which Persian Government gave transit facilities to "Victorias." Differentiation between Christian and non-Christian Government might lead to misunderstanding.

[N 1011/1/97]

No. 63.

Government of India to India Office.

(No. 717 S.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

February 13, 1929.

KATODON No. 191.

We should be glad if Minister would review pros. and cons., as we ourselves had not assumed that withdrawal of consul from Kandahar would proceed automatically with withdrawal of Legation from Kabul. *Primâ facie* arguments in favour would be the removal of one excuse for the Russians to plant representative at Kandahar, uniformity of procedure and impartiality to the Kabul and Kandahar Governments. Disadvantages would be deprivation of Indian nationals of all protection and guidance, resentment in India at withdrawal without the justification of danger and prior evacuation of the colony, and loss of valuable source of intelligence. Provisionally we feel, therefore, that unless the local situation seriously worsens consul should remain in Kandahar. Minister's second point is being dealt with in a separate telegram.

[N 1022/1/97]

No. 64.

India Office to Government of India.

(No. 555.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, February 13, 1929.

REFERENCE your telegram No. 672 S, dated the 11th instant.

I must now await your views on further proposals contained in telegram from Humphrys No. 191, dated the 12th February. You will no doubt carefully weigh questions whether probable advantages outweigh objections that might be taken on the ground that action would be unreasonable in itself in changed circumstances created by Amanullah's move to Kandahar, and precisely what we should stand to gain by proposed action, and that it would lend itself to alarmist misrepresentation and to Soviet and Afghan propaganda.

[N 904/1/97]

No. 65.

*Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir W. Tyrrell (Paris).**

(No. 49.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, February 14, 1929.

PLEASE make following personal and secret communication to Minister for Foreign Affairs in view of the misrepresentations that have been made:—

"His Britannic Majesty's Government desires to make it clear that they have not interfered, and have no intention of interfering, in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and that their relations with *de facto* Government at Kabul have been and will continue to be confined to making necessary arrangements in regard to immediate practical questions, such as evacuation of British

* Also to Berlin (No. 34) and Rome (No. 40).

subjects and foreigners. They have now decided that they will be obliged to withdraw the British mission to India as soon as can be conveniently arranged, since early establishment of a settled Government generally accepted in Afghanistan can no longer be reasonably anticipated. His Britannic Majesty's Government consider it essential that detailed arrangements for evacuation by air from Kabul to India of members of foreign missions, if they are to be withdrawn, and of other foreigners at Kabul for whom such facilities are desired, should now be concerted without delay with His Majesty's representative, as continuance of these facilities will no longer be possible after British mission has been withdrawn."

You should explain verbally that, in a comparatively short time when weather conditions permit of it, a resumption of fighting generally may occur in Kabul, and there is a real danger of a massacre of Europeans. The international complications which would ensue are obvious and too dangerous to be contemplated. If French, German and Italian Ministers and staffs remain after British mission have left they will be helpless, and if worst happens they will be cut off from all hope of escape. We would therefore most strongly urge that categorical instructions be immediately sent to German, French and Italian Ministers to concert with Sir F. Humphrys for previous or simultaneous evacuation of German, French and Italian Legations.

You should insist that above communication be kept absolutely secret from press and public, as, if decision to evacuate becomes freely known to Afghan Government, they may frustrate whole scheme by raising difficulties as regards aeroplanes.

[N 1037/1/97]

No. 66.

Government of India to India Office.

(No. 732 S.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

February 14, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 555 and Katodon No. 191.

We should, of course, press for proposed threat if we could be certain that it would have the effect of keeping Russian representatives out of Kandahar. We must, however, realise great probability of its not proving effective and of our having to implement our threat. In view more especially of the strong pro-Amanullah wave among our frontier tribes and in India, any measures which might colourably be described as active intervention against Amanullah would be so dangerous that we feel we be content with protest without definite threat. If we lodge our protest, intrusion of Russian representative in present extraordinary circumstances into Kandahar will hardly weaken our case for his permanent exclusion when there is again a central Government to deal with.

In India pro-Amanullah wave has been due to sympathy with an Asiatic sovereign, who first wresting independence from the British and then compelling the attentions of European capitals, and to the hopes political India has been building on his demonstrating to Swaraj possibility of swift attainment of progressive and efficient administration. Amongst our tribes pro-Amanullah wave has been due chiefly to revulsion of feeling against the possibility of a non-Pathan Ameer. To begin with, pro-Amanullah agitation threatened to take dangerously anti-British course. It is now assuming comparatively innocuous form, thanks to our ability to point to absolute non-intervention to sedative pronouncements at home and in India, and the absence of any definite obstruction on our part on which anti-British propaganda might seize. To-day, none but extremists seriously credit us with any desire to exploit situation for imperialistic or anti-Russian ends, and now that Kandahar Government has called on Indian sympathisers, not for personal help but for hard cash, pro-Amanullah agitation is likely soon to dissipate itself harmlessly if left to run its course.

From the internal point of view feeling of political India is of obvious importance. Externally, it is important (1) in its reactions on Russia, (2) as tending to react on our tribes through frontier Khilafat committees and other agitators. Should Indian Government resort to measures which could be misrepresented as overt action against Amanullah, it would provide Russia with propaganda that we were actively intervening, and might even convince her that we were actually doing so and scare her into dangerous counter-action. We are convinced that by far our safest course is "business as usual," as far as possible, within our own borders.

[N 1097/1/97]

No. 67.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 213.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, February 15, 1929.

REFERENCE your telegram No. 51: Evacuation.

Present position is as follows: Detailed summary was contained in my telegram of the 7th instant, No. 159.

Since then I have evacuated to India by air 108 British Indian subjects (this includes 3 from British Legation and 1 from French Legation), 3 British protected Indians, 9 Germans, 6 Persians and 7 Turks; total, 133. Above are in addition to 308 previously sent down. Following is revised estimate of those who remain to be evacuated:—

British subjects in Legation 52; others 10. Reference my telegram No. 207, dated the 14th February. I have personally selected all those who have already been sent down and have carefully checked list of applicants, and I consider that I have no further obligations towards remainder. The majority of these, in any case, owing to business ties, are unable to go; while rest have adopted Afghan nationality or are for other reasons unsuitable candidates. I may still receive applications from a few worthy people, but I put total number of British subjects at not more than 80, including 9 Indians who are employed in other European Legations.

Italian Legation 3, outside 12.

French Legation 3, outside 12.

German Legation 2, outside not known.

Of those who have applied I have evacuated but one.

Turkish and Persian missions will apparently stay. There are 4 in each. All their nationals who have applied have been evacuated. Excluding members of this Legation at the present moment I have on my list only 6 men who are ready to leave, viz., 2 Italians, 1 French, 1 German, 2 Indian servants of Italian Minister.

I have asked my French, German and Italian colleagues to meet me to-morrow to discuss proposals contained in your telegram No. 51 received to-day. I shall press them to finally complete formalities with Kabul Government without delay regarding release of their nationals. I shall, if they are successful, aim at complete evacuation of all those outside Legations by the 20th February. On the same day I should inform Ataul Haq of the decision of His Majesty's Government to withdraw this Legation to India, and ask my three European colleagues to make a similar communication regarding their own withdrawal.

German, French and Italian Legations and part of the British Legation would be evacuated on the 21st February in four "Victorias." On the 22nd February whole available fleet of "Victorias" and "Hinaidi" would be required to evacuate remainder of His Majesty's Legation. If evacuation cannot be fixed for the 20th February owing to bad weather or other obstacles, programme would be telegraphed accordingly.

[N 849/1/97]

No. 68.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir H. Rumbold (Berlin).

(No. 238.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 15, 1929.

I HAVE received with satisfaction and relief your despatch No. 103 of the 6th February.

2. I must admit that the deliberate suppression by the German press of all reference to the gallant and humane work of rescue carried out by the Royal Air Force had left a very disagreeable impression on my mind. It seemed to argue the continued existence among the German people of a degree of hostility, if not of actual hatred, towards anything British which was discouraging to one who, like myself, has worked unceasingly for the improvement of our relations, and to augur ill for the future of this policy

of conciliation. I am, therefore, the more gratified by the news which you are now able to convey. Like your Excellency I attribute this changed attitude to the exertions and influence of Dr. Stresemann, and I shall be glad if you will take a suitable occasion to inform him of my sentiments.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[N 1103/1/97]

No. 69.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 218.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, February 16, 1929.

GOVERNMENT of India telegram of the 13th February, No. 717 S.

In my opinion the chief and decisive argument in favour of simultaneous withdrawal of consul from Kandahar with withdrawal of Legation is necessity for us to preserve strict impartiality *vis-à-vis* Afghan people. When I announce His Majesty's Government's decision to withdraw this Legation the first question that Kabul Foreign Minister will ask is whether we also intend to withdraw the British consulate at Kandahar. If I say no or temporise, he will jump to conclusion that we intend to support Amanullah or Inayatullah. It is difficult for Government of India to realise that in Afghan eyes the gross vilification of Habibullah and almost frenzied championship of Amanullah by Indian press has already cast grave doubts on sincerity of their neutrality.

Other reasons are possibility of danger to consulate if Durrani-Ghilzai feud develops, as consul is inclined to think it will, and removal of any justification for Russians to establish representatives.

As regards disadvantage British Indian colony has never numbered more than sixty persons, and they still have ample opportunity of evacuating themselves to India by normal methods.

I can easily arrange for a caretaker to be left in Kandahar to provide us with information after departure of consul.

It seems to me that resentment of Kabul Government at consul and his staff remaining on after withdrawal of British Legation will be reasonable, whereas Indian opinion as voiced in public resolutions and press has clearly demonstrated that it is unwilling to preserve that impartial attitude towards internal affairs of Afghanistan which is settled policy of His Majesty's Government and Government of India.

Consul at Jalalabad has ceased to function since the 26th November and is in embarrassing and undignified position of being refugee with a religious leader who has openly denounced present ruler of Kabul. On every ground I consider simultaneous evacuation of himself and his staff to be desirable. I would arrange for supply of information from Jalalabad.

[N 1104/1/97]

No. 70.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 219.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, February 16, 1929.

SINCE despatch of Government of India's telegram No. 732 S, dated the 14th February, we have learnt that eight Russians, including a so-called representative of Moscow Foreign Office, have arrived at Kandahar as guests of Amanullah with two aeroplanes, and they have installed a wireless set there.

It may be held that presence of these Russians is insufficient to cause us serious embarrassment in view of the fact that Amanullah's influence has waned to almost vanishing point.

It, however, clearly amounts to a challenge which we must either accept or ignore. It is my definite opinion that if we wish to get rid of them a mere protest will not suffice, and the only likely means of achieving our object is the withdrawal

of British consul after giving a warning such as I have suggested in my telegram No. 191.

Another point is that a request by Amanullah to the Soviet for assistance would be so unpopular with Afghans generally, and particularly in Kandahar, that lives of the Russians would be in danger.

[N 1117/1/97]

No. 71.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 225.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, February 17, 1929.

REFERENCE my telegram No. 213 dated the 15th February.

At a meeting yesterday with my French, Italian and German colleagues I handed them a paraphrased copy of note addressed to their Governments as contained in your telegram No. 51.

I very frankly explained situation to them and said that it was either now or never.

I also offered to receive and transmit by my private wireless during next few days urgent messages between them and their Governments. They have gratefully accepted this offer.

We agreed that question of withdrawal should be kept secret for the present and we provisionally fixed following dates: Announcement of withdrawal (subject to approval of their Governments) to Kabul Foreign Minister, the 20th February. Final evacuation, the 21st and 22nd February.

[N 1135/1/97]

No. 72.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 18.)

(No. 230.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, February 18, 1929.

I WAS informed by my German colleague this morning that his Legation has received orders to remain in Kabul until all members of the German colony have left. There are still fifty-five German nationals to evacuate and German Minister thinks that it may take several weeks to wind up their affairs. He said it was essential for him to leave Kabul immediately on account of heart trouble and he implored me to arrange that Plessen should arrive in Kabul by air on the 20th February.

He himself could leave with his Indian servants on the 21st February. This would reduce Legation staff to [group undecypherable] and one [group undecypherable].

Cecchi has received orders to withdraw if British, German and French Legations are to be withdrawn. Feit states that he has instructions to withdraw his Legation if British and Italian also leave. A vicious [group undecypherable: ? circle] is thus created, and effect of these orders would be that detention of a single German (and there are many) who is charged by Afghan Government with embezzlement would hold up my French and Italian colleagues, who otherwise might be quite ready to leave.

I have explained to my European colleagues the absurdity of the situation and Feit tells me that he has telegraphed for permission to withdraw his Legation with first batch of British Legation on the 21st February if by that date his nationals have all left Kabul. Cecchi, I understand, is taking similar steps and has cancelled his request for Falconi to be sent up by air to relieve him.

I consider it very important that evacuation of His Majesty's Legation should take place as soon as possible and that operations should be completed by the 22nd February, and I have warned my three colleagues accordingly. I understand that Kabul Government is behaving with daily increasing insolence towards heads of other foreign missions, although they still treat me personally with deference and consideration, and the longer we remain the greater the chance of our withdrawal being hindered.

I have arranged to see Kabul Foreign Minister on afternoon of the 20th February.

[N 1134/1/97]

No. 73.

Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 18.)

(No. 16.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Berlin, February 18, 1929.

MY telegram No. 13.

Secretary of State informed me after my interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 15th February that German Foreign Office instructed German Minister at Kabul to report on situation of Germans there. They also instructed German consul-general at Calcutta to proceed to Peshawar via Delhi and to await further instructions at Peshawar. Meanwhile, German Foreign Office had received two telegrams from German Minister at Kabul which had crossed the above-mentioned telegram to him. German Minister reported that he had been in touch with Sir F. Humphrys, who had informed him that he would leave Kabul on the 22nd February. Sir F. Humphrys wished to evacuate all foreign nationals by the 20th February and to proceed with evacuation of German, French and Italian Legations on the 21st February. German Minister also reported that he was having difficulty in obtaining permits to leave for some of his nationals, such as teachers in the service of the Afghan Government.

German Ministry for Foreign Affairs had telegraphed to German Minister to-day to confirm, if possible, to Sir F. Humphrys proposed arrangements, and to apply to latter for assistance, if necessary, in order to obtain permits to leave for German nationals. Secretary of State begged me to telegraph and ask you to request Sir F. Humphrys to grant German Minister sufficient time to evacuate German nationals from Kabul as German Government felt that, in view of public opinion here, German Minister could not leave until all his nationals had gone. I then drew Secretary of State's attention to a paragraph in this evening's "Berliner Tageblatt" commenting on recent telegrams about Afghanistan. This paragraph categorically stated that British Minister at Kabul had informed the other diplomatic representatives of his intention to evacuate British Legation shortly, and had drawn their attention to difficulties which would arise for them owing to the withdrawal of British mission and severance of all communications between India and Afghanistan. Legations which remained behind would be completely isolated. I then read to Secretary of State the last paragraph of your telegram No. 34 to me, which I had already read to Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 15th February, and pointed out the gravity of this incident.

Secretary of State was much upset, and assured me that leakage had not occurred in German Foreign Office, where my communication had been dealt with by only four persons, including Minister for Foreign Affairs and himself. He fully realised the unfortunate effect which this statement in the press might have, and would see what he could do to prevent any further harm.

[N 568/1/97]

No. 74.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir F. Humphrys (Kabul).

(No. 40.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 18, 1929.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 19 of the 30th January, I enclose a copy of a note,* dated the 28th January, from Shuja-ed-Dowleh Khan, informing me of the cancellation of ex-King Amanullah's abdication. On the following day the Minister issued to the press an announcement in almost identical terms and similar official communications and announcements appear to have been made in other capitals. This note reached me at the same time as your telegram No. 113 of the 28th January, reporting that Ghulam Sadiq Khan had notified the British consul at Kandahar of ex-King Amanullah's resumption of the Royal power, and had demanded that His Majesty's Government should declare within seven days whether they recognised Amanullah or Habibullah as King of Afghanistan.

2. *Ex parte* declarations of this nature have obviously no force, and the attitude which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have adopted is

* No. 35.

[20088]

I

expressed in the reply which I made to a question by Mr. J. H. Thomas in the House of Commons on the 30th January. The text of this answer was sent to you in my telegram No. 30 of the 2nd February for communication to Ghulam Sadiq by His Majesty's consul at Kandahar. I now enclose a copy of the question and answer for purposes of record.

3. I am not sending any reply to Shuja-ed-Dowleh Khan's note.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

Enclosure in No. 74.

Question asked in the House of Commons, January 30, 1929.

AFGHANISTAN: BRITISH POLICY.

Mr. Thomas (by private notice) asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has any statement to make regarding the attitude which His Majesty's Government propose to adopt in relation to the present disturbances in Afghanistan?

Answer.

Sir Austen Chamberlain: His Majesty's Government have no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan by supporting or assisting any of the parties at present contending for power in that country. They earnestly desire the establishment of a strong central Government, and they will be prepared, when this Government is established, to show their friendship for the Afghan people by giving it such assistance as they can in the reconstruction and development of the country. King Amanullah has formally announced his abdication to His Majesty's Government, and consequently, until it is clear that in spite of this abdication he is regarded as their King by the people of Afghanistan generally, His Majesty's Government are unable to regard his Government as the rightful Afghan Government.

[N 1136/1/97]

No. 75.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 232.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Kabul, February 19, 1929.

FOLLOWING grave objections are seen by me to investing my senior caretaker in Kabul with status of a temporary consular nature:—

(1) He will live in servants' quarters behind Legation, and is unsuited for this rank. He will take refuge in a village when the situation becomes dangerous.

(2) My European colleagues have already been informed by me, in answer to their suspicious questions on this point, that withdrawal of British Legation will be complete and only a caretaker left behind. I shall be accused by my colleagues of *mala fides* if I inform Kabul Foreign Office that consular status is possessed by this person.

Interests of Indian merchants at Kandahar have been in no way assisted during the last seven years by presence of Indian consul. He has never succeeded in doing more than grant visas to those seeking permission, and therefore cannot be compared with British consuls in other parts of the world. This is due to unfortunate fact that Afghans can never get on properly with Indian officials, who are consequently unable to make headway with them.

[N 1156/1/97]

No. 76.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 234.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, February 19, 1929.

ALL British Indian colony who have any claims to go have been evacuated.

All French colony who wish to leave have also been evacuated.

I informed my French and Italian colleagues that increasing sodden surface of Sherpur Aerodrome and weather forecast made it imperative to adhere to my programme detailed in my No. 213 of the 15th instant; in other words, that their last day for leaving Kabul would be the 21st February.

I think they both will withdraw their Legations on that date, and if Plessen arrives to-morrow, Feigel will also leave.

If Cecchi had not received an ultimatum, he might have gone on wabbling for weeks.

I propose to-morrow to announce to Kabul Government His Majesty's Government's decision to withdraw the Legation.

[N 1136/1/97]

No. 77.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir F. Humphrys (Kabul).

(No. 57.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, February 19, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 232, dated the 18th instant.

His Majesty's Government approve in principle your proposal that British consulates should leave simultaneously with British mission subject to detailed arrangements to be made with Government of India for withdrawal.

[N 1135/1/97]

No. 78.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir F. Humphrys (Kabul).

(No. 58.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, February 19, 1929.

WITH reference to Government of India's telegram No. 223 K, dated the 13th February, in view of paramount necessity for secrecy, no communication has been made to the Turkish and Persian Governments. But you are at liberty to inform your Turkish and Persian colleagues if you see no objection, and to offer them all reasonable facilities after your announcement of withdrawal to Kabul Foreign Minister.

Reference your telegram of the 18th instant, No. 230. Subject to the concurrence of the Government of India as regards details, His Majesty's Government approve of your programme of withdrawal.

[N 1104/1/97]

No. 79.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir F. Humphrys (Kabul).

(No. 60.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, February 19, 1929.

IN view of fact that we have agreed in principle (see my telegram No. 57 of the 19th February) to withdrawal of both British consuls, and that Russians have arrived at Kandahar, and that Amanullah's party there appears to be in process of disintegration, we consider that our treaty rights to demand exclusion of Russian representative from South-East Afghanistan by Afghan Government when reconstituted will as far as possible be safeguarded if and when opportunity offers, we announce that we regard presence of Russians in Kandahar very unfavourably, and if consul is instructed to withdraw forthwith.

[N 1134/1/97]

No. 80.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir H. Rumbold (Berlin).

(No. 39.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, February 19, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 16 of 18th February.

Sir F. Humphrys's instructions to evacuate as soon as possible are irrevocable. He certainly will do his utmost to assist German nationals, but he cannot remain at Kabul simply because Germans refuse to avail themselves of opportunity of leaving during next two days.

Please explain this to German Government.

(Repeated to Kabul, No. 63.)

[N 1173/1/97]

No. 81.

Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 18.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Berlin, February 20, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 39.

I have made position perfectly clear to German Foreign Office.

German Foreign Office are aware that there are two or three Germans who for personal reasons are unwilling to leave Kabul. They recognise that these persons will have to remain at their own risk, and German Government do not expect German Minister to remain on their account. German Foreign Office are only concerned about the Germans who are anxious to be evacuated, but for whom German Minister could not, at least some days ago, obtain permits to leave.

German Foreign Office feel that public opinion here would not understand German Minister leaving behind in Kabul German nationals who were anxious to leave but had been refused permits to do so. German Foreign Office have had no further news from German Minister since that given in my telegram No. 16 of 18th February.

I again made it quite clear that evacuation dates arranged for would have to be maintained.

[N 1182/1/97]

No. 82.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 241.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, February 20, 1929.

THIS afternoon I had a difficult and delicate interview with Kabul Foreign Minister. I announced decision of His Majesty's Government to withdraw this Legation. Finally, I calmed his suspicions and got my way about aeroplanes, though permission for eight aeroplanes on final day (the 22nd February) will require confirmation of Kabul Government. I will telegraph fuller report of interview later.

This evening it is cloudy, and unless weather clears, it will be impossible to evacuate French and Italian Legations to-morrow.

[N 1214/1/97]

No. 83.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 242.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, February 21, 1929.

REFERENCE your telegrams Nos. 62 and 63: Evacuation of Germans.

The following are the facts: I wrote to German Minister on the 13th January asking for a list of Germans who wished to leave Kabul by air. He sent me list of 18 persons. On the 6th February I again wrote a circular letter to my colleagues asking for final list. All complied, with the exception of Feigel. On the 14th February no Germans were left on my list. Since then, up to this morning, 26 have applied at a few hours' notice, of whom I have evacuated 16, 2 absented themselves and 5 others were prevented by Afghans from leaving. This morning,

after departure of last non-diplomatic aeroplane, Feigel gave me 4 more names, including one woman who had previously twice refused to go; 55 Germans have been evacuated, including 32 in February.

There still remain about 50. In spite of my clear and repeated warning that it was utterly impossible for them to evacuate themselves by road, the Germans have throughout clung to this hope. Yesterday, a large party of Germans attempted evacuation by road, but were stopped by snow 15 miles from Kabul and were obliged to return.

To-morrow's aeroplanes are reserved for several members of this Legation, two sick Afghans, by request of Foreign Minister, and French and Italian Ministers and their staffs. I am afraid that I cannot do much now for German colony (except woman) without risking the success of our final programme.

[N 1213/1/97]

No. 84.

Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 19.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Berlin, February 21, 1929.

MY telegram No. 18.

I this morning received urgent written communication from German Secretary of State to the effect that German Minister at Kabul, telegraphing on the 19th February, reported that certain number of German nationals were still unable to obtain the necessary permissions to leave. German Minister appeared to have collapsed completely, and German Government had, therefore, telegraphed to Plessen at Peshawar instructing him to proceed at once to Kabul and take over from the present Minister, who would be evacuated by air. Communication closes with the request that I should beg competent authorities to facilitate journey of Plessen and return of Feigel.

I at once caused following verbal communication to be made to the Foreign Office, which I am confirming in writing:—

1. That although I would telegraph to you substance of German request, I must refuse to be a party to any implication that Sir F. Humphrys's programme could be interfered with. It was unfair on the latter, who was faced with grave responsibilities on the spot if the Governments at home were to make eleventh hour suggestion liable to upset his arrangements. German Foreign Office stated that it was not their intention to suggest that Humphrys should, in any way, modify his programme.

2. That it was now too late to make any further suggestions from here regarding Plessen's flight to Kabul. Flight had been approved some days ago, but circumstances had since changed. Decision must rest entirely with the men on the spot, and I could not undertake to make any representations to you on the subject.

3. That if Plessen had already started, or if Feigel had not already left, and if either or both of them refused to leave until all German nationals had been evacuated, then His Majesty's Government must disclaim all manner of responsibility for the consequences. It would be impossible either for Humphrys to stay on in order to assist Germans, or for His Majesty's Government, once Humphrys had left, to send any further relief aeroplanes to Kabul. Despatch of Plessen appeared to me to be a hazardous and unfair proposal, and I wished to make it quite clear in advance that His Majesty's Government could not be blamed or expected to help if disastrous consequences followed.

Texts of both communications by bag.

[N 1213/1/97]

No. 85.

India Office to Government of India.

(No. 651.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, February 21, 1929.

GERMAN Government have instructed Plessen that he should proceed to Kabul as soon as possible, and they hope that permission previously given still holds good. Please facilitate.

Above refers your telegram No. 254 K., dated the 19th instant.

(Repeated to Kabul, No. 65.)

[N 1214/1/97]

No. 86.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir F. Humphrys (Kabul).

(No. 67.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, February 21, 1929.

REFERENCE your telegram No. 242, dated the 21st instant.

As you have now given the Germans every opportunity of evacuation, your own programme should be carried out without further regard for them.

[N 1242/1/97]

No. 87.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 23)

(No. 255.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, February 22, 1929.

MY No 241, dated the 20th February.

Kabul Foreign Minister was much disturbed on my announcing the withdrawal of this Legation. He enquired by what means he was to communicate with me in future, and said that he could not agree to eight aeroplanes in one day, as four was the limit. He also raised question of Kandahar consulate.

I replied that he could still telegraph, if he had a special message to send me, and that consulate would be withdrawn simultaneously from Kandahar.

[N 1240/1/97]

No. 88.

Government of India to India Office.

(No. 840 S.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

February 22, 1929

THIS morning Nadir Khan and his brothers arrived Bombay in "Kaisar-i-Hind." Reuter's is publishing full account. Bombay Government's report not yet received. Following instructions were issued to Bombay Government:—

"Government of India would be glad if some discreet official, who should not be in uniform, could go on board by the first launch. He should frankly inform Nadir Khan, but with all friendliness, that the Government of India much regret that their policy of non-intervention in Afghan affairs, circumstances of the time, and to some extent Nadir Khan's own interests, unfortunately preclude the facilities and courtesies which Government of India would otherwise have been pleased to show to so distinguished a visitor. They trust that he will appreciate reasons why special facilities are not being offered and the motives underlying their desire that he should refrain from any sort of political activity while in India."

[N 1267/1/97]

No. 89.

Government of India to India Office.

(No. 848 S.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

February 23, 1929.

TELEGRAMS, as follows, from Bombay Government:—

First.—"General Nadir Khan appreciates their attitude of Government, thanks them for their courtesy, and promises to proceed expeditiously to Afghanistan and also to refrain from political activities while in India. He has not yet decided by which route he will travel, and his present intention is to remain one or two days in Bombay. He expects to meet friends in Bombay, from whom he will receive advice on this point."

"Shaukat Ali is in touch with him and intends to call on him. Nadir Khan promises that neither he nor his brothers will return call or attend any political meeting."

"He states that leading men and tribesmen in Afghanistan are against Bolshevik views, and that number of those holding Bolshevik views is small. He is extremely anxious to know what party is secretly favoured by Government

of India. He professes to be strongly pro-British and anxious to adopt a policy favoured by the Government of India, so long as it is consistent with an independent and strong Afghanistan. He says that he is not definitely pledged to support of Amanullah or anybody else. Amanullah has sent instructions to his son and other supporters to join him via Russia. Nadir Khan was also directed to do so, but he preferred to travel via India.

"Freke, who saw Nadir Khan, reports that the impression left on him is that Nadir has not ruled out possibility of himself becoming candidate for supreme power in Afghanistan."

Second.—"Full report of Freke's interview is being forwarded by post. Following extracts may be of interest:—

"General Nadir Khan more than once assured me that he was very anxious to know exactly what course British Government will like events in Afghanistan to take. If he knew this he would then do his best to operate accordingly. They may wish Amanullah to be King or Bacha Saqao, or Mahomed Khan or another member of Royal Family or some other person. Nadir Khan, personally, was prepared to support with all his weight and influence any line which British Government favoured; he was only anxious to see Afghanistan strong and peaceful and united."

Following sent to Bombay:—

"Should be glad if Freke would deliver following message verbally to Nadir Khan:—

"Government of India appreciate courtesy which prompted Nadir Khan's enquiries. Their one desire is identical with his own, namely, the early restoration of an Afghanistan peaceful, united, independent, strong and friendly. As a patriotic and far-sighted Afghan, he will, they are sure, realise that this consummation would be imperilled, not advanced, if they allowed their sympathies with Afghanistan in its present misfortunes to deflect them from the path of strict non-intervention, even to the extent of tendering counsel. He may, however, rest assured that when peace is again restored to a united Afghanistan proofs of their friendship will not be lacking."

[N 1241/1/97]

No. 90.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 256.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, February 23, 1929.

I FEEL that hope of preventing split up of Afghanistan into separate tribal communities under different chiefs and general anarchy centres on Nadir Khan and his brothers. Anarchy would presumably result in separation of Northern Province from South and entail gravest political consequences.

I should much like to have a frank talk with Nadir Khan before he enters Afghanistan, if it can be arranged. I believe that I could do good without in any way infringing neutrality of His Majesty's Government. Above refers Government of India's telegram No. 840 S, dated the 22nd February.

[N 1241/1/97]

No. 91.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir F. Humphrys (Kabul).

(No. 69.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, February 23, 1929.

KABUL telegram No. 256, dated the 23rd February.

We feel that there need be no objection to a meeting if it has the appearance of being entirely fortuitous. This is subject to your views in the light of local reactions.

Press here state that, after a few days in Bombay, Nadir Khan is proceeding to Kandahar via Peshawar.

[N 1271/1/97]

No. 92.

Government of India to India Office.

(No. 858 S.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

February 24, 1929.

FOREIGN OFFICE telegram No. 69 to Kabul: Nadir Khan.

Nadir Khan and any indication of the line he is likely to take are being subjected to extraordinary publicity, which will be intensified on his arrival in Peshawar. If his presence there coincides with Humphrys's return, both will be in the full blaze of limelight throughout, and we fear it would be entirely impossible to give any meeting between them appearance of being fortuitous.

We appreciate advantages which might flow from frank talk between Humphrys and Nadir. We are, however, convinced that reactions in India, stimulated by publicity with the prospect of Russia feeling herself driven to take counter-measures, would be too dangerous.

[N 1265/1/97]

No. 93.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 25.)

(No. 258.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Kabul, February 24, 1929

GOVERNMENT of India telegram No. 858 S, dated the 24th.

If to-morrow's programme is carried out Nadir Khan's arrival in Peshawar coincides with my own, and will, in fact, be entirely fortuitous. Whether I see him or not, Soviet Embassy will take it for granted that I have had an interview with him—compare canard about my previous interview with Habibulla. There can be no doubt that fate brings myself and Nadir Khan together in same place, and he and his brothers, who are my oldest and closest friends in Afghanistan, will take it as a grave affront, and will misunderstand whole position if I decline to see him. I request this point of view should be given fullest weight. Russia and a certain section of Indian press will abuse me whatever I do, but to antagonise most influential families in Afghanistan merely for fear of misrepresentation seems to me to be worst thing that could happen.

I should in my interview explain policy of His Majesty's Government in such a way that Nadir Khan would accept it as authoritative but not be offended.

[N 1269/1/97]

No. 94.

Government of India to Sir F. Humphrys (Kabul).

(No. 279 K.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

February 24, 1929.

AT your discretion you may tell Plessen that, if hereafter he can, by means of Afghan wireless, assure Government of India that he has obtained the necessary permission of the Afghan Government for evacuating the German colony by British machines and that he has completed his own arrangements, they will send single machine to check arrangements with a view to despatching necessary transport machines.

It would be politically unfortunate if evacuation of Germans had to be left dependent on the Russians, and Plessen deserves well of us.

[N 1315/1/97]

No. 95.

India Office to Government of India.

(No. 699.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

February 25, 1929.

TELEGRAM No. 258, dated the 24th February, from Humphrys.

Your telegram No. 848 S, dated the 23rd instant.

His Majesty's Government approve of language of your message to Nadir Khan. Whilst appreciating your anxiety to avoid suspicion of partiality for reasons given by Humphrys, we consider he should not avoid meeting Nadir Khan at Peshawar if latter desires it. Humphrys should be informed accordingly.

[N 1276/237/97]

No. 96.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 25.)

(No. 6.)

Sir,

Kabul, January 14, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to transmit the diary of Major C. E. T. Erskine, D.S.O., M.C., military attaché to this Legation, for the week ending the 12th January, 1929.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Secretary of State for India and the Government of India.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure in No. 96.

Diary of the Military Attaché, British Legation, Kabul, for the Week ending January 12, 1929.

1. Military.

IT has been difficult to follow with any degree of accuracy the movements of the Afghan army in its operations against Bachai Saqao. The following appears to be roughly the sequence of events:—

Night, January 5-6.—About 200 infantry moved out of Kabul via the Khair-Khana Pass (Khirsikhana Pass on map). The above appears to have been a small advanced guard to the troops moving out next day.

January 6.—7 A.M. A collection of infantry (some in uniform and others in mufti, all proceeding in no military formation) about 2,000 strong, three guns and two machine guns, moved out over the Khair-Khana Pass.

During the morning rifle and machine-gun fire was heard, but no gun-fire.

In the evening Bachai Saqao was reported to have been driven out of the Kila Murad Beg.

January 7.—9 A.M. Heavy gun-fire was heard from the direction of Kila Murad Beg, and this fire was kept up in varying degrees of intensity all day.

A stream of miscellaneous vehicles, such as lorries, limbers, tum-tums and ponies, laden with shells, ammunition and rations, passed the British Legation.

Two D.H.9A's participated in the day's flight, and their activities will be found under the "Aviation" paragraph of this diary.

In the evening it was reported that the day's fighting had gone against the King's troops.

The Wazir contingent had returned to Kabul, as it was not satisfied with the tactics employed by the Afghan commander. These tactics seem to consist in placing the Wazirs in the forefront of the battle, in which conspicuous position they became a good target for either the enemy or the King's regulars.

January 8.—No fighting was heard. It appears that Bachai Saqao did evacuate Kila Murad Beg, but took up positions in the lower ground in the vicinity. When eventually the King's troops advanced to take possession of the place, they were shot down, and Kila Murad Beg was never occupied by the army.

A visit was paid to the aerodrome to-day. The following dispositions were noticed for its defence:—

(a.) Three 10.5 cm. French guns in the south-west corner.

(b.) One gun on the eastern end of Bimaru ridge.

(c.) Two guns on the western end of the ridge.

(d.) An electric light signalling device was installed on the Air Force Commandant's house.

(e.) From 200 to 300 infantry were scattered along the Bimaru ridge.

January 9.—No fighting was heard. It was reported that efforts were being made to bring Bachai Saqao to terms, but that he had absolutely refused to negotiate. Minor alterations in the defences round the aerodrome were noticed.

Five French guns were this day on the south-west corner of the aerodrome. The guns looked clean, but it appears that no one knows how to handle them.

The artillery ponies have the most crude type of harness, which seems to be held together with pieces of string.

January 10.—The fighting to-day seems to be taking place in the Paghman direction, but no definite action has so far taken place.

2. Aviation.

The following flights have been observed during the past week:—

6.1.29. 1105 hrs. One D.H.9A left Sherpur for Jalalabad and returned the same day at 1500 hrs. Estimated time, 1 hour 50 minutes.

7.1.29. 0930 hrs. One D.H.9A left the aerodrome and flew over the Koh-i-Deman area. Aeroplane returned over British Legation at 1105 hrs. and was observed to be carrying one small type bomb. A bomb raid had been carried out, but no bombs were heard to explode. Aeroplane landed at 1110 hrs. Duration, 1 hour 40 minutes.

1120 hrs. One D.H.9A carried out a reconnaissance over Koh-i-Deman area, and landed at 1200 hrs. Duration, 40 minutes.

One D.H.9A, when gliding in to land, hit the top of the trees on the outskirts of the southern side of the aerodrome. Aeroplane stalled, dived into the ground and burst into flames. Russian pilot and mechanic escaped with slight injuries.

8.1.29. 1230 hrs. One small type Junker aeroplane took off from Sherpur Aerodrome, climbed to about 3,000 feet above the ground and flew in the direction of Termez.

1445 hrs. One D.H.9A carried out a reconnaissance over the hills about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles north of the British Legation. Landed at 1330 hrs. Duration, 45 minutes.

1515 hrs. One D.H.9A carried out a reconnaissance as above. Landed at 1550 hrs. Duration, 35 minutes.

1530 hrs. One D.H.9A carried out a reconnaissance as above. Landed at 1620 hrs. Duration, 55 minutes.

Three Junkers were seen starting up in front of the workshops on the south edge of the aerodrome.

9.1.29. 0800 hrs. One D.H.9A left Sherpur Aerodrome for Jalalabad. Estimated time, 55 minutes.

1030 hrs. The King's Junker aeroplane and one small type Junker started up and taxied out to the centre of the aerodrome to take off for Kandahar to fetch the Queen back. These orders were cancelled, and the aeroplanes taxied back to the hangars.

1100 hrs. One small type Junker aeroplane arrived from Termez and left again at 1130 hrs.

3. Internal Reforms.

The ulemas of Kabul and Kandahar have separately petitioned the King, outlining what reforms in the existing Administration they consider necessary.

In its issue of the 14th January, the "Anees" published a Royal proclamation, the substance of which is as follows:—

- (a.) The King refuted the allegation that he had ever shown any disrespect to the Holy Prophet.
- (b.) A permanent council of ulemas was to be established to examine all laws passed by the National Assembly.
- (c.) The girls sent to Turkey were to be recalled.
- (d.) Special steps were to be taken to stop bribery.
- (e.) Women were to be veiled and their hair was not to be cut short.
- (f.) Any mullah might become a teacher without having to produce any certificates.
- (g.) Hasht Nafri was to be abolished and the army organised on a tribal basis.
- (h.) The King proposed to personally interest himself in the prohibition of drinking.
- (i.) Officers were to be appointed to attend to the supervision of public morals.
- (j.) Fridays were again to become general holidays.
- (k.) No restrictions were to be placed on Piri Moredi.
- (l.) Students whilst at school might be married.
- (m.) The female schools were to be abolished for the time being.
- (n.) The Department of Riyasat-i-Himayat-i-Niseven (the association for helping women) was to be abolished.
- (o.) No restrictions were to be placed on the lending and borrowing of money.
- (p.) All dress restrictions were to be removed, and European dress was not to be worn.

The proclamation goes on to state that the above clauses are all subject to the endorsement of the Council of State, now in course of formation.

It is very possible that, should the situation improve, the King may use his Council of State in order to revoke what he has been forced to agree to under pressure.

4. King Amanullah.

During the past week the King seems to have been losing ground all round.

In spite of the proclamation referred to in paragraph 3 above, the King is still most indiscreet in his remarks about the mullahs, and no one believes in his sincerity.

His army, with the exception of the Shahi troops, is useless, and has no intention of fighting. The Arg is garrisoned by Hazaras under the leadership of a well-known brigand. All ammunition from the Koh-i-Lula fort has been transferred to it, and quantities of sand have been seen taken into it.

Although Alijaris have been arriving from Kandahar, so far no Duranis have come.

In spite of continual assurances that the Peshawar Road would shortly be open, it has not become an accomplished fact as yet.

Lawlessness seems to be breaking out in Kabul itself. On the 10th January three men were found murdered in the streets, and it is reported that the King's life was attempted near the Tomb of Timur on the same date.

Bachai Saqao is becoming an increased menace, and the half-hearted attempts of the Mullah of Shor Bazaar to win over the Tagao Mullah to the side of the King seem to have failed.

5. Foreigners.

About twenty Russian ladies are reported to have been evacuated during the past week.

6. Miscellaneous.

(a.) *Petrol*.—Two large consignments of petrol have arrived in Kabul from Gardez. These have been commandeered for military purposes, and the shortage in the city itself is still as acute as ever.

(b.) *Evacuation*.—The following persons employed in the British Legation were evacuated by air on the 9th January, 1929:—

Contractor, Dina Nath.
Contractor, Mohmud Jan.
Servant of Dina Nath.
Painter, Abdul Karim.
Courier, Ahmedyar Khan (proceeding on leave).
Cook to counsellor.

C. E. T. ERSKINE, Major.

[N 1277/237/97]

No. 97.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 25.)

(No 7.)

Sir,

Kabul, January 21, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to transmit the diary of Major C. E. T. Erskine, C.I.E., D.S.O., M.C., military attaché to this Legation, for the week ending the 19th January, 1929.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Secretary of State for India and the Government of India.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure in No. 97.

*Diary of the Military Attaché, British Legation, Kabul, for the Week ending January 19, 1929.*1. *Military.*

AS far as can be ascertained the following is the sequence of events during the past week :—

January 10.—The disposition of the rival forces is reported to be somewhat as under :—

Bachai Saqao's forces—

- (a.) At Kila Murad Beg : 2,000 men under Bachai Saqao himself.
- (b.) At Zardalu (Paghman area) : 1,000 men under Shah Nur, Hazara, a well-known bandit chief.
- (c.) At Zimma Kotal : 2,000 men of Tagao and Ningrao under Mian Gul, son of the Akhunsada of Tagao.
- (d.) At Bagrami : 1,000 men under Said Hussein. Supposed to have gone there to punish Malik Abdul Wahab, who had declared for the King.

King's forces—

- (a.) At Khirs Khana : the 1st Firqa and Wazir irregulars under General Mahmud Umar.
- (b.) At Qargha : One ghund of regulars.
- (c.) Opposite Zimma : The "Kita Namuna" or model regiment.
- (d.) At Deh Aya : 1,500 Alijaris from Shah Karobi area.

January 11.—Severe fighting occurred in the Paghman area, but no details are available. Both sides are said to have lost heavily.

Cabinet Ministers are sending their families out of Kabul.

Bachai Saqao has capped the King's reward of 40,000 rupees (Afghani) by offering 60,000 rupees (Afghani) for King Amanullah's head.

January 12.—Jagdilak is reported to have been looted by rebels.

Kaizim Pasha and his staff arrived at Kabul at 5.45 p.m. On the road, two marches from Kandahar, Kiazim Pasha's party passed about 1,500 men of the Herat garrison on the 9th January. On the 10th, about 2,000 half-clad Hazara Alijaris were passed between Mukur and Ghazni.

For the first time there appears to be a scarcity of flour in Kabul, and a sharp rise in prices has occurred.

January 13.—The King's troops were expelled from the Koh-i-Deman area, and Bachai Saqao occupied Kila Hazara, capturing Khair Khana Pass and 300 men.

4.30 p.m. Bagh-i-Bala was shelled by Bachai Saqao; shelling was not severe.

8 p.m. The village of Deh-i-Kopak capitulated. General Mahmud Umar and 400 men were taken prisoners, and the general's guns and headquarters were captured. It is very questionable whether the "capitulation" had not been pre-arranged.

Only the Shahi Risala and Wardak irregulars seem to be fighting with any heart.

January 14.—12.30 p.m. The King's troops, about 500 in number, evacuated the Bagh-i-Bala area.

1 p.m. The King is reported to have abdicated.

1.30 p.m. The King's artillery from the city carried out a very feeble bombardment of the rebel's positions round Bagh-i-Bala and Deh-i-Kopak.

2.30 p.m. Prince Inayatullah is crowned King at the Arg.

4.30 p.m. A charabanc full of mullahs, carrying a large white flag, passed through the King's front line unscathed, and in spite of heavy firing obtained contact with Bachai Saqao and communicated the King's abdication to him.

The King's troops evacuated all positions and retired on Kabul. Rebels, estimated at 4,000, streamed past the Legation during the evening and occupied the positions evacuated by the King's troops.

6 p.m. The Afghan wireless station ceased working.

The Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazaar and Mahmud Usman Khan, ex-Governor of Kandahar (W.W. 834), stationed themselves outside the British Legation in order to prevent anyone interfering with the Legation.

Night, 14-15.—Heavy and continuous firing broke out at midnight in Kabul City and continued until 9 a.m. on the 15th January.

January 15.—Bachai Saqao arrived at Bagh-i-Bala. His troops have occupied all places of tactical importance round Kabul with the exception of the Arg, Lula Pushta (Koh-i-Lula) and Kila Baland (near the Habibiya College). After midday there was no firing.

Streams of villagers from Koh-i-Deman, Kohistan, &c., mostly unarmed, passed the Legation towards the city during the afternoon.

January 16.—In spite of lengthy conferences between the Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazaar and Bachai Saqao, which appear to have been going on during the 15th January at Bagh-i-Bala, Bachai Saqao has refused to acknowledge Inayatullah as King.

Koh-i-Lula capitulated during the night, 15th-16th January. Bachai Saqao has given King Inayatullah until 6 p.m. to surrender the Arg.

All prisoners in Sherpur jail have been liberated.

1 p.m. The inhabitants of Chardeh and Paghman, and the King's two brothers, Hayatullah and Kabir Jan, visited the Bagh-i-Bala and made their surrender to Bachai Saqao.

3.30 p.m. It is confirmed that King Amanullah arrived at Kandahar by car yesterday evening.

January 17.—12.45 p.m. The Afghan wireless station commenced working again.

5 p.m. The Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazaar visited the British Legation and had an interview with the Minister, and requested that in order to avoid further bloodshed in Kabul, two aeroplanes should be put at the disposal of Prince Inayatullah to take him and his family to Kandahar on the 18th January. The Minister refused this, but agreed to allow aeroplanes to take the Royal party to Peshawar *en route* for Kandahar.

Bachai Saqao has complete possession of the city, and has guns trained on the Arg, the only place in Kabul still holding out against him.

In spite of the fact that from 15,000 to 20,000 villagers from the surrounding country have flocked to Kabul, comparatively good order is maintained in the city and looting on any considerable scale has so far been prevented.

All the late King's irregulars are said to have returned to their homes and to have not gone empty-handed. It may be assumed that each man took away at least one rifle.

2. *Aviation.*

The following flights have been observed during the past week :—

10.1.29. 1055 hrs. One D.II.9A took off, circled, and climbed to a height of 4,000 feet above the ground. It was observed to be carrying four small-type bombs. Reconnaissance was carried out over the hills 3 miles north of the British Legation, and over the Paghman range, where the rebels of Bachai Saqao are reported to have been located.

It is thought that the bombs were dropped in the Paghman area.

Aeroplane landed at 1215 hrs. Duration, 1 hour and 20 minutes.

11.1.29. 1130 hrs. One D.H.9A took off and flew over the Koh-i-Deman area carrying out a bomb raid. Machine landed at 1215 hrs. Duration, 45 minutes.

1600 hrs. One D.H.9A carried out a reconnaissance over Koh-i-Deman area. Machine landed at 1650 hrs. Duration, 50 minutes.

16.1.29. A small-type Junker reported to have arrived over the aerodrome from Termez at 1230 hrs. It was fired at by the rebels, was unable to land, so flew round over Kabul for a short while, and, it is believed, returned to Termez.

3. *Turkish Mission.*

Kiaxim Pasha arrived at the Cafe Wali at 5.45 p.m. on the 11th, and was received by a guard of honour of Shahi troops. The following Turkish personnel accompanied him :—

- Noori Beg : Ghund Mishar.
- Muharram Maglum Beg : Ghund Mishar.
- Jamil Tahir Beg : Ghund Mishar.
- Rashid Beg : Ghund Mishar.
- Izzet Beg : Kandak Mishar.
- Halim Beg : Kandak Mishar.
- Rashid Beg : Toli Mishar.

The above party in two cars and three lorries left Kandahar at 4 A.M. on the 9th, reached Ghazni at 7 P.M. on the 10th, and all arrived at Kabul at 5.45 P.M. on the 11th, with the exception of one lorry which arrived at 2 P.M. on the 12th.

The driver of one of these lorries stated that the road was not bad, but that there was a great deal of snow and mud near Ghazni.

C. E. T. ERSKINE, *Major*.

[N 1278/1/97]

No. 98.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 25.)

(No. 8.)

Sir,

Kabul, January 26, 1929.

IN continuation of my telegram No. 99 of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit a translation of a copy of a manifesto and a proclamation which were signed on the 18th January and issued yesterday in Kabul on the subject of the dethronement of ex-King Amanullah and the accession of Ameer Habibullah.

2. The reasons which are set forth in the manifesto which necessitated the dethronement of Amanullah are entirely religious in nature, and I am of opinion that they roughly illustrate the violent antipathy of the Afghan public to Amanullah's Western reforms and general mode of life. The religious prejudices excited by Amanullah's recent actions are too deep-seated, in my opinion, to admit of the possibility that he will be again accepted by the majority of his countrymen as King of Afghanistan.

3. As regards the nomination of his successor, I have already reported in my telegram No. 99 that the signatures of the Kabul notables were obtained under *force majeure*. It is hardly credible that a person of Habibullah's extraction and antecedents will be allowed by the Pathan races of Afghanistan to remain on the throne for long. The present difficulty is to find an alternative candidate who would be acceptable to all parties. Unless this is done, the country is faced with the risk of civil war of a character which may at any time become more devastating than has been known for the past two centuries of Afghanistan's existence as a single nation.

4. A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Secretary of State for India and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure in No. 98.

Manifesto and Proclamation.

(Translation.)

LET it be known to all the people and to the Islamic nation of Afghanistan.

The men of Afghanistan promised allegiance to Ameer Amanullah Khan in accordance with the policy of Shariat and on the condition that he would not violate the orders of Shariat. He, however, did not abide by the conditions which bound us to obey him, but violated the Shariat and the policy (of the State). All his acts were contrary to the orders of the Koran and to the example set by the Holy Prophet. The following are clear examples of his violation of the Shariat of the Prophet and of introducing his own inventions instead:—

1. He abandoned the forms of salutation and introduced instead a sign after the fashion of the unbelievers and against the example of the Prophet, and forcibly persuaded the Mussulmans to adopt this method.

2. He introduced hats after the fashion of the unbelievers and abandoned the turban which was worn by the Prophet, with which headdress only can prayers be performed completely. A man who violated Amanullah's rule regarding hats was subject to punishment.

3. He changed the Islamic dress which was used by the Mussulmans of the past and gave orders that all should resemble the unbelievers in manner of dress. The new dress is still in use.

4. The Koran says that men and women who are strangers should not show their eyes to one another. Amanullah, however, cast aside this grand order of God and gave orders for the unveiling of women.

5. The religious lawyers consider it unlawful that a grown-up woman should go out of her house without the permission of her husband. Amanullah, however, gave orders that all women and girls should go to schools. He has thus disgraced the Mussulmans.

6. The growing of the beard and the clipping of the middle portion of the moustache was the practice and order of the Prophet, but Amanullah's orders are against the same.

7. He ordered that boys should go to schools. Boys have the same legal position as grown-up girls. In these schools religion, Shariat and the Koranic laws were not taught, but subjects were taught which interfered with the faith of the students. The boys became shameless. It is the duty of every Moslem man and woman to receive education when possible, but by education only knowledge regarding the orders of the Koran is intended, and not the knowledge of writing European languages and figures, or knowledge about countries or about the Kings of the past, or the languages of the unbelievers.

8. It is not, and has never been, the practice that grown-up Moslem girls should be sent away from an Islamic country for the sake of learning European writing and arts. On account of this undesirable action, we Mussulmans have been ridiculed by all Islamic and non-Islamic countries. Never did, and never will, any King practice worse tyranny on the people than this.

9. The actions of Amanullah demonstrate the defect of his faith. He is against the orders of the Shariat. His activities are centred on the short life of a few days in this temporary world and are based on selfish motives. He did not care for the progress of religion which leads to everlasting life.

10. The Prophet said that he who loved learning, and the learned, loved him. Amanullah, however, hated learning and the learned. He liked to curse the ulemas and their learning. This is a clear sign of his non-belief in Islam.

11. The Koran says that one who creates a split between Mussulmans, *i.e.*, one who introduces innovations in religion contrary to the Hanfi orders, and who tramples on religion, is the murderer of Mussulmans in general. He who grants life to religion grants life to all Mussulmans. The present disturbance has been caused by Amanullah because he abandoned the paths of Islam and adopted the fashion of the unbelievers. He wished to make us independent of Islam and to make us unbelievers.

12. The Koran makes mention of the Kamri (Lunar) year, but Amanullah abolished this and introduced the Shamsi (Solar) year.

13. He issued proclamations to the effect that the Western year and date should be adopted in the future. He thereby meant to do away gradually with the reliable religious books of Moslem jurisprudence and wanted to introduce the books of the unbelievers which have been condemned long ago.

14. From the time of the Holy Prophet it has been forbidden to transact any business after the call for the Friday prayers, but Amanullah changed the meaning of the days. He made Friday into Saturday and Thursday into Friday. He thereby interfered with religion. This is a clear violation of the Shariat and his own invention.

15. He spent the money of the State on works not legalised by the Shariat. He abolished allowances of the mullahs, of the callers to prayer, and of the servants of the mosques, which these people received from the previous Kings. He stopped the call to prayer, the preaching of religion and the appointment of the guardian of public morals. This is against the orders of the Shariat.

16. Amanullah stopped all such mullahs and sheikhs as used to exalt the name of God and used to preach religion to the people. This clearly shows that he was bent on destroying religion.

17. He imprisoned the Hazrat Sahib, whose family is held in reverence by the Mussulmans of the world and who had crowned Amanullah, and whose murid (disciple) Amanullah had become. The imprisonment of the Hazrat Sahib was the outcome of unlawful intrigues. Amanullah killed Mulla Abdur Rahman and his relatives. Mulla Abdur Rahman was a great scholar and a learned man, and was the Imam of the Hazrat Sahib. His only fault was that he tried to check Amanullah in his unlawful activities.

18. The drinking of wine is a great offence, and drinking has been definitely forbidden in the Koran. Idol worship is clearly a lack of belief in the Unity of God. Amanullah introduced these (abuses) in his circle and amongst his officials.

19. Mulla Abdullah was a great mullah and Ghazi. He was against Amanullah's unlawful activities. Amanullah forced thousands of our people to

fight Mulla Abdullah, and thus arranged to destroy the lives of the Mussulmans. He, however, gave a promise on oath on the Holy Koran to the mullahs and summoned them and promised them that he would do nothing against religion in future. But he cheated the mullahs of the Southern Province and killed them and destroyed the rest of the people. Amanullah had a personal grudge against the ulemas and the religious people. His faith was defective. The Holy Prophet said that one who hated learning and the learned hated in reality the Prophet and God. What need is there to say more about a man who is an enemy of God? All the above unlawful activities of Amanullah were enforced up to the present day, and the Koran says that, if a man will not obey what has been said by God, he is an unbeliever. God is the guardian of the religion of the Prophet. He therefore produced two young, brave and proud persons for the service of religion.

One is Ameer Habibullah, the servant of religion, a resident of the Koh-i-Daman of Kabul, and the other is Syed Husain Khan, a syed of Charikar, who is now the War Minister of Afghanistan. God granted them power and courage and they came forward for the service of Islam, and with the sword and by their own courage they put an end to all the unlawful activities. They protected the honour of Islam and saved Islam from disgrace. They drew the sword and rose against Amanullah and besieged and defeated him. These men prevented further attacks on religion, and, on account of the blessings which they received for the service which they did in granting new life to Islam, the throne of Afghanistan was occupied. He (Habibullah) found the throne of the Independent Ameer of Afghanistan. We Mussulmans have thus been saved from the mischief that had been caused by the great shock that was given to Islam. Thank God that we Mussulmans are all aware of the tricks of this proud and treacherous world. Thousands of our lives in this world are of no worth in comparison with one particle of the faith, nor do we set value on even thousands of lives when it is required to sacrifice them for the exaltation of the name of God and for winning paradise. We are detached from worldly things. We will sacrifice our lives, our property and our children for the religion of the Prophet and in order to do away with innovations in the Holy Religion. We were, therefore, no longer bound to obey Amanullah, the founder of mischief, the innovator, the violator of religious orders, the doer of many unlawful acts, the enemy of the religion of the Prophet. Therefore, the previous bond of our allegiance to him became null and void. Amanullah has been dismissed by the Mussulmans of Afghanistan from the Ameer of Afghanistan, and, in accordance with the orders of God and the instructions of the Prophet and his friends, we have given a promise of obedience to Ameer Habibullah Khan, a sincere servant of the nation and a follower of the pure religion of the Prophet and of the ideas of the Hazrat Sahib and the ulemas. He has many virtues and is brave, self-respecting and kind-hearted. We willingly accept him as the Ameer on the throne of Kabul and as Ameer of Afghanistan, so that he should carry out the work and the policy of the State in accordance with the orders of God and the Shariat. We all pray for his success in this task.

Usual ending.

Dated Thursday, the 6th Shaaban, 1347 (18th January, 1929).

There are eighty signatures, many of which are illegible, but some of the signatories are:—

Muhammad Wali Khan, formerly Regent in King's absence.
Muhammad Sarwar Khan, formerly Governor of Kandahar.
Ghulam Muhammad Khan, ex-Minister of the Interior.
Ahmad Shah Khan, A.D.C. to King Amanullah.
Syed Habib Khan, Mustaufi of Kabul.
Mahmud Khan, Yawar and Officer-in-charge of Dar-ul-Aman.
Sher Ahmed Khan, President of the National Assembly.
Faiz Muhammad Khan, Minister of Education.
Sardar Azizullah Khan, son of an uncle of King Amanullah.
Muhammad Akbar Khan, Chief of the Privy Council.
Abdul Aziz Khan, ex-Minister, Tehran.
Ghulam Mujtaba Khan, Chief Investigating Officer under the Ministry of the Interior.
Muhammad Ayub Khan, of the Privy Purse Office of King Amanullah.
Sardar Hayatullah Khan, elder brother of King Amanullah.
Mir Muhammad Hashim Khan, Minister of Finance.

Muhammad Haider Khan, Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Commerce.
Shah Mahmud Khan, Under-Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior.
Muhammad Hussain, Under-Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior.
Sardar Muhammad Umar Khan, uncle of Amanullah.
Ghulam Naruf Khan, ex-Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Finance.
Abdul Hadi Khan, ex-Minister of Commerce.
Mohiuddin, editor of "Anees."
Khalifa Sher Ahmed, a well-known merchant of Kabul.

Let it be known to the public, the syeds, the ulemas, the sheikhs, the high officials, the senior and junior military officers, the khans and all other people of Afghanistan:—

Amanullah was the independent Ameer on the throne of Kabul on behalf of the people of Afghanistan. In accordance with the details given above, defects in his religious faith became evident, and all the religious authorities of the Northern Province, the high officials, the Ministers and officials, and the notables of Kabul have certified to the offences of Amanullah. He therefore deserved dismissal. He was therefore to be dismissed. I, the servant of the religion of the Holy Prophet, and my brave brother, Syed Husain, Minister of War, made endeavours to dethrone Amanullah and to grant fresh life to the religion of the Prophet. By the kindness of God we stood against Amanullah, and we succeeded in dismissing him from the throne and from the Government of Afghanistan. The people have made me the Ameer and have made allegiance to me, a servant of the religion of the Prophet, Ameer Habibullah Khan. Thank God that, with the help of my brethren, I am now independent on the throne and in the Government of Kabul, and that my efforts have been crowned with success. I now convey these tidings to you and ask and request God to help me, and to grant me the necessary power to abolish and to root out the innovations which interfered with the Hanfi religion, and to work for the daily progress of the sacred religion. I announce the following exemptions which I think will bring welfare and prosperity to you:—

1. Arrears (of revenue) of past years have been written off.
2. Conscription is abolished. There will be no compulsion to serve. Anyone wishing to serve can do so. The pay of a soldier will be 20 rupees monthly in cash and 64 pounds of grain.
3. All taxes additional to the lawful revenue have been abolished.
4. Land revenue will be fixed in accordance with the orders given in the Book of God.
5. Schools established by the order of the ex-King are abolished.

Any other defects which may come to my notice will be communicated later. Be satisfied, God willing. Officials who held posts before are reappointed to their previous duties, but they should be kind to my sincere subjects. Their papers of allegiance should be submitted to me early.

(Seal of Habibullah.)

Thursday, dated 6th Shaaban, 1347 (18th January, 1929).

[N 1279/237/97]

No. 99.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 25.)

(No. 9.)

Sir,

Kabul, January 28, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to transmit the diary of Major C. E. T. Erskine, C.I.E., D.S.O., M.C., military attaché to this Legation, for the week ending the 26th January, 1929.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Secretary of State for India and the Government of India.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure in No. 99.

Diary of the Military Attaché, British Legation, Kabul, for the Week ending January 26, 1929.

1. *Military.*

(a.) The old regular army round Kabul may be said to have demobilised itself.

When the gates of the Arg were opened on the 18th January, between 2,000 and 2,500 men (Shahis, Hazara Alijaris and the Kita Arg Battalion) laid down their arms and were permitted to march out. The 800 regulars who had been sent down to various places towards Jalalabad by King Amanullah, are reported to have returned on the 21st January to Kabul. They were permitted to proceed to their homes after disarmament.

The remainder of the regular army which is not accounted for above has melted away.

(b.) It is reported that King Habibullah is endeavouring to raise an army out of the people who have helped him in his recent operations.

Said Hussain has been appointed commander-in-chief, and has been ordered to get together a Shahi Corps of about 4,000 men, who are to receive 50 rupees (Afghani) a month, and also a force of about 4,000 others from the Sasht Krobi area, on 20 rupees (Afghani) a month and a ration of 64 lb. of flour.

Enlistment is not proceeding very briskly, owing to the reluctance of the people to be enrolled.

(c.) There appears to be some shortage of modern rifles. No reports have as yet been received as to how many rifles were issued by King Amanullah during the recent operations (estimates vary between 15,000 and 20,000 rifles). It is thought that at least two-thirds of those issued have now found their way into the countryside, and one-third have been secured by Habibullah.

(d.) A large quantity of munitions must have fallen into Habibullah's hands when the Arg capitulated. King Amanullah had previously been collecting all the ammunition from the forts round Kabul city and had had it conveyed to the Arg.

(e.) The troops from Herat who were marching on Kabul, returned to Kandahar on the 23rd January.

2. *Aviation.*

The following flights have been observed during the past week :—

20.1.29. One D.H.9A landed at Sherpur at 1215 hrs. This was believed to have come from Russia.

One D.H.9A, believed to have come from Russia, passed over Kabul at 1415 hrs. at 5,000 feet above the ground, and flew in the direction of Kandahar. This aeroplane returned and landed at Sherpur at 1500 hrs.

21.1.29. 1340 hrs. One D.H.9A took off and flew over the aerodrome at about 2,000 feet above the ground, executing steep turns. Landed at 1410 hrs. Duration, 30 minutes.

1415 hrs. The same D.H.9A took off and flew round the aerodrome at about 1,500 feet above the ground, and landed again 1425 hrs. Duration, 10 minutes.

21.1.29. 1430 hrs. One small type Junker arrived from Termez and landed at 1435 hrs., after circling the aerodrome several times.

1435 hrs. One D.H.9A took off and flew over the city at 1,000 feet above the ground, doing "S" turns. Landed at 1455 hrs. Duration, 20 minutes.

1600 hrs. One D.H.9A was seen to approach from Kandahar direction and landed at Sherpur. It has not since been confirmed that this machine came from Kandahar.

From the fact that the same aeroplane has carried out the local flying during the day, it is possible that Afghan pilots are receiving dual instruction. As it has not been possible to visit the aerodrome these last few days, it cannot be confirmed, although it is presumed, that the instructors are Russians.

22.1.29. 1055 hrs. One D.H.9A took off and flew in the direction of Termez, and did not return the same day.

1315 hrs. One D.H.9A took off and flew over the city for 30 minutes. Landed at 1345 hrs.

3. *Afghans.*

(a.) King Amanullah was accompanied by the following persons when he left Kabul for Kandahar at 4 A.M. on the 14th January :—

Mahmud Tarzi.
Ghulam Sadiq.
Muhammed Yakub.
Abdul Ahad.
Gul Akhmad.
Three ladies.

The party left in seven cars.

(b.) The party evacuated by air to Peshawar on the 18th and 19th January, consisted of the following :—

January 18—

Prince Inayatullah.
Abdul Aziz, ex-Minister for War.
Abdul Tawab, brother of the Queen.
Abdul Wahab, brother of the Queen.
Ahmed Ali, late Minister at Berlin.
Seven ladies.

January 19—

Abdul Habib, secretary to Prince Inayatullah.
Abdul Fattah, son of Mahmud Tarzi.
Khalilullah, eldest son of Prince Inayatullah.
Shamsul Banat, sister of Prince Inayatullah.
Five or six children.

The above party reached Kandahar on the evening of the 22nd January.

(c.) The following Ministers are reported to have been appointed by King Habibullah :—

Abdul Hadi Khan (W.W. 46) General Adviser to the Minister of Court.
Sher Jan : Minister of Court. The son of a Mullah of Koh-i-Deman.
Said Hussain : Commander-in-Chief and G.O.C., Kabul area. A Seyd of Koh-i-Deman.

Under-Secretaries appear to have been instructed to continue in their various departments.

Guards have been placed on the houses of all ex-Ministers, and doubtless a systematic search will be conducted. The house of Abdul Aziz, ex-Minister for War, has been searched and its contents removed to the Arg.

(d.) Said Hussain is stated to be an ex-soldier and to have deserted from Mazar-i-Sharif. Having murdered his wife and father-in-law at Charikar, he became a brigand, and eventually joined forces with Habibullah. Although appointed Commander-in-chief, his unpopularity seems to be increasing, and it is quite possible that he and Habibullah may shortly be forced to dissolve partnership.

4. *Miscellaneous.*

(a.) The French and German schools have already been closed down, and their school-books have been sold by auction. These were bought up to a large extent by the boys themselves.

(b.) Electric light was again seen in Kabul on the evening of the 20th January for a short period, and the power-house at Jabul-us-Saraj is now working properly.

(c.) General Kiasim Pasha and his staff, who had been living in the Arg, were removed to the Turkish Legation on the 17th January. They do not appear to take any part in the present situation.

(d.) The Mangal and Jadran Alijaris, when returning to their homes, are said to have looted the Tajik colony round Gardez.

(e.) The "Machine Khana" (arsenal) was looted of its contents when Habibullah entered the city. Munitions and machinery were left intact.

(f.) European clothes have entirely disappeared. All officials and the Afghan officers of the Air Force are in chogas and puggies.

(g.) The Wireless Station was being worked by Russians up to the 23rd. It is now in the hands of Afghan operators.

C. E. T. ERSKINE, Major.

[N 1283/1/97]

No. 100.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 26.)

(No. B.L.-1.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Peshawar, February 25, 1929.

WE all arrived safely this morning at Peshawar, and Kabul evacuation is now complete. It is seven years to the day since His Majesty's Legation first crossed the Afghan border. The Royal Air Force have performed an historic achievement. They have conveyed 586 persons in eighty-two aeroplanes without a single mishap to passengers since the 23rd December over mountainous country in the depth of winter at an average height of 10,000 feet. Conditions have always been difficult, and for the last two days almost insuperable on account of the heavy fall of snow. The services of Flying Officer Trusk, who was shot down on the 18th December and remained in the Legation as a supernumerary member of my staff, have been invaluable.

[N 1328/1/97]

No. 101.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 261.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Peshawar, February 26, 1929.

FOR various reasons, some political and some technical, I am of opinion that to send up British aeroplanes to Kabul to continue evacuation after withdrawal of British Legation would be unsuccessful in attaining object and would involve unjustifiable risks. Local Royal Air Force officers agree with above opinion.

Before I left Kabul I suggested to Plessen that his best plan would be to hire German Junkers to come from Tehran. Remaining Germans may be evacuated to Chaman in German machines by arrangements between the German Legation and Afghan Government, if Government of India would permit Junkers to land at Chaman. If so desired, I will telegraph detailed reasons for the above opinions.

[N 1362/1/97]

No. 102

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 262.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Peshawar, February 28, 1929.

WITH reference to your telegram of the 27th instant, No. 70.

Successful organisation of flights of British aircraft to Kabul involves Foreign Minister's permission to land, preparation of aerodrome, intimation of weather conditions, liaison with Afghan Air Force, checking of passports and enforcement of discipline on aerodrome, weighing of passengers and luggage and allotment of seats. Throughout evacuation operations scrupulous and unremitting attention to these details has been paid by myself and by several members of my staff, and Kabul Government to all intents and purposes handed over Sherpur Aerodrome to our charge.

I consider that without these safeguards, which neither a British-piloted machine nor German Legation would be able to secure, employment of British aircraft would be unduly hazardous and would result sooner or later in disaster.

What would probably happen would be that Kabul Government would ask us to convey Afghan passengers from Peshawar to Kabul, and would consider that aeroplanes were at their disposal for return journey to Peshawar. They have already sent me one request. Their argument would be that British had lent their aircraft to Afghanistan, and that aerodrome and air were Afghan. On arrival of British machines at Kabul, there would be a wild rush for seats. Afghans wishing to visit Peshawar would force themselves in so ousting German and other foreigners, and there would be nobody to check weights or prevent stampede.

Hitherto the Germans themselves have been the worst offenders, surreptitiously attempting to overload our machines with extra luggage. Feigel has described those who remain as an undisciplined rabble.

There are at present, I understand, in Kabul 45 Germans, about 30 Turks and 60 Indians, while a large number of Afghans desire to fly to India if Kabul Government will allow them to leave. None except Plessen have any reasonable claim to consideration by Government of India.

If free evacuation to India were given, Indians would rightly claim priority, and it would be difficult to refuse Turks, and the operation might therefore last for several weeks. If German Government chartered a few Junker aeroplanes to fly from Persia to Kabul via Meshed and Chaman, these difficulties could be avoided to a great extent. The Afghans would have no claim and possibly no wish to use these machines for themselves as popular traffic is with Peshawar, and employment for evacuation of German subjects of German aeroplanes paid for by the German Government would be recognised as reasonable.

Junkers could fill up with petrol at Chaman and carry enough petrol to Kabul for return journey if Government of India agree. They could dump their passengers at Chaman, which is ordinarily a three-hour flight, until operation was complete. Compare flight of Egyptian Minister in December, who flew from Tehran to Kabul and filled up at Kandahar. Feigel's only objection was expense to German Government. Plessen agreed with me that above scheme, which we discussed in Kabul, seemed feasible.

Government of India's telegram No. 863S of the 24th February was not received till my arrival at Peshawar.

[N 1379/1/97]

No. 103.

Government of India to India Office.

(No. 954 S.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

March 2, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 780.

Objections raised to the employment of British aeroplanes by Minister in Katodon No. 262, to evacuate German colony puts it, we fear, out of court. However, we shall gladly do all we can to assist evacuation by Junkers by giving fuelling, landing and other facilities at Chaman if this course is adopted

[N 1404/1/97]

No. 104.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 266.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Peshawar, March 1, 1929.

IN continuation of my telegram No. 263.

Nadir Khan and his brothers, Muhammad Hasham, ex-Minister of Moscow, and Shahwali, ex-G.O.C., Kabul Army Corps, on evening of 27th February came to see me. Nadir Khan first pressed me to tell him who my Government would prefer to sit on the Afghan throne, and he asked particularly whether Amanullah was an acceptable candidate. I replied that, speaking in my private capacity as a friend, that my Government's policy was one of strict neutrality and non-interference, and that they refused to take any part in King-making; my Government had no complaints to make against Amanullah's foreign policy, while his domestic policy was no concern of theirs. It was for the Afghan people alone to decide whether they wanted him back as King or not. I told him neither the Government of India nor the British Legation had supplied a single rupee or rifle or cartridge either to Habibullah or to Amanullah or to Ali Ahmed or to any of the rebel forces, and that, except on the day of the first attack on Kabul, when I conversed with him at the Legation gate in a crowd, I had never seen Habibullah, nor had I written to him.

I said Afghans could set their minds at rest about attitude of Great Britain towards their present troubles. We should do nothing to interfere with their independence, and we should not take advantage of their helplessness.

[20088]

K 3

Nadir Khan then pressed me to advise him, as an old friend, what he should do. I replied that I could not offer him any advice except to try to prevent a continuance of civil war and act as a patriotic Afghan. The best way to do this seemed to me to be to induce tribes of Afghanistan to send their representatives to convenient central meeting place and try to get them to acknowledge one as their king, whether Amanullah or anyone else. This seemed the only way to prevent breaking up of Afghanistan into separate tribal communities, which would mean the end of its existence as a nation. I reminded him of your declaration in the House of Commons that Great Britain would be ready to hold out to the King who succeeded in establishing a settled Government throughout the country the hand of friendship.

Nadir Khan thanked me warmly for the friendly advice and private assurances, and said that many doubts that had been working in his mind were laid to rest. He said he would do his best to save his country from ruin and that there was no other means to do this except for him with his brothers to tour the country, convene a meeting of tribal representatives, and work for cessation of bloodshed and unanimity.

He proposed to stay at Peshawar three more days, and then, while one brother would go to meet Shah Mahmud in Southern Province, he and the other brother would probably proceed to Jalalabad.

He finally remarked that Great Britain was only country which had shown towards Afghanistan in her distress the true spirit of friendship. He had received proof from his countrymen that British impartiality and firmness had saved city of Kabul and foreign Legations from destruction, and Afghans would never forget all this when they succeeded in setting their house in order, if God so willed.

[N 1405/1/97]

No. 105.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 267.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Peshawar, March 2, 1929.

ALI AHMED, who arrived on 28th February in Peshawar through Mohmand country, called on me yesterday. I first thanked him for assistance he had so kindly given to Chapman and Davis. He assured me that the tribes of North Hindu Kush and all the tribes of the eastern and southern provinces of the Ghilzai Hazara were ready to support him in an attack on Kabul. I regard this optimism as merely bluster, unjustified by facts of situation.

He said he was in urgent need of money and could not believe my Government would be so shortsighted as to refuse him financial help in his hour of need. He said that he was a lifelong friend of the British Government and that this was their opportunity which would never recur, and that, once established on the throne, he would make it his first business to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with Great Britain and to scotch all Bolshevik tendencies in his country.

I explained you had already made in the House of Commons a declaration of the strict neutrality of His Majesty's Government, and that grant of assistance to any candidate for the throne in the present circumstance would be inconsistent with such a policy, and that he must, therefore, put out of his head all hope of financial help to enable him to gain the throne. Ali Ahmed professed bitter disappointment, and said that money might be paid secretly, and when I replied that I deprecated such a suggestion, he hinted that he would be obliged to go to Kandahar and support Amanullah if he could get no help from British, although he loathed him and all his works. I reminded him that I had privately reproved him for his open disloyal attitude towards Amanullah during tour in England, and replied that his discretion in this matter was unfettered. I explained that my Government held that it was for Afghan people alone to select their own King, and that, when the decision had been made, Great Britain would hold out hand of friendship to man who succeeded in establishing settled government throughout country, whether Amanullah or anyone else.

Ali Ahmed said he wished to stay a few days in Peshawar before he decided on his next move, and I warned him not to indulge in political propaganda with British tribesmen or to stay long.

[N 1439/1/97]

No. 106.

India Office to Government of India.

(No. 809.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, March 5, 1929.

PLEASE refer to your telegram No. 965 S of the 4th instant.

His Majesty's representative at Berlin, on instructions of Foreign Office, informed German Government of purport of your telegram No. 863 S, dated the 24th February, before receipt of Humphrys's telegram, dated the 26th February, No. 261.

On the 27th February Rumbold was instructed to warn German Government that it might prove impossible, after all, for technical reasons to send aircraft from India, and on the 4th March he was further instructed to inform German Government that His Majesty's Government very deeply regret that, after most careful consideration, and with every desire to assist, for technical reasons they cannot send British aircraft to Kabul to bring away Germans. Also, he is to inform German Government of Humphrys's suggestion regarding the employment of Junkers and your offer to provide facilities at Chaman, and to say that it is presumed that German Government will accordingly inform Plessen. In the circumstances, you may prefer to inform Plessen that communication to him of offer of evacuation in British aircraft was due to a misunderstanding. He should not count on it, therefore.

[N 1531/1/97]

No. 107.

India Office to Government of India.

(No. 872.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, March 9, 1929.

ON instructions from Kandahar, Afghan Chargé d'Affaires has lodged written protest alleging that Government of India does not allow Afghans to proceed from Kandahar via India to the eastern and southern Afghan provinces, but has given general permission for transit in large numbers from Kabul to Kandahar.

He states that Kandahar Government consider this differentiating attitude not equal to facilities formerly and not quite friendly.

No reply to this communication, substance of which is telegraphed merely for your information, has been returned by the Foreign Office.

I shall be glad to receive your views of the whole subject, after consultation with Humphrys, as soon as possible.

[N 1632/1/97]

No. 108.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 10.)

Sir,

Peshawar, February 27, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the conditions signed by ex-King Inayatulla Khan, the eldest brother of ex-King Amanulla, on which he handed over the Throne of Afghanistan to Amir Habibulla Khan. The translation was taken from a facsimile of the original, which was written on a Koran and photographed by my Turkish colleague. There is no reason to doubt its authenticity. Wali Muhammad Khan was unable to accompany the party to Kandahar owing to illness.

2. A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Secretary of State for India and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure in No. 108.

(Translation.)

Conditions signed by ex-King Inayatulla Khan.

With the name of God the Benevolent the Beneficent. My brother Habibulla Khan!
 EVERYONE knows that I have no intention or desire for becoming a King. At the time of martyrdom of my lamented father I had forgone the claim in spite of there being means at hand. Now when Amanulla Khan abdicated from kingdom I had no desire or intention to become a King, but the officials and the notables at the capital persisted in my accepting this responsibility, placing before me the view-point that the step would be for the good and advantage of Islam. I accordingly accepted it through their persuasions; but now for the welfare of the Moslems I forgo this and abdicate the Amirate of Afghanistan, and, as all other Moslems have tendered their allegiance to you, I also tender you my allegiance. The following are the persons and elders with me in the Ark who had tendered their allegiance to me:—

Muhammad Wali Khan.	Muhammad Ishaq Khan.
Abdul Aziz Khan.	Syed Qasim Khan.
Muhammad Sarwar Khan.	Abdul Wahab Khan.
Ghulam Haider Khan.	Abdul Tawab Khan.
Ahmed Ali Khan.	Shah Mahmud Khan.
Ghulam Dastgir Khan.	Syed Abdulla Khan.
Abdul Ghias Khan.	Sultan Muhammad Khan.
Ataul Haq Khan.	Syed Ahmed Khan.
Muhammad Aman Khan.	Mir Ali Ahmed Khan.
Muhammad Amin Khan.	Muhammad Akram Khan.

Like me, and in my presence, they have been released from allegiance to me and tender their allegiance to you on the following conditions:—

Firstly.—I myself, with my family and all relatives, inmates of my household, officials and all those who are in the Ark, all military officers and soldiers, the staff and servants of the Ark, their relatives and property shall be granted safety. No harm, damage or injury by any means whatever shall be done to them.

Secondly.—I myself, with my family and my relatives, shall proceed to Kandahar or foreign territory, and should be taken to Kandahar by aeroplane.

Thirdly.—Muhammad Wali Khan, Abdul Aziz Khan and Ahmed Ali Khan may be permitted to proceed along with me.

Fourthly.—Of the high officials, whoever may desire to go to foreign territory, permission to be granted to them to proceed with their families after one month from this date and until a period of two years from date.

Fifthly.—Until the aeroplane arrives to take me I will remain in the Ark, and after I have taken my seat in the aeroplane and it has started to fly the Ark will be surrendered to you.

Night of Thursday, the 5th Sha'aban, 1347 Hijrah (17th January, 1929).

INAYATULLA.

We creatures of the Beneficent God, Abdul Aziz, Abdul Habib, Muhammad Wali and Ahmed Ali, do hereby individually give our solemn word to Habibulla Khan that we do not break our promise nor will we wish evil for him. If we remain on the soil of Afghanistan we will not set afoot any disturbance or trouble against Amir Habibulla Khan, and like all other Afghan subjects we will pass the remaining days of our lives under the patronage of the Islamic Government.

Night of Friday, the 6th Sha'aban, 1347 Hijrah (18th January, 1929).

ABDUL AZIZ.
 AHMED ALI.
 ABDUL HABIB.
 MUHAMMAD WALI.

[N 1687/1/97]

No. 109.

Government of India to India Office.

(No. 1126 S.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

March 19, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 872 of the 9th March. After consulting Humphrys and Frontier Administrations, we propose to lay down for ingress and egress of Afghan subjects following general rules, our main objects being to preserve neutrality to ensure against additions to our refugee colony and to prevent intrigue among our tribes. There are four classes:—

- (a) Persons of first-class importance, *e.g.*, Ali Ahmad and Nadir Khan.
- (b) Officials and other persons of lesser importance, *e.g.*, Aminullah and Abdul Jabbar.
- (c) Combatants seeking asylum.
- (d) Ordinary tribesmen, merchants, &c.

(a) Will be allowed to enter India only for *bonâ fide* transit once and for all either to another country or to another point in Afghanistan.

(b) Will be allowed to transit frontier provinces once only from Kabul side *en route* to Kandahar side, or *vice versa*; subject, however, to their abstaining from anti-British propaganda or other obnoxious activity, they will be permitted freely to visit, but without halting in, trans-Indus areas cis-Indus destinations. Point is that, while activity by Afghan agents in favour of one or other party in interior of India is comparatively innocuous, in view of risk of our tribes becoming involved in hostilities, it is dangerous in the frontier provinces.

(c) Combatants, regulars or irregulars, will be disarmed, and until there is an established Government to whom to return them, their arms will be retained. On penalty of being put back at the point most convenient to us, they themselves will be required to move back into Afghanistan within a reasonable space of time by whatever route they please.

(d) Will remain unrestricted

We recognise that special cases will require special treatment. Do you approve these general lines?

[N 1760/1/97]

No. 110.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 283.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Peshawar, March 24, 1929.

IT is difficult to sum up the present situation in Afghanistan or to forecast future developments, but I submit the following analysis for what it is worth:—

Nadir Khan and his three brothers are busy canvassing tribal opinion in the southern and eastern provinces. They have not yet shown their hand, but I consider their support of Amanullah unlikely and of Habibullah impossible.

If they can evoke sufficient enthusiasm for their own family, they will put up (a) Nadir, (b) Mahomed Hasham, if Nadir declines to stand on grounds of ill-health; (c) Asadullah, the 18-year-old son of Nadir's sister and half-brother of Amanullah. Others who might appear in the semi-finals are (d) Khalilullah, aged 18, eldest son of Inayatullah and senior great grandson of Abdur Rahman; (e) Obidullah, aged 17, full brother of Amanullah.

(c), (d) or (e) would involve for some years a Council of Regency in which members of Nadir Khan's family would predominate. Amanullah is distrusted throughout the country, and, unless he receives strong support from Nadir Khan and the tribes of the south and east, his chances of re-establishing himself on the throne seem to be exceedingly slender. Inayatullah could muster a considerable following, but is understood to be a very unwilling candidate. Habibullah appears to be losing ground, and might be induced to surrender the capital on terms satisfactory to himself and his followers to a nominee—other than Amanullah—unanimously accepted by the Pathan tribes. He would fight to the death against Amanullah.

Ali Ahmed has been definitely eliminated from the contest.

On the whole, I put Asadullah's chances highest. If the tribes are unable to agree, and if heavy fighting takes place without any side gaining an overwhelming advantage, I consider it probable that we shall be asked eventually to intervene to restore order and place a generally acceptable candidate on the throne. Unofficial suggestions that I should act as mediator were made to me before I left Kabul.

Even if Nadir Khan succeeds in inducing the tribes to agree without fighting to give their unanimous support to a single candidate, I think that the nominee would be unlikely to accept the throne without a guarantee of British support. Interesting developments are expected in the course of the next ten days. It is important that we should observe strict neutrality so long as it is practicable to do so.

[T 3658/1281/373]

No. 111.

Government of India to India Office.

(No. 1208 S.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

March 27, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 999. We advise continuance of present position after consultation with Humphrys. Afghan Legation seems to be doing no harm and its presence may serve as a sedative to rumours, and its enforced withdrawal might offend decent Afghans generally as rubbing salt into wound.

[N 1831/1/97]

No. 112.

India Office to Government of India.

(No. 1108.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, March 28, 1929.

HIS Majesty's Government approve proposals contained in your telegram No. 1126 S of the 19th instant regarding ingress and egress of Afghans.

In case of Parliamentary questions, please let me know whether any public announcement on the subject is being made by you and, if so, terms of same.

[N 1832/42/97]

No. 113.

India Office to Government of India.

(No. 1119.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, March 29, 1929.

PLEASE refer to your telegram No. 1208 S of the 27th instant.

2. On the 26th instant Afghan Chargé d'Affaires, who was interviewed at Foreign Office, asked for written reply to communication referred to in my telegram No. 872 of the 9th instant alleging differentiation against Afghans proceeding from Kandahar to Kabul. He has already been informed orally that any restrictions are imposed equally on Afghans travelling in either direction.

3. He said also that Amanullah had instructed him to ask that certain French machine guns purchased by the King during visit to Europe, and now held up at Karachi, should be allowed to go forward to Kandahar at once.

4. I should be glad to have your views as to this request, which possibly relates to the machine guns mentioned in your telegram No. 726 S of the 14th February. A question which arises is whether the machine guns are consigned to King Amanullah by name and not to the Afghan Government, his claim to represent which we do not recognise. His Majesty's Government concur generally in views expressed in your telegram No. 629 S of the 8th ultimo that supply of munitions to belligerents is legal and that question is one of political expediency, but this involves impartial treatment both sides. I shall be glad to learn what the position now is as regards Kohat Pass question.

5. *Démarche* of Yunus Khan raises question of defining more narrowly his present position. One possibility would be, while continuing to treat mission as at present as an official mission in a state of suspense, to refuse in future to entertain representations and requests made by Yunus even in private and personal capacity

on behalf of one only among claimants to headship of Afghan Government which we do not recognise. If equal treatment is to be accorded to all, proper channel of communication between Amanullah or other leading Afghans and British Government would be through local frontier political officers. In this connexion, please see your express letter to N.-W. F. P. Administration No. 55-F/29, dated the 7th ultimo. I should be glad to have your views generally and as to whether a communication should be made to Yunus regarding his status and, if so, on what lines.

6. Please let me know in due course whether while one central authority is recognised you contemplate issuing any general instructions to frontier administrations as regards conducting *de facto* relations with Afghans.

[N 1821/42/97]

No. 114.

Government of India to India Office.

(No. 1258 S.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

April 2, 1929.

PLEASE refer to your telegram No. 1119.

Whether Amanullah's machine guns are consigned to him personally or to the Afghan Government seems to us immaterial, for we do not recognise any Government and do not allow private consignments until there is an established Government whom we can recognise. We are of opinion, which Humphrys shares, that we should decline all transit of arms to Afghanistan. Already we have declined transit on former grounds for this consignment (*vide* papers sent by mail of the 28th March) and are doing so now in respect of fifteen cases of rifles also lying at Karachi. Kohat Pass rifles on a somewhat different footing for they do not have to transit British India; and theoretically they are open to sale to all parties. We could close factory down, of course, but result would be to drive it completely out of our control elsewhere. Afghan tribes now are so glutted with arms that inferior arms from this source will make no appreciable difference, and at present we incline to leave things as they are.

We are disposed as regards Afghan Chargé d'Affaires to think that, while declining to enter into correspondence with him, it would be a pity to question too pointedly whom he represents or to refuse to have oral dealings with him. At the same time, should he attempt to take liberties reminder of his ambiguous position might be useful. Position is, of course, illogical, but it seems better to leave it as it is as we said in our telegram No. 1208 S. We have not closed down dealing in India with consular officers, but more than once have had occasion to remind them of their ambiguous position and consequent necessity for circumspect conduct. As consul-general has corresponded with Habibullah while remaining in regular though infrequent correspondence with Kandahar he is in peculiarly ambiguous position. We anticipate that as time goes on communications between leading Afghans and our local frontier officers is likely to become more common. At present we do not contemplate adding to Kurram instructions on the subject and propose to let practice grow of its own accord, each case being dealt with on its own merits of correspondence with *de facto* leaders like Nadir.

[N 1823/1/97]

No. 115.

Government of India to India Office.

(No. 1261 S.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

April 2, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 1108.

We would at present prefer to make no announcement of our ingress and egress rules, as they lend themselves to controversy, and, also, we wish to retain elasticity. Communiqué as in our next following telegram is, however, being held in readiness and parliamentary answers might be framed on it, perhaps.

[N 1824/1/97]

No. 116.

Government of India to India Office.

(No. 1262 S.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

April 2, 1929.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

It appears that some misunderstanding exists over the nature and purpose of the regulations which Government have laid down regarding the crossing of the Afghan frontier during the present crisis. These are dictated by Government's declared policy of non-intervention and neutrality, and by their determination to prevent our frontier districts being used by any of the contending parties in Afghanistan as a base for furthering civil war, and in particular to frustrate the efforts that are being made to embroil our frontier tribes in it.

Permission is in no case given to British subjects to cross the frontier into Afghanistan.

Afghan combatants, regulars or irregulars, who seek temporary refuge in India are disarmed on entry and required to move back into Afghanistan within a reasonable time in whatever direction and by whatever route they please. Their arms will be retained until there is an established Government in Afghanistan to whom they can be returned.

While the movements of ordinary Afghan traders and individual Afghan tribesmen are left unrestricted, the entry into India of high personages likely to attempt to settle in India as political refugees is discouraged, but transit is given freely for direct journey to a foreign destination. In the case of officials of the various *de facto* Governments and others of similar standing, permission to transit the frontier provinces from one part of Afghanistan to another in whatever direction is ordinarily given once only. Permission to visit India, however, is given freely on condition that travellers pass to their cis-Indus destinations without halting in transit in the frontier districts, and abstain during their stay in India from anti-British or other obnoxious activity.

[T 4021/1281/373]

No. 117.

Government of India to India Office.

(No 1316-1317 S.)

(Telegraphic.) P. and R.

April 7, 1929.

PLEASE see my telegram No. 1310 S, dated 7th instant.

In view of facts reported therein and of probability of our having to take action against the trade agent, we are now publishing communiqué contained in my telegram No. 1262 S of 2nd idem, with addition of following paragraph: "Despite the absence of a recognised Afghan Government, ex-consular officers, trade agents and the like have been permitted as a matter of courtesy to remain in India and discharge their normal functions on the explicit understanding that if they engage in illegitimate activities beyond the scope of those functions, and, in particular, in intrigue with the tribes under British control, they will be requested to remove themselves to Afghanistan."

[N 1937/1/97]

No. 118.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 291.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Simla, April 8, 1929.

BY special messenger Nadir Khan has sent me two Royal proclamations in original addressed to Afghan tribes of the Southern Province. Both bear Amanullah's signature, which I have verified. First proclamation is dated 26th January. It sets forth reasons for Amanullah's abdication and roundly abuses Habibullah.

Following words are put into Inayatullah's mouth:—

"I had no desire originally to be King and have no desire now, and I resign the throne."

The recent disasters in Kabul are attributed to "internal intrigues and dissensions, which are based solely on the machinations of the enemies of the progress of Afghanistan."

Second proclamation, on Royal official paper, is numbered 130, and dated 4th Hoot (22nd February). It contains following significant passage:—

"Habibullah has no other object than to bring about the ruin of Afghanistan and destruction of Mussulmans in whatever manner it may be possible to do so. It has come to my knowledge that he has been instigated by the English, and that he acts according to their instructions. This is evidently an issue between the unbelievers and the faithful."

It goes on to say that Amanullah is preparing to march on Kabul, and calls on the tribes of the Southern Province to meet him at Ghazni. The date of this proclamation suggests that it was issued in order to forestall Nadir Khan's visit to Khost. The reason why "the English" are mentioned by name instead of under the usual vague expression "the enemies of Islam" is probably to discredit Nadir Khan by suggesting that he was coming as a British nominee.

My next succeeding telegram contains an oral message from Nadir Khan which was delivered by the messenger who brought the proclamations.

[N 1938/1/97]

No. 119.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 292.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Simla, April 8, 1929.

FOLLOWING is message:—

"In Gardez I hope to collect a tribal army and march to the Logar Valley with 10,000 men. I shall then request Habibullah to vacate the throne on generous terms for himself and his followers. If he sees that I have sufficient force to turn him out Habibullah will comply. After entering Kabul I shall summon representatives of all the tribes of Afghanistan. From them will be formed a Parliament which will draw up a Constitution and determine the powers of the future king. As it is obvious that Afghanistan can no longer be safely ruled by an autocrat, these powers will be drastically curtailed. When this has been done, the tribal representatives will nominate their King, and on the conditions framed by the Parliament the throne will be offered to him. As my followers must be paid, I require money to carry out this programme. It is certain that there will be a long period of civil war and Afghanistan will be dismembered if my programme fails."

I gave an oral reply that the policy of my Government was one of neutrality and non-interference. At this stage the granting of financial assistance to any Afghan would be incompatible with such a policy, and if it was suspected that he was being helped by a foreign Power might, indeed, do harm to his cause. My Government earnestly desired to see a strong and united Afghanistan under one ruler, and I sent personally my best wishes to Nadir Khan in his patriotic attempt to secure unanimity for whatever candidate might be chosen by the Afghan people without further bloodshed.

[N 2036/1/97]

No. 120.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 293.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Simla, April 17, 1929.

PRESENT position in Afghanistan appears to be as follows:—

The Pathan tribesmen generally do not at all want a King.

Exemption from taxes and conscription they find a pleasant change from the oppression of the old régime, and a lucrative pastime in the exaction of tolls from passing caravans. They dislike intensely, moreover, the idea of having to disgorge their loot and stolen rifles.

The trading community, on the other hand, and the inhabitants of Kabul, are longing for the return of a settled Government throughout the country. The forces of Habibullah and Amanullah are about to meet, apparently near Ghazni.

I suspect that Amanullah is being drawn into a trap by the Ghilzais, who, when they consider that he is at their mercy, will fall on him. Nadir Khan and his brothers are playing a waiting game still, and the tribes of the north will certainly join the winning side, though apparently in favour of Habibullah for the moment.

It seems likely that, throughout the summer, there will be fighting, during the cold winter months a lull, and a settlement next spring through weariness.

No. 121.

Government of India to India Office.

(No. 1546 S.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

April 30, 1929.

NADIR KHAN has sent messenger with letter to Ebner's agent in Peshawar saying that he was making good progress, and had succeeded in uniting tribes of southern and eastern provinces, but was in need of money, and asking him to approach Chief Commissioner for loan of money to him, Nadir Khan, either personally or as representative of Afghan State. It was added in postscript that ex-King was not accepted by the tribes and was in great difficulties.

Following sent Chief Commissioner to-day:—

"Messenger should be informed that, while Government of India are in full sympathy with all patriotic efforts for the peaceful unification of the Afghan nation, they much regret that they are unable to accede to Nadir Khan's request. As Sir Francis Humphrys explained to him, to do so would constitute a departure from their declared policy of non-intervention in Afghan affairs."

No. 122.

India Office to Government of India.

(No. 1440.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, May 2, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 1258 S of the 2nd ultimo, paragraph 2.

Afghan Chargé d'Affaires. It has been decided that present arrangements should continue. Yunus understands his position fully and is unlikely to take liberties.

As personal concession he has been given private letter confirming oral assurance about frontier policy stated in my telegram No. 1119 of the 29th March, paragraph 1, but told that Foreign Office will be unable to give him any but oral replies in future.

No. 123.

India Office to Government of India.

(No. 1441.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, May 2, 1929.

HIS Majesty's Government agree that until a settled Government is re-established no arms should be allowed to pass to Afghanistan through India.

Yunus Khan has been told that this is part of our general policy, and that machine guns now at Karachi cannot proceed.

This is in reply to your telegram No. 1258 S of the 2nd ultimo.

No. 124.

Government of India to India Office.—(Received in Foreign Office May 13.)

(No. 1646 S.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 10, 1929.

PERMISSION has been asked for by the Afghan consul-general for a quantity of rifles and machine guns now held up at Karachi to be re-exported. There is reason to believe that the destination may be Turkey, though the consul-general is unwilling to indicate the destination. If you agree, we propose to give permission. This refers to papers about the import of arms into Afghanistan sent by mail of the 28th March.

[N 2424/42/97]

No. 125.

Government of India to India Office.

(No. 1687 S.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

May 16, 1929.

FOLLOWING addressed to Humphrys from Kabul:—

"It is requested that arms and ammunition purchased by the Afghan Government from Europe and already landed at the Indian ports or will land hereafter may at present be detained at their respective ports of arrival. As soon as complete stability and uniformity is established throughout Afghanistan and the whole country is consolidated and brought under one supreme authority, in that case the Indian Government may, after receiving an intimation from the Central Government at Kabul, permit the transition of the said arms and ammunition into Afghanistan. Meanwhile, your Excellency is further requested to kindly intimate to this Ministry the amount of the arms and ammunition received at the Indian ports and the name of the Government from whom purchased. No. 63, dated 13th May, Afghan Foreign Ministry, Kabul."

Foreign Secretary has telegraphed to-day as follows:—

(No. 43.)

"In reply to your telegram No. 63, dated 13th May, which has been delivered to me as Sir Francis Humphrys is now in England, I have the honour to inform you that, in pursuance of their declared policy of scrupulous neutrality and non-intervention, the Government of India have throughout prohibited the export to Afghanistan of consignments of munitions from whatever source and to whatever destination."

Reply is meant for Russian as well as Afghan consumption.

[N 2475/1/97]

No. 126.

Government of India to India Office.(No. 1732 S.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

May 23, 1929.

FOLLOWING from Baluchistan:—

"News just received that ex-King Amanullah arrived Chaman by car at 1 o'clock this afternoon with Sardar Inayatullah, Queen Souriya and other members of family. They have been accommodated in political bungalow there, which is guarded by Gurkhas. Arrival was without any previous warning, and no information has been received as to why they have come or where they wish to proceed. Enquiries are being made and result will be telegraphed."

[N 2476/1/97]

No. 127.

Government of India to India Office.(No. 1735 S.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

May 23, 1929.

FOLLOWING sent to Baluchistan to-day:—

"If Wingate or other responsible officer has not already gone to Chaman he should be sent first thing to-morrow, preferably by air."

"It should be made plain with all courtesy to Amanullah that Government's declared policy of neutrality and non-intervention unfortunately precludes their extending further hospitality to himself, ex-Queen Souriya and their party. They will, however, be glad, on learning his destination, to do all in their power to arrange for expeditious and comfortable transit of party across Indian territory."

"Should Amanullah not propose spontaneously to leave as soon as special train is available, it should be made clear to him again, of course with utmost courtesy, that he must do so."

[N 2495/1/97]

No. 128.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 24.)

Sir,

India Office, May 23, 1929.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to transmit to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of papers received from the Government of India on the subject of the rebellion in Afghanistan.

I am, &c.

A. HIRTZEL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 128.

Note by Oriental Secretary, British Mission to Afghanistan.

(No. 2.)

ABOUT twenty armed soldiers entered the British Legation by climbing compound wall and stole twenty baskets, two garden scissors and some firewood from the godown of the Legation gardeners. They also slightly wounded with rifle butts two Legation servants, who resisted. The matter was reported by the caretaker of the Legation to the Afghan Foreign Office, from where it has been referred to the Governor of Kabul. The authorities are taking necessary steps to prevent repetition of this interference with the Legation, and have in the meanwhile sent an additional guard of seven persons.

2. Two Russian aeroplanes, which had been detained in Kabul for over a fortnight on account of weather difficulties, have left Kabul on the 25th, taking four Germans and some luggage. This leaves behind thirteen Germans consisting of two members of the German Legation and eleven others.

3. The Hazrat of Shorbazar continues to lose influence in Kabul.

S. MAHBUB ALI, *Oriental Secretary,*
British Mission to Afghanistan.

Peshawar, April 27, 1929.

Enclosure 2 in No. 128.

Note by Oriental Secretary, British Mission to Afghanistan.

(No. 3.)

RAHMAT KHAN, caretaker of the British Legation in Kabul, reports that General Mahmud Sami was sent to him by Bacha-i-Saqao, asking him (Rahmat Khan) to go and see Bacha-i-Saqao. Rahmat Khan complied and during the interview, which took place in the presence of all other courtiers, Bacha-i-Saqao expressed his regrets at the incident of theft from the Legation compound (reference my report No. 2), and stated as follows:—

"I am pleased with the British Government because they have observed strict neutrality and, unlike the Russians who have helped Amanullah, the British Government have not interfered in the internal troubles of Afghanistan. The British have neither helped me nor have they helped Amanullah. When I first attacked the Kabul City and occupied Bagh-i-Bala, false reports were circulated in the city of Kabul to the effect that the British Legation rendered me medical assistance. This is not true. The British friendship was useful to Afghanistan, but the Germans, the French and the Russians were of no use for Afghanistan. There were rumours that the Indians were helping Amanullah and Nadir Khan, and that they were collecting large funds for them. I do not believe in this. The British Government will not permit this as they are neutral. I will go and see the Legation one day and examine what damage has been done to the building by Amanullah's forces. Please send my salaam to Sir Francis Humphrys and Sheikh Mahbub Ali Khan."

Rahmat Khan thinks it will be a good thing if the Minister could send Bacha-i-Saqao a telegram of thanks, and the telegram to be delivered through Rahmat Khan

S. MAHBUB ALI, *Oriental Secretary,*
British Mission to Afghanistan.

Peshawar, April 28, 1929.

[N 2515/42/97]

No. 129.

India Office to Government of India.

(No. 1645.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, May 24, 1929.

PLEASE refer to your telegrams of the 10th instant, No. 1646 S, and the 16th May, No. 1687 S.

His Majesty's Government concur in your reply to Habibullah and your proposal to allow shipment of arms to Turkey is also approved by them.

No. 130.

Government of India to India Office.

(No 1794 S.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

May 28, 1929

FOLLOWING from Wickham, Bombay, to-day :—

"Amanullah summoned me to an interview this evening. After expressing appreciation of Government of India's hospitality he assured me that he had no intention of ever returning to Afghanistan. He said he attributed whole of his misfortune to Russia, who had estranged him from the British, the traditional friend of his father and grandfather, and had egged him on, and who, when the crisis came, had not lifted finger to help him. He assured me that revolution had taken him completely by surprise and that he had not deposited a penny in foreign banks. His sole capital consisted of what he had with him, equivalent of about four lakhs British, which he would have to share with his brother and his retinue. He made following requests, to which he asks that categorical replies be given to enable him to know exactly where he stands :—

"(a) Would Government of India be prepared to permit members of his suite, whom he is quite unable to support and who could not possibly gain livelihood in Europe, to reside in India, and would they contribute to their support?

"(b) Would Government be prepared to change his money for him at a fair rate; it consists of 30,000 to 40,000 gold Amaniya valued at approximately ten rupees each and about one lakh Afghanis, and he anticipates difficulty in inducing Bombay banks to take it over at reasonable rate. I said I would consult Accountant-General, Bombay.

"(c) Will British Government assist him to recover his private property in Kabul consisting of factories, and cash value of which he estimates at 6 crores?

"(d) Is British Government, out of consideration for his father's friendship, prepared to advance him anything on security of this property in Kabul?

"(e) Would British Government be prepared to educate some of his sons and near relations, say, half-a-dozen, in England. King fears effects of rough sea on his wife and children and would like to proceed by P. and O. as before, changing ship at Suez. I hope to settle the date of sailing to-morrow or next day, but Queen's condition complicates matters. As regards (c), I said we could not in any case take action before re-establishment of diplomatic relations and that, therefore, it was not matter to be considered at the present time. As regards (d), I thought he should be prepared for disappointment. He is, of course, just begging. I also observed that (e) might be difficult matter to arrange."

Following sent Wickham, also to-day :—

"Answers are (a) no, it would violate Government's policy of neutrality and non-intervention to give important personages during the civil war other than temporary harbourage in India, still more to finance them; (b) Government will gladly do what they can and your further reports on this score are awaited; (c) it is quite impossible for the British Government to attempt to meddle in such a matter, as no one knows better than Amanullah himself; (d) is equally impossible; (e) is probably impracticable but is a matter not primarily affecting Government of India; (f) it is immaterial to the Government of India whether party proceeds straight to Italy or via Suez. Indeed, embarrassment of Government of India, like his own, will be less the earlier his departure. You will, of course, reduce these unsatisfying answers to as courteous a form as possible."

No. 131.

Government of India to India Office.

(No. 1841 S.)

(Telegraphic.) P

June 1, 1929.

A TELEGRAM, dated the 30th May, has been received from oriental attaché at Peshawar and reads as follows :—

(R.) "Rahmat reports that Minister of Court invited him to tea, and during conversation told him that King Habibullah Khan would be very pleased if British Government detain Amanullah in India and prevent him going to Europe, wherefrom he may proceed to Russia and create trouble for Bacha Sakao Government and India. King Habibullah Khan also requests for help in cash from the British Government."

[N 2621/1/97]

No. 132.

India Office to Government of India.

(No. 1746.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 31, 1929.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 1789 S and 1794 S of the 28th May.

Tenor of your instructions to Wickham on King Amanullah's requests (b) to (f) are approved generally by His Majesty's Government, but they feel considerable doubt on the question of refusing temporary asylum in India to Inayatullah and his sardars if they themselves make the request. There seems to be no serious risk of Inayatullah conducting agitation in India or of making any move to re-establish himself on Afghan throne, without assistance in money and arms, which, of course, we would refuse except in response to a clear invitation from Afghan people. On the other hand, in response to such an invitation, his peaceable return seems now a contingency that we should at least visualise as possible, and it would be well in that case that he should go with best impression of British treatment. The alternative might be his entry into Afghanistan under Russian auspices, especially if he went at once to Persia, as contemplated in your telegram of the 28th instant, No. 1789 S, and his appearance in Persia might even operate as an invitation to Russians to retrieve their past blunder and make him a stalking-horse for embarking on measures of intervention that otherwise they would hesitate to employ. Situation appears now so changed that it should be considered on its merits and (*vide* your telegram of the 19th March, No. 1126 S) "as a special case, demands special treatment." Difficulties are realised by His Majesty's Government, but might it not be further developments? It would perhaps be desirable to avoid chances of possible and advisable to allow Inayatullah temporary asylum in Burma pending misunderstanding and misrepresentation to inform Nadir's and Habibullah's Foreign Minister unofficially, and to announce publicly that persons in question had asked to be allowed asylum in India, and that for the time being this request had been granted to extent of allowing them residence in Burma, and that British Government would continue to adhere to policy of strict neutrality.

His Majesty's Government consider possibility involved in foregoing alternatives so important as to merit most careful consideration, and they would be glad to have further expression of your views.

[N 2651/1/97]

No. 133.

Government of India to India Office.

(No. 1849 S.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

June 1, 1929.

OVER the possibility of making an exception in favour of Inayatullah and allowing him asylum in India we ourselves had hesitated, chiefly because of his friendliness to us, pathetic record, and general ineffectualness. Ground has again been gone over very carefully by us in the light of the further arguments in your telegram No. 1746.

[20088]

M

It is recognised by us that, should Inayatullah, in response to a popular invitation, return to Kabul, it would be well for him to go with the best impressions of British treatment, and that it would be very unfortunate if he went under Russian auspices or with Russia's active intervention. Happily, his appreciation of British treatment should be great and lasting, for there is little doubt that his life was saved by Humphrys in getting him away from Kabul in our aeroplanes. And the contingency seems very remote of his being recalled to the throne after renouncing it twice and twice fleeing his country. Danger of leaving Russia any extra tool, even one so unpromising as Inayatullah, with which to meddle in Afghan affairs is, even so, however, an argument the force of which is recognised by us.

To isolate Inayatullah's case is, however, unfortunately impossible. There are no grounds, as indeed you imply, on which we could refuse asylum to the others now in Amanullah's party, should they request it, if he is given asylum in India. Nor is it beyond the bounds of possibility that Amanullah might be prompted by the grant of temporary asylum to Inayatullah to request one likewise as a convenient way of putting off his final exit to Europe, perhaps for ever. Possibility obviously exists of numerous other refugees, including two more ex-Amirs, Nadir and Ali Ahmed, the latter of whom we have already refused asylum. Such an influx could not be faced by us, with the great possibility of temporary asylum degenerating into a permanency, thus adding intolerably to our Afghan colony problem with its hitherto insoluble political and human difficulties and its financial embarrassments.

Yet it would be hard to differentiate Inayatullah's case from the rest. Indeed, the very inference we should wish at all costs to avoid would at once arise from any attempt at differentiation, viz., that Inayatullah was being reserved as our candidate for the throne.

Only safe course, we are convinced, for us to steer is one of rigid non-interference and impartiality. Every one of the protagonists has now asked us for support, and we seem to have earned respect of all by fact that we have shown favour to none. It seems even to have acted as some sort of sedative on Russia. It has certainly served us well in India, where Muslim zealots and malignants alike have failed to find any real material for their suspicions to feed on, though all have been on the look-out for an occasion of dangerous agitation against us.

[N 2650/1/97]

No. 134.

Government of India to India Office.(No. 1851 S.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

June 2, 1929.

FROM Intelligence from Meshed and other sources facts point to dangerous friction between Kabul Government and Soviet, on the one hand, over Basmach raids into Russian territory from Afghanistan, and on the other and more seriously over accusations of connivance by Russia in the assembling in Russian territory of pro-Amanullah forces, their furnishing with Russian arms, and the bombing of Habibullah's forces operating against Mazar by Russian aeroplanes. The bellicose attitude of the Kabul Government may be largely bluff, but it may be prompted also by the idea that anti-Russian action would not only promote union internally by inducing Pathan tribes to rally against alien unbelievers with non-Pathans to standard of Ghazi Habibullah, but would also enlist if not support our goodwill.

Our lack of touch with the Kabul Government is making itself acutely felt. Otherwise we could have disabused them in London, Simla or Kabul of all idea that we would countenance action of an aggressive nature against Russia and could have enlightened them as to the suicidal tendency of such a course. Chief Commissioner is being asked whether Habibullah's trade agent is in effective communication with Kabul, and whether he is the sort of man who could be relied on to pass on properly a verbal message. If he is, we are inclined to recommend that Chief Commissioner should tell them verbally that we hold aloof absolutely from internal affairs of Afghanistan and anxiously look forward to establishment of a Central Government over united Afghanistan with whom we can resume our old friendly relations. At the same time we trust that there is no truth in the disturbing reports of friction between Afghanistan and Russia, as we are greatly concerned that Afghanistan should maintain peace with all her neighbours, whoever may be her ruler.

Should, however, the trade agent be too uncertain or too leisurely a correspondent with Kabul, we think oriental attaché should send a message of this kind through our Legation caretaker. We should have to assume in either case that message would reach Russian ears, and our old difficulty confronts us of telling one party not to be aggressive without letting the other feel she can do what she likes. In addition, there are the peculiar difficulties arising out of the present awkward situation. Can you advise a better course, or do you approve?

[N 2722/1/97]

No. 135.

India Office to Government of India.

(No. 1799.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, June 5, 1929

REFERENCE your telegram No. 1851 S of the 2nd instant.

Generally we agree as to desirability of conveying warning to Habibullah and approve language proposed by you.

It seems preferable, however, to use a method more indirect for despatch of actual message than through his trade representative or our caretaker, in order to avoid encouraging him to hope for closer relations with us or to claim help from us to meet Russian reprisals against Basmachi band, over whom his authority may be of a very slight nature.

To accord with our policy of non-interference we suggest it would be best to convey substance of proposed communication to Afghan consul-general in conversation (not actually as a message but on assumption that if he is in communication with Habibullah he would pass it on to Kabul) and also to arrange simultaneously, with a view to Russian consumption, some similar statement in India press.

[N 2750/1/97]

No. 136.

Government of India to India Office.

(No. 1892 S.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

June 7, 1929.

YOUR No. 1799.

Your suggestion would clearly be the right one if Afghan consul-general were in Simla and in communication with Habibullah. He is, however, hand in glove with Amanullah and his party in Bombay, and to impart message to him would be calculated to do more harm than good. Unless atmosphere clears in the meanwhile, as seems now not impossible, we propose, therefore, to fall back on one or other of our previous suggestions. Does this meet with your approval?

[N 2773/1/97]

No. 137.

India Office to Government of India.

(No. 1840.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, June 9, 1929.

PLEASE see your telegram No. 1849 S of the 1st instant.

In view of your apprehensions of financial and other internal embarrassments from according further temporary asylum to Inayatullah or other Afghan refugees, I will not press this suggestion. If, however, their sojourn is not to be permanent it seems worth while at least to handle them as gently as possible in order that they may not leave with feeling of inhospitality, and, in the case of Inayatullah referred to in your telegram No. 1893 S of the 7th instant, to extend hospitality until it is known whether Persian Government are willing to receive him. In the meantime you will, I assume, hear what his emissaries have to say, even though he is warned that their mission is not likely to be successful.

[N 2785-86/1/97]

No. 138.

Government of India to India Office.

(Nos. 1923 S and 1924 S.)
(Telegraphic.) P. and R.

June 10, 1929.

PLEASE see my telegram No. 1892 S

Oriental attaché, Peshawar, telegraphs as follows, No. 25, the 9th June:—

“Following is purport of telegram from Rahmat. Minister of Court interviewed Rahmat and informed him it has been ascertained officially Russians were helping Ghulam Nabi. They have given him forty aeroplanes, 6,000 men, including horsemen specially equipped with machine guns. Ghulam Nabi's forces were officered by Russians. Attention of British Government invited as situation no longer internal. In accordance with wishes of Russians, Ghulam Nabi has issued proclamations in favour of republic. Minister of Court anxious to get into touch with representative of British Government, preferably former oriental secretary, to reach Kabul either by air or via Kandahar, which road was open, or permission be granted for the Afghan Foreign Minister or Minister of Court to proceed to India to represent matters personally. Minister of Court requests former oriental secretary to stop Minister's two Peshawari relatives named Mushtaq Ahmad and Nisar Ahmad proceed Kabul as situation is dangerous.”

This opportunity is being taken of conveying our attitude non-committally to Kabul (and presumably to Russians also), and we have replied oriental attaché as follows:—

“Your reply to Rahmat should include following: ‘Since you telegraphed on the 8th instant good news has been received of publication of Habib-ul-Islam of denial by the Russians of assisting Ghulam Nabi and Kabul Government's acceptance of this denial. Please send a copy. Until Government is established over whole of Afghanistan it is unlikely that I would be allowed to go to Kabul myself or that representatives from Kabul would be invited here.’”

[N 2769/1/97]

No. 139.

Memorandum respecting Recent Events in Afghanistan.

THE present Ameer of Kabul, Habibullah Khan, also called Bacha-i-Saqao, the “son of the water-carrier,” first came into the limelight on the 14th December, 1928, when he took advantage of King Amanullah's preoccupation with the Shinwari rebellion to make a surprise attack on Kabul, which was only driven off after eleven days of hard fighting. He is about 40 years of age, illiterate, and by tribe a Tajik—a serious handicap in the eyes of the true Afghan tribes. At one time he served in the Afghan army, from which he deserted in 1924. Since then he has become famous as a bandit leader, and a certain rough chivalry and generosity to the poor have caused him to be compared to Robin Hood.

2. Habibullah's second attack began on the 7th January, 1929, and by the 17th January he was in possession of the whole of Kabul except the Arq, or citadel, in which Sardar Inayatullah Khan, who had been made King on the 14th January, when King Amanullah formally abdicated in his favour, was holding out with some 5,000 men. Amanullah had already fled to Kandahar, and, in order to prevent a general sack of the city, Inayatullah agreed to surrender the Arq on condition that the lives of his men were spared and that he and his principal supporters were also sent to Kandahar. This was finally arranged with the help of Sir Francis Humphrys, and on the 18th January Inayatullah left in a British aeroplane for Peshawar, whence he was able to proceed to Kandahar by way of Chaman.

3. Sardar Inayatullah, who is Amanullah's elder half-brother, has been described as “respectable but colourless.” He lacks ambition, and made little or no effort to assert his right to the throne when his father, the old Ameer Habibullah,

was murdered in 1919. Since then he has played no part in public life, but is well liked in Afghanistan, probably because he is considered perfectly harmless.

4. The departure of Inayatullah left Habibullah in undisputed control of Kabul, of which he proclaimed himself Ameer, and of the immediately surrounding country, but it was evident that he would have to fight to maintain his position. At Kandahar, King Amanullah rescinded his abdication and began to collect support among the Durani tribe (to the Barakzai section of which belong the Muhammadzai, the former Royal House), while garrisons loyal to the former Government still held Jalalabad in the east, Herat in the west and Mazar-i-Sharif in the north. In addition, Ali Ahmed Khan, who had been sent in December by King Amanullah to restore order in the eastern provinces (the country around Jalalabad), openly took the title of Ameer, with which he had been toying for some time, and the Ghilzais, the largest and most united of the Afghan tribes, who hold the country between Kabul and Kandahar, seemed likely to choose an Ameer of their own.

5. Ali Ahmed is both cousin and brother-in-law to King Amanullah, to whom his loyalty has always been a little suspect, and a man of great courage and considerable ability. He signed the Treaty of Rawal Pindi in 1919, was for some time Governor of Kabul, and came to England with King Amanullah in 1928. When sent to Jalalabad to suppress the rebellion he at once began intriguing with the Shinwaris and other tribes, and by dint of swearing to observe rigidly the tenets of the Mahometan religion, and in particular to abstain from alcohol, of which he is over-fond, he obtained the promise of their support in a bid for the throne. When, however, he began to advance on Kabul, the Ameer Habibullah succeeded by bribery in causing a split among his supporters, with the result that his camp at Jagdalak was looted by his own men on the 7th February and he was forced to take refuge in British territory. From there he made his way to Kandahar, where he was kept under surveillance, but not imprisoned, by King Amanullah.

6. The same tribesmen who had looted Ali Ahmed's camp proceeded on the 10th February to sack Jalalabad, which was practically destroyed by the explosion of the magazine.

7. The next complication was the arrival from France of Nadir Khan and his brothers. Nadir Khan, who was the Afghan Commander-in-chief in the Third Afghan War, has great influence among the Pathan tribes along the Indian frontier and is generally regarded as the most straightforward, reliable and disinterested of the leading Afghans. He has also a reputation for excessive caution. Owing to a quarrel with King Amanullah, of whom he is a distant cousin, he lived for some years in the South of France in virtual exile, but when the rebellion became serious he returned in the hope of saving his country from chaos and reached the district of Khost, in the southern provinces, early in March. His aim was understood to be the reuniting of the country and the holding of a national assembly to choose a King, who might be Amanullah or anyone else—except Habibullah, whose antecedents made him an obstacle to national unity and whose removal was the first necessity. It was generally believed, however, that, if he were successful in this aim, he would secure the election to the throne of the 17-year-old Sardar Asadullah, the son of the old Ameer Habibullah by his (Nadir Khan's) sister, the Ulya Janab.

8. During the weeks following his return Nadir Khan, with the help of his brothers, who are also popular among the Pathan tribes, obtained many promises of support from the southern provinces, collected a force, and, aided by the Ghilzais, advanced on Kabul. Early in May he penetrated into the Logar Valley, some 40 miles south of Kabul, but was there defeated in a battle with the Ameer Habibullah's troops through the sudden treachery of his Ghilzai allies. He retired to Khost, and since then little has been heard of his activities.

9. In March the Ameer Habibullah sent an expedition to occupy Mazar-i-Sharif and the country north of the Hindu Kush, and from Mazar-i-Sharif one of his generals, Abdur Rahim, advanced on Herat, which he entered on the 4th May without opposition, King Amanullah's garrison having mutinied. But while this advance was taking place Ghulam Nabi Khan, the Afghan Ambassador at Moscow, collected a force on Soviet territory, and with Soviet assistance, as the Ameer Habibullah believed, recaptured Mazar-i-Sharif for King Amanullah towards the end of April and held it throughout the month of May. Ghulam Nabi is a brother of Ghulam Sadiq, King Amanullah's Foreign Secretary, and has held a variety of posts at home and abroad. His military reputation is not high, and he is said to be corrupt. As a result of these disturbances in the northern provinces, the Basmachis, mostly refugees from Soviet Turkestan, have of late been able to carry out a number of raids into Soviet territory.

10. In the meantime King Amanullah was busy at Kandahar throughout the winter organising his forces. These seem, however, to have been badly equipped and to have possessed little spirit. At the end of March he began to advance on Kabul, and by the middle of April had reached the neighbourhood of Ghazni, half-way to Kabul, which was held by Habibullah's troops. His communications were constantly threatened by the Ghilzais, and after a certain amount of fighting he was forced to retire in the direction of Kandahar, being finally defeated at Kalat-i-Ghilzai on the 22nd May, largely owing to the attitude of the Ghilzais. After this defeat he fled with his family, including Sardar Inayatullah, and principal supporters to British territory and declared that he would never return to Afghanistan. He is now at Bombay and is expected to leave shortly for Italy. There is little doubt that King Amanullah is a sincere patriot and had no other object in pressing his social and administrative reforms than to promote the welfare of his people and the internal and external strength of his country. It was his misfortune that his natural energy and enthusiasm caused him to introduce these reforms at a pace for which his people, and in particular the fanatical mullahs, were not prepared.

11. Directly King Amanullah had fled, Ali Ahmed proclaimed himself Ameer at Kandahar, but the city was taken by Habibullah's troops early in June and Ali Ahmed was sent as a prisoner to Kabul.

12. Nadir Khan, too, is reported to have proclaimed himself Ameer of Afghanistan as soon as King Amanullah had left the scene, but this has not been definitely confirmed, and reports as to his prospects are conflicting.

13. As for Ghulam Nabi, according to one report, he has given up his enterprise at Mazar-i-Sharif since King Amanullah's flight, but, according to another, a force which he despatched towards Kabul during May was astride the Hindu Kush early this month.

14. The present position appears to be, therefore, that the Ameer Habibullah holds Kabul, Kandahar and Herat, but may be threatened, how seriously it is impossible to say, by Ghulam Nabi from Mazar-i-Sharif. Apart from this, he has little or no control over the powerful tribes of the south and east, who are thoroughly enjoying their present freedom, with exemption from taxation and conscription, and who, in spite of Nadir Khan's efforts, show no desire for an early return to settled government.

*Northern Department.
Foreign Office, June 10, 1929.*

[N 2819/1/97]

No. 140.

Government of India to India Office.

(No. 1949 S.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

June 12, 1929.

FOLLOWING from Kabul Foreign Minister, to Humphrys, No. 107, dated 9th June:—

"With reference to the memorandum No. 35 dated 20th February, 1929, I have the honour to inform you that most of the provinces and a major portion of the nation in Afghanistan have recognised and accepted the present Government, and under its prestige are formed into a well organised Government, as a majority of the representatives of other foreign Powers are already present in the capital. Your Excellency's presence is therefore also desired in Kabul that matters regarding the establishment of friendly relations between the Afghan and the British Governments may favourably be conducted."

Our comments follow.

[N 2863/1/97]

No. 141.

India Office to Government of India.

(No. 1909.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, June 14, 1929.

YOUR telegram of the 7th instant, No. 1892 S.

Initiation of communication with Habibullah either through Afghan trade agent at Peshawar, whose non-official status you have constantly emphasised, or through caretaker, whose status and qualifications seem totally inadequate, does not appeal to me. I take no exception, however, to limited action reported in your telegram of the 10th instant, No. 1923 S, and I infer that you consider no further action is considered necessary. If so, I should prefer that it should take the form of a semi-official inspired article in Indian press.

[N 2880/1/97]

No. 142.

Government of India to India Office.

(No. 1987 S.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

June 17, 1929.

MY telegram No. 1949 S.

On the whole we incline to think that reply on the following lines should be wirelessly by our Foreign Secretary to Kabul Foreign Minister:—

"I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram No. 107 dated 9th June, and to express regret that it is not possible to comply with your request at present as, apart from other difficulties, it would be against the declared policy of His Majesty's Government to reinstate their Legation in Kabul until the establishment of a Central Government accepted throughout Afghanistan."

Do you approve?

[N 2943/1/97]

No. 143.

Government of India to India Office.

(No. 2031 S.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

June 22, 1929.

AMANULLAH and party sailed to-day on the "Multan" Major Fraser, late military attaché, Kabul, who happened to be travelling by the mail, has been entrusted with duties of memander.

[N 3015/1/97]

No. 144.

India Office to Government of India.

(No. 2027.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, June 26, 1929.

YOUR telegram of the 17th instant, No. 1987 S.

Reply to Ataulhaq. Subject to suggestion that, in order to be less committal, word "generally" might be inserted before "accepted throughout Afghanistan," and that "their Legation" should read "the British Legation," His Majesty's Government approve channel and language proposed.